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This Article addresses the appropriate reach of the U.S.
mandatory securities disclosure regime. While disclosure
obligations are imposed on issuers, they are triggered by
transactions:- the public offering of, or public trading in, the issuers'
shares. Share transactions are taking o n an increasingly
transnational character. The barriers to a truly global market for
equities continue to lessen: financial information is becoming
increasingly globalized and it is becoming increasingly inexpensive
and easy to effect share transactions abroad.1 There are
1. For a detailed discussion of the trend toward a global market for the securities of
significant issuers, see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who
Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2498 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Disclosure .in a
Globalizing Market].
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approximately 41,0002.issuers of publicly traded shares in the world.
For an ever larger portion of these issuers, there will be significant
numbers of transactions in their shares that have at least one U.S.
dimension - the investor will be a U.S. resident, the transaction
will occur in the United States, or the issuer itself will be from the
United States - thereby generating some kind of claim for the
United States to apply its disclosure regime. On which of these
issuers is it in fact in the enlightened best interest of the United
States to do so?
In a previous article in this Review, I addressed the question of
what apportionment of regulatory authority among the countries of
the world would most enhance global economic welfare.3 The
concern here is with the practical choices faced by U.S. officials as
to the reach of their particular country's regime. Building on the
earlier article, this piece thus extends the inquiry by examining the
legal and political environment in which these officials operate and
the impact of their decisions on U.S. economic welfare.4
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has
traditionally taken the position that the reach of the U.S. disclosure
regime should be set so as to protect U.S. resident investors from
making damaging securities choices due to poor information.s This
has been the position of most academic commentators as well.6 The
goal of "investor protection" leads directly to the principle that the
only transactions associated with an issuer that should trigger
2. According to the International Fmance Corporation's annual survey of world stock
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1995 was 36,572. See
INTERNATIONAL FIN. CoRP., EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FAcrnOOK 1998, at 23 (1998).
3. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1.
4. This Article's focus on U.S. economic welfare does not mean that I believe as a general
matter that U.S. practices with effects abroad should be judged solely by their impact on the
United States. Rather, it reflects the fact that the U.S. officials making decisions concerning
the reach of the U.S. regime will be primarily concerned with U.S., not global, welfare. It
also reflects the fact that the impact of their choices on U.S. welfare is an important
component in determining the legal constraints under which these officials operate. See infra
Part II. In any event, as it turns out, there is no real conflict here. A comparison of the
recommendations of this and the earlier article shows that the U.S. approach to statutory
reach that most enhances U.S. welfare most enhances global welfare as well. And this is true
whether or not other countries adopt similar practices.
5. See infra section I.A.1.
6. See, e.g., James J. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC
Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 119
(1996); J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities Laws: The
Impact of International Regulatory Competition, 1 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEG AL Sroo. 431
(1994). Richard Breeden, a former Chairman of the SEC, takes a similar position. See
Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of Economic
Transformation, 11 FORDHAM INTL. LJ. 77, 90 (1994) (symposium).
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imposition of U.S. disclosure regulation are those involving U.S.
investors.7
In 1988, the SEC, in proposing its subsequently adopted
Regulation S, articulated a different, capital market protection goal
for the U.S. approach to statutory reach.8 The new goal still seeks
to protect certain investors from being poorly informed, but
reformulates the class of persons protected to include all investors,
wherever resident, but only if they purchase in the U.S. market.
This change in articulated goal suggests that the place where
transactions in an issuer's shares occur should be the exclusive
consideration in deciding whether to apply the U.S. regime. The
United States should impose its regime on all issuers where a
significant number of transactions in their shares are effected in the
United States and on no other issuers. The nationality of the issuer
and that of the buyers of its shares should be irrelevant.9
A third possible goal for the U.S. approach to statutory reach
would be to maximize, to the extent cost effective, the benefits
enjoyed by U.S. residents from disclosure's capital allocation
improvement and managerial agency cost reduction effects.10 The
7. In actual practice, the United States puts some weight as well on the nationality of the
issuer and the location of the potentially triggering transactions. See infra Part I. Inclusion
of these additional factors, however, is presumably justified by the idea that they serve as
proxies for the nationality of buyers, information about which is hard to acquire. Tue fact
that transactions in an issuer's shares occur in the United States or that the issuer is from the
United States increases the likelihood that the buyers are in fact U.S. residents.
8. See Securities Act Release No. 6779, 41 SEC Docket (CCH), at 126, 132 (June 10,
1988) [hereinafter lNrrrAL PROPOSING RELEASE]; infra section I.A.2.
9. Transaction location has always played a role in determining the reach of the regime.
See infra sections I.A.1 and I.B. While the SEC has not yet moved actual U.S. practice
significantly toward exclusive reliance on this approach, see infra sections I.A.2, I.B.l, I.C,
the mere articulation of the capital market protection goal puts such exclusive reliance on the
agenda for discussion and raises the possibility the SEC will make this move in the future.
Professors Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman have, for example, recently endorsed just
such exclusive reliance on the transaction location approach. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew
T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality ofAmerican Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INTL. L.
& Bus. 207, 221-23 (1996) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality];
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a
Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1894 (1997) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman,

National Laws].
10. There has been a growing recognition over the last fifteen years of the importance of

economic efficiency as a goal for disclosure regulation. Professor Coffee, for example, states:
"This focus on fairness, rather than efficiency, is not surprising because proponents of a
mandatory disclosure system have historically stressed the former over the latter.
Nonetheless, the strongest arguments for a mandatory disclosure system may be efficiency
based." John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 751 (1984). See also Steven A. Ross, Disclosure

Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modem Finance Theory and Signaling
Theory, in IssUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 191 (Franklin Edwards ed., 1979). Tue
growing importance of efficiency is also illustrated by the recent enactment of Tue National
Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (to be
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concern under this goal is the capacity of issuer disclosure to aid in
the functioning of the real economy in the United States, i.e., in the
production of goods and services. This goal, we will see, implies
that U.S. practice should be changed so that we impose the U.S.
regime only on issuers of U.S. nationality, but do so wherever
transactions in the issuer's shares are effected and whatever the
nationality of the buyers. The nationality of an issuer would be
determined by where the issuer has its center of gravity as a firm.1 1
I conclude that this third goal - capital allocation improvement
and managerial agency cost reduction - is the only viable goal for
disclosure regulation in a world with a global market for securities.
I thus recommend that the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime be
determined by the nationality of the issuer.12 I come to this
conclusion by using the tools of financial economics to trace out the
ultimate effects in different countries of the disclosure behavior of
transnational issuers. The pattern of effects revealed by this
exercise shows that the issuer nationality approach most enhances
U.S. economic welfare. Because the adherents of the investor
residency and transaction location approaches have not traced out
the ultimate effects in this fashion, they have failed to appreciate
the superiority of the issuer nationality approach.13
Two examples help show how this recommended change in
approach would fundamentally alter current practices. The United
codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), which amended the Securities Act of
1933 to add Section 2(b) providing that:
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
15 U.S.C.A. § 77b (b) (emphasis added). The 1996 Act made an essentially identical amend
ment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the addition of Section 3(f). See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78c(f).
11. Important factors would include where the entrepreneurs who formed the enterprise
reside, where the current headquarters is located, and where the bulk of its operations are
now conducted. Nationality would not be determined by jurisdiction of incorporation or
where the issuer's shareholders reside.
12. For a less theoretical article that takes a position close to the issuer nationality
approach that I advocate here, see Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S.
Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413 (1995). Some
economists have favored such an approach also. See, e.g., Franklin R. Edwards, Listing
Foreign Securities on U.S. Exchanges, 5 J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 28 (1993).
13. See supra note 6. These authors, of course, may have conceived of their projects as
the development of principles of statutory reach within what they interpret as the bounds
imposed by existing statutory language and judicial and administrative precedent. While I
believe that the issuer nationality approach recommended here does fit within these bounds,
particularly after the recent enactment of the National Securities Market Improvement Act
of 1996, see infra note 58, I am, as noted, addressing a different question in this article, to wit:
what approach to statutory reach will maximize U.S. economic welfare? The answer to this
question is important whether or not its adoption would require legislative change.
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States, unlike today, would apply the mandatory disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 even to a U.S. corporation that goes public
abroad through an offering in the Euroequity market and that
imposes restrictions on the offering designed to deter its "flowback"
into the United States. The United States, also unlike today, would
not apply these requirements to an established French public issuer
conducting a share offering in the United States to U.S. residents as
long as the issuer provides, pursuant to the French regime, the same
disclosure as it would have if it had made a purely domestic public
offering in France.
One other alternative should be noted at the outset. If the U.S.
disclosure regime were made voluntary, the problem of defining its
reach would disappear.14 A few legal scholars, such as Professors
Roberta Romano, Stephen Choi, and Andrew Guzman, suggest just
such a change, in reaction, in part, to the increasing need to define
the reach of the existing mandatory regime. Under their proposals,
every issuer, whether U.S. or foreign, could choose whether to
subject itself to the disclosure obligations of the U.S. regime or the
regime of one of the fifty states or some other country.15 Whether
it is desirable to make the U.S. regime voluntary, however, rests
largely on considerations that are equally present with or without
globalization. It is thus separate from the question addressed in this
article: What is the appropriate reach of a mandatory disclosure
system if we do have one? As a practical matter, since we are likely
to continue to have a mandatory disclosure system for the
14. The underlying issues behind statutory reach do not entirely disappear, however.
Elimination of U.S.mandatory disclosure statutes would represent U.S.policy that issuers
should not be required to provide disclosure. U.S.officials and courts might still need to take
a position as to which of the world's issuers this policy applies. The need to take such a
position could arise as a result of a request made to such an official or court asking it to take
some action that would assist in the enforcement of the disclosure regime of another country.
Alternatively, it could arise from U.S. officials needing to decide whether affirmatively to
take action to dissuade a foreign country from applying the foreign country's regime to a
particular issuer or group of issuers.
15. See, e.g, Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). Professors Choi and Guzman also suggest such a
reform, which they refer to as "portable reciprocity," as a more far reaching alternative to
their proposed switch to exclusive reliance on the transaction location approach. See
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International
Reach ofSecurities Regulation, S.CAL.L. RE.v. (forthcoming 1998); see also Choi & Guzman,
Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 231-32. I have written elsewhere an extensive
critique of the scholarly principles for issuer choice. See Merritt B. Fox, Empowering Issuers
to Choose Their Own Securities Regimes: A Mistaken Reform (Apr.9, 1998) (unpublished
paper presented at the University of Michigan Law and Economics Workshop, on file with
author) [hereinafter Fox, Empowering Issuers].
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foreseeable future, this question needs to be answered regardless of
the other debate.16
This paper has seven Parts. Parts I and II look at the formal
legal landscape. Part I reviews existing U.S. practice. Part II
reviews the extent to which the SEC, the courts, and Congress are
constrained by law in changing this existing practice and thus gives
a sense of the scope of the reforms necessary to implement the
change to the issuer nationality approach recommended here.
Parts III, IV, and V assess the effects on U.S. economic welfare
of adopting the issuer nationality approach compared with adopting
either of the other two approaches or a uniform international
disclosure regime.

Part III shows why the issuer nationality

approach discriminates more precisely than the investor residency
approach between those of the world's issuers whose disclosure
behavior primarily affects the welfare of U.S. residents and those
whose disclosure behavior primarily affects other countries. When
a country's issuers disclose at an appropriate level, the disclosure
can, through its positive effects on managerial motivation and the
choice of real investment projects, increase the returns generated
by capital-utilizing productive activity in that country. The
beneficiaries of these increased returns are the country's
entrepreneurial talent and labor, not the issuers' investors. Because
of capital's greater mobility internationally, competitive forces push
capital toward receiving a single global expected rate of return
(adjusted for risk) regardless of the disclosure practices of the
particular issuers involved. The United States thus has a strong
interest in the disclosure behavior of all U.S. issuers, even those
whose shares are sold to or traded among foreigners, but not in that
of any foreign issuers, even those that are sold to or traded among
U.S. residents.
Part IV shows that if issuers have a choice of disclosure regimes,

they have a preference for picking one requiring less disclosure
than is socially optimal. The transaction location approach gives
issuers the capacity to determine which regime governs them. Thus
it hurts U.S. economic welfare by permitting U.S. issuers to disclose
at a lower than optimal level.

It also reduces the volume of

16. This Article ultimately does touch upon issues that go to the desirability of a
voluntary regime because the choice of approach to statutory reach determines whether
regulatory competition will develop between the United States and other countries. Such
competition is likely to lower U.S. requirements. One who believes that a mandatory U.S.
regime is undesirable, but who is faced with its continued existence, is thus likely to favor an
approach to statutory reach that would promote such competition. These issues are explored
infra in Parts VI and VII.
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transactions effected in the United States because the relative
strictness of the U.S. regime scares issuers away. Part V shows why,
in terms of U.S. welfare, the disclosure level required by any
achievable uniform international regime would be inferior to that
required by the U.S. regime.
Parts ill-V assume that the choice of approach will not affect
the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime. Part VI relaxes
this assumption. It shows that under the investor residency and
transaction location approaches, the increasing globalization of the
market for securities would lead to increased political pressures to
lower the U.S. requirements, and that under the issuer nationality
approach, it would not.
Part VII shows how these increased pressures are likely to result
in the U.S. regime requiring too little disclosure.

Some

commentators believe that such regulatory competition would be
helpful. Their arguments are found unpersuasive, however, in part
because they do not account for the preference of issuers for
disclosing too little. Thus the conclusion of Parts III-V that U.S.
economic welfare would be enhanced by a switch to the issuer
nationality approach is strengthened, not weakened, by the fact that
such a switch would avoid these increased pressures to lower U.S.
requirements that globalization would otherwise bring.

I.

THE CuRRENT U.S. APPROACH TO STATUTORY REACH

Two basic components of U.S. securities law link transactions in
securities with regulations requiring issuers to disclose information
about themselves. First, certain sections of the Securities Act of
1933 (the "Securities Act") 17 regulate the primary market for secur

ities, imposing a set of disclosure obligations upon the offering and
sale by the issuer of a new block of securities. Second, certain sec
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934

(the "Exchange

Act") 18 regulate the secondary market for securities. Exchange Act
disclosure obligations are triggered by indices suggesting that al
ready issued securities of an issuer

will be frequently traded:

a list

ing of the issuer's securities on a securities exchange or the
existence of more than a given number of shareholders.

17. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1994).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811.
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Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Primary Market Transactions
1.

The SEC's Traditional Approach

Section 5 of the Securities Act by its terms prohibits the offer or
sale of any security by any person unless the security is registered
under the Act,19 which requires a complex process of disclosure.
Section

5

makes no distinctions between foreign offerees and do

mestic ones, nor between transactions occurring abroad and trans
actions occurring at home. Its application depends only on the use
at some point of an instrument of "interstate commerce" in connec
tion with the transaction.20 Given the global interconnectedness of
the financial industry today, use of such an instrument can be found
in connection with almost every public offering in the world, wher
ever conducted and at whomever aimed. The question is whether
Section 5 should be interpreted in some narrower fashion to limit
its reach.

5

a. A foreign issuer offering in the United States.

While Section

has not, in fact, been construed to cover all public offerings any

where in the world by any issuer that uses an instrument of inter
state commerce, the SEC has always interpreted Section

5

to cover

public offerings in the United States by foreign issuers.21 The tradi19. Section 3 of the Act exempts certain securities from this requirement. Section 4 of
the Act exempts certain transactions from this requirement including most secondary
transactions.
20. Interstate commerce is broadly defined under Section 2(7) to include "trade or com
merce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the sev
eral States . ..or between any foreign country and any State... . " 15 U. S.C. § 77b{7).
21. Traditionally, foreign issuers wishing to publicly offer securities in the United States
were required to register them on the same Form S-1 that was required of all domestic issuers
not qualifying for one of the SEC's abridged forms. It was possible for potential issuers to
obtain variations in the required accounting practices, but only through case by case negotia
tions with the SEC staff. See HAROLD BLOOMENTHAL, 1980 SECURITIES HANDBOOK 354-57
(1980). In 1982, the SEC, in an extension of the integrated disclosure system, adopted three
registration forms exclusively for foreign issuers: Forms F-1, F-2, and F-3. See Securities Act
Release No. 6437, SEC Docket ( C CH), at 964 (Nov. 19, 1982) [hereinafter Release No.
6437]. These new forms make a number of concessions to foreign issuers. They need not
disclose as much information about their various lines of business, their management remu
neration (which can be reported in aggregate rather than individually), and material transac
tions into which they have entered. They also may prepare their financial statements in
accordance with home-country generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) as long as
they discuss material variances from U. S. GAAP and reconcile net income as determined
under the two methods. See JAMES A. FANTo & ROBERTA S. KARMEL, A REPORT ON THE
ATTITUDES oF FOREIGN COMPANIES REGARDING A U. S. LISTING 9, 13 (NYSE Working Pa
per No. 97-101, 1997); Linda C. Quinn, Internationalization of the Securities Markets, in IN
TERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS: BUSINESS EXPERIENCE ANO
REGULATORY POLICY 1, 21-27 {A.L.I. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Quinn, BUSINESS EXPERIENCE] .

In 1985 the Securities Exchange Commission issued a concept release entitled "Facilita
tion of Multi-National Securities Offerings" in which it first began to consider multi
jurisdictional disclosure, whereby a foreign issuer would be permitted to engage in a public
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tional position of the SEC has been that the registration require
ments of Section 5 are primarily intended to protect United States
investors,22 and a large portion of the purchasers of any public of
fering made in the United States would obviously be U.S. investors.
The SEC's only concern has been - given the public interest in
attracting foreign issuers to make public offerings in the United
States market - how much,

if any,

it should relax the ordinary dis

closure standards applicable to domestic issuers because of the spe
cial hardships these ordinary standards create for foreign issuers.23

b. A U.S. issuer offering abroad. The public offering abroad
of newly issued securities by a United States issuer presents the
converse of the transaction discussed above. The traditional inves
tor protection rationale thus suggests that the United States disclo
sure regime should not be applied even

if

an instrumentality of

interstate commerce has been used. This, in fact, has been the posi
tion of the SEC for over thirty years. Its policy has been not to take
action against U.S. issuers for failure to register securities that have
been distributed abroad to foreign nationals if the distribution is

effected in a manner that will result in the securities coming to rest
abroad.24

offering of its securities in the United States based on its home-country registration {with
certain supplements, perhaps). See Securities Act Release No.6568, 32 SEC Docket (CCH),
at 707 (Feb.28, 1985) [hereinafter Release No.6568]; see also Linda C.Quinn, International
ization of the Securities Markets, 743 PLI/CoRP17, 29 (1991) [hereinafter Quinn, Internation
alization]. The release requested public co=ent on ways the SEC could facilitate
multinational security offerings and streamline both the securities distribution systems and
prospectus disclosure standards of the United States and other countries. See Release No.
6568, supra. The SEC then' utilized that public co=ent to formulate a proposal creating an
initial multi-jurisdictional disclosure system between the United States and the Canadian
provinces of Ontario and Quebec. See Securities Act Release No. 6841, 44 SEC Docket
(CCH), at 56-57 (July 24, 1989); Quinn, Internationalization, supra. Thus the United States in
essence adopted the issuer nationality approach with respect to issuers from these two prov
inces. The SEC amended that system on October 10, 1990. See Securities Act Release No.
33-6879, 47 SEC Docket (CCH), at 526-27 (Oct.22, 1990); Quinn, Internationalization, supra,
at 34. In the succeeding eight years, however, no other foreign jurisdiction has qualified for
such special treatment. See Securities Act Release No.6902, 49 SEC Docket (CCH), at 260
(June 21, 1991); Securities Act Release No.6902A, 51 SEC Docket (CCH), at 66 (Mar.23,
1992) [hereinafter Release No.6902A]; International Securities Markets, 961 PRAcr.L.INST.
77, 96-97 (1996).
22. See Securities Act Release No.4708, Fed. Sec.L.Rep.(CCH) 'l[ 1361, at 1362 (July 9,
1964) [hereinafter Release No.4708].
23. See Release No.6437, supra note 21; Fanto, supra note 6; see also supra note 21.
24. The Commission's rationale is as follows:
[T]he Commission has traditionally taken the position that the registration requirements
of Section 5 of the Act are primarily intended to protect American investors ... [I]t is
i=aterial whether the offering originates from within or outside of the United States,
whether domestic or foreign broker-dealers are involved and whether the actual
mechanics of the distribution are effected within the United States.
.
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2. Regulation S
In 1988,

the SEC issued a release first proposing its subse

quently adopted Regulation S rules concerning Securities Act regis
tration exemptions for offers and sales abroad. In this release, the
SEC articulated a shift in goal concerning the appropriate reach of
the entire U.S. disclosure regime. The Commission states:

[T]he registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. capital
markets and all investors purchasing in the U.S. market, whether U.S.
or foreign nationals. Principles of comity and reasonable expectations
of participants in the global markets justify reliance on laws applicable
in jurisdictions outside the United States to define disclosure require
ments for transactions effected offshore. As investors choose their
markets, they would choose the disclosure requirements applicable to
such markets.25
Thus concern with where the transaction is effected, which in the
past had been simply a proxy for the likely residency of the person
buying the security, becomes an end in itself.
How far the SEC

will

go in carrying out this articulated change

in goal, however, is not clear. So far, there has not been a major
change in practice. The SEC's immediate impetus for proposing
Regulation S - its desire to lay out clearer, more coherent stan
dards for exempting both U.S. and foreign issuers when they make
public offerings arguably only to the public abroad - was much
narrower than the fundamental shift in rationale suggested by the
release. Reflecting this, the rules actually adopted do not provide a
wholesale

exemption

for

every

transaction

effected

abroad.

Rather, the focus is on two concerns. The first is preventing di
rected selling efforts in the United States of unregistered shares
nominally only offered abroad.

The second is preventing the

"flowback" into the United States of unregistered shares initially
sold abroad, particularly where the issuer is also not providing peri
odic disclosure under the U.S. regime.26
Release No. 4708, supra note 22, at 1362 (emphasis added). The SEC mentions offerings
directed toward United States servicemen abroad and, because of their close connection with
United States exchanges, offerings through the facilities of Canadian stock exchanges as ones
not free from the registration requirements. See John H. Ehrlich, Comment, International
ization ofStock Markets: Potential Problems for United States Shareholders, 7 Nw. J. INTL. L.
& Bus. 532, 540 (1986).
25. INmAL PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at 89,128.
26. Regulation S was proposed by the SEC in June 1988. See INmAL PROPOSING RE
LEASE, supra note 8. It was reproposed in 1989. See Securities Act Release No. 6838, (1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ( C CH) 'll 84, at 426 (July 11, 1989), 43 SEC Docket
( C CH), at 2008 (1989) (hereinafter REG S REPROPOSING RELEASE]. The Commission
adopted Regulation S on April 24, 1990. See Securities Act Release No. 6863, (1989-90
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ( C CH) 'll 84, at 524, 46 SEC Docket ( C CH), at 52 {Apr.
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The Regulation S rules cover both U.S. issuers and foreign issu
ers. Rule 901 provides for an exemption from the Section S regis
tration process for "offers and sales that occur outside the United
States."27 Rule 903, a safe harbor, deems offers and sales by issu
ers, underwriters, and dealers meeting certain stated requirements
to be ones occurring "outside the United States."28 To qualify for
this safe harbor exemption, the offer must be made only to persons
outside the United States,29 it must be reasonably believed that the
purchasers are outside the United States when they place their or
ders,30 and there must be no directed selling efforts in the United
States.31 Qualification may also require meeting additional condi
tions designed to discourage flowback to the United States. The
need to meet these additional conditions and their severity depends
on factors suggesting the likelihood of such flowback and the extent

of its damage if it does occur. Such factors include the nationality
of the issuer, the nature of the security, whether the issuer's cur

rently outstanding securities trade in the United States, . and
whether the issuer currently provides periodic disclosure under the
Exchange Act.32
a.

U.S. issuers.

Under Regulation S, a U.S. issuer that scru

pulously offers its shares only to persons residing abroad and lists
the shares only on a foreign stock exchange will ultimately still have
difficulty avoiding compliance with U.S. disclosure requirements.
This is true even though purchasers of its shares, both primary and
secondary, would have chosen to acquire their shares in a market
24, 1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1998)) [hereinafter

REG S ADOPTING

RELEASE] .

For an overall description and analysis of Regulation S, see RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET
AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 519-21, 1594-612 (7th ed. 1992);
Louis Loss & JoEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 792 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996);
Don Berger, Offshore Distribution ofSecurities: The Impact of Regulation S, 3 TRANSNATL.

LAW. 575 (1990); John Regis Coogan & Thomas C. Kimbrough, Regulation S Safe Harbors
for Offshore Offers, Sales and Resales, 4 INsrmrrs (P-H) 3 (No. 8, Aug. 1990); Samuel Wolff,
Offshore Distributions Under the Securities Act of1993: An Analysis of Regulation S, 23 L. &
POLY. INTL. Bus. 101 (1991-92).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 230.901.
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903.
29. See SEC Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a); 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(i)(l)(i).
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(a); 17 C.F.R. § 902(i)(l)(ii).
31. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903(b).
32. See 17 C .F.R. § 230.903(c). Where factors suggest that the likelihood of flowback is
significant, an issuer that currently provides periodic disclosure under the Exchange Act does
not need to impose as severe measures to prevent flowback as one that does not provide such
disclosure. Compare Rule 903(c)(2) and Rule 903(c)(3). The theory is that in the case of the
issuer currently providing Exchange Act periodic disclosure, any flowback that does occur
causes less damage.
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outside the United States and hence, according to the newly articu
lated goal of mai:ket protection, have chosen foreign disclosure re
quirements as well. For such an issuer, the conditions imposed to
prevent flowback to the United States would make it difficult or
impossible to construct a practical scheme to market its shares
abroad. And even

if the

issuer succeeded at that, its victory would

likely be Pyrrhic: soon after, it would probably have to provide the
same information under the
requirements.33

b.

Foreign issuers.

1 934

Act periodic disclosure

A foreign issuer that offers its securities

only to persons residing abroad is likely to avoid the need to com
ply witJ;i U.S. disclosure requirements. To start, the foreign issuer

will find it easier to qualify for an exemption under Regulation S
from disclosure at the time of offering. The only tricky question
here is whether it will be considered to have engaged in a directed
selling effort in the United States if it creates publicity abroad that
ends up reaching not only investors abroad, but investors in the
33. Consider first a privately held issuer whose operations and management are predomi
nantly in the United States and whose initial shareholders are primarily U.S. residents. It
decides to go public only abroad. Even if the issuer is incorporated (or reincorporated)
abroad, such an issuer would not qualify as a "foreign issuer" under Regulation S Rule 902{f)
because, at the time of the offering, more than 50% of its shares would be U.S. held and it
would have a U.S. economic center of gravity. Thus the only safe harbor from new issue
registration for which the issuer could qualify would be Rule 903(c)(3), which imposes the
most severe conditions to prevent flowback to the United States. See supra note 32. Under
Rule 903(c)(3), the offering must be constructed in such a way that the purchasers are non
U.S. residents who for a year agree to resell only to other non-U.S. residents who themselves
agree to similar restrictions. This prevents the shares for a year from being listed to trade in
an ordinary fashion even on a foreign stock exchange. Because of the consequent reduction
in liquidity, these conditions greatly reduce the marketability of the shares. Moreover, even
if this previously privately held issuer were able and willing to market its securities to the
non-U.S. public under these difficult circumstances, it would still not escape for long the U.S.
regime's periodic disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act, unless the offering re
sulted in a majority of its shares being held by non-U.S. residents. See infra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text (discussing periodic disclosure).
Now consider an issuer with the same U.S. connections that is already publicly traded in
the United States. It would already be providing Exchange Act periodic disclosure. Because
of this, it could qualify for the Rule 903(c)(2) safe harbor. The conditions designed to dis
courage fiowback under Rule 903(c)(2) would not create the same roadblocks to the shares
being traded on a foreign exchange immediately after the offering. But ultimately the al
ready publicly traded U.S. issuer would find it even harder than the previously privately held
one to avoid continued imposition of the Exchange Act periodic disclosure requirements.
This would be so even if the offering were so large that it led to a majority of the issuers'
shares being held by non-U.S. residents. There are only two exemptions from 1934 Act peri
odic disclosure based on an issuer's foreign aspects: Rule 12g3-2(a) and Rule 12g3-2(b). See
infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Neither is likely to be available to the issuer con
sidered here. A Rule 12g3-2(a) exemption would be unavailable since the issuer would still
presumably have more than 300 U.S. resident shareholders. A Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption
would be unavailable because of Rule 12g3-2(d)(l), which denies the exemption to issuers
whose shares are already Exchange Act registered.
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United States - something happening with ever greater frequency
as the financial media become increasingly intemational.34 As long
as it avoids this problem, a foreign issuer that does not have any
securities currently publicly traded in the United States can engage
in a public offering abroad and qualify for an exemption under Reg
ulation S from Securities Act disclosure without having to meet any
additional conditions designed to prevent flowback.35 And, as dis
cussed below, the issuer will also not likely be subsequently re
quired to provide Exchange Act periodic disclosure as long as it
does not subsequently list its shares on a U.S. stock exchange or
NASDAQ.
Thus, the U.S. practice with respect to foreign issuers conforms
much more closely to the SEC's market protection goal. When pur
chasers, including U.S. purchasers, decide to acquire the shares of a
foreign issuer offered or traded only abroad, the purchasers, in their
34. For offers and sales to be within the "safe harbor" provisions of Rule 903 that deem
them as "occur[ring] outside the United States," there must be inter alia, "no directed selling
efforts . . . made in the United States." Rule 903(b). "Directed selling efforts" are in tum
defined in Rule 902(b)(l) as "any activity undertaken for the purpose of, or that could rea
sonably be expected to have the effect of, conditioning the market in the United States for any
of the securities being offered" (emphasis added). "Conditioning" is a term of art with re
gard to Section 5. The SEC has stated that
[T]he publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts, generally, made
in advance of a proposed financing, although not couched in terms of an express offer,
may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the
issuer . . . in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in fact
part of the selling effort.
Securities Act Release No. 3844, 17 Fed. Reg., at 835 (Oct. 4, 1957). The SEC gave as an
example of such conditioning a speech by an executive of a prospective issuer before a securi
ties analysts meeting in which projections of sales and profits were provided. See id. In a
subsequent enforcement decision, the SEC found a press release provided to the New York
press by an underwriter concerning the future operations of a prospective issuer to be an
"offer" in violation of Section S(a) by both the underwriter and the issuer, stating that it "is
equally applicable whether or not the issuer or the surrounding circumstances have . . . news
value." Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959).
The SEC, in its statements concerning the impact of news conferences on the availability
of a Regulation S exemption, has indicated, however, that it may not be as strict in its inter
pretation of the term "conditioning" here as it has been in the purely domestic context. In
Preliminary Note 7, it states that nothing in the Regulation "precludes access by journalists
for publications with a general circulation in the United States to offshore press conferences,
press releases and meetings with company press spokespersons . . . provided that the infor
mation . . . is not intended to induce purchases of securities by persons in the United States"
(emphasis added). The text of the initial release proposing Regulation used similar language,
but makes clear that, at least at that earlier point, the SEC remarks concerned only corporate
news of foreign issuers. See lNrrrAL PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at 'll 89,132.
The SEC recently adopted a safe harbor relating to this question under a new Securities
Act Rule 135e. See Securities Act Release No. 33-7470, 65 SEC Docket (CCH), at 1543
(Oct. 10, 1997). The Rule provides that for foreign issuers, the invitation to a U.S. journalist
to participate in an off-shore press activity in connection with an offering does not generally
constitute a "directed selling effort" under Regulation S.
35.

See

17 C.F.R. § 230.903(c)(l).
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decision to acquire shares in a market outside the United States, are
in fact choosing foreign disclosure requirements as well.
B.

Issuer Disclosure Triggered by Secondary Market Transactions
Issuers, both U.S. and foreign, can also become subject to the

U.S. disclosure regime pursuant to the Exchange Act's periodic dis
closure requirements. This is true whether or not they have ever

engaged in a public offering registered under Section 5 of the Secur
ities Act.36 The United States, in determining the transnational
reach of these requirements, again puts some weight on each of the
three national dimensions of trades in an issuer's shares: investor
residency, issuer nationality, and the place of the transaction. Con
sistent with the traditional investor protection approach, however,
issuer nationality and the place of the transaction appear to be
taken into account largely because they serve as proxies of the like
l ihood that a significant number of U.S. investors are trading in the
issuer's stock. While the articulated goal of market protection set
forth in the SEC Release originally proposing Regulation S appears
at least as applicable to periodic disclosure as to new issue disclo
sure, the SEC has not attempted any maj or reworking, akin to Reg
ulation S, of the rules governing the reach of the periodic disclosure
requirements.
1.

Foreign Issuers

Foreign and U.S. issuers alike that wish their securities to be
listed on a U.S. stock exchange, need, pursuant to Exchange Act
Section 12(a), to register these securities with the SEC and thereby
36. Sections 12(b) and 12(g) of the Exchange Act set forth requirements for the registra
tion of the securities of certain issuers. Exchange Act Section 13(a) requires issuers regis
tered under Section 12 to file, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the
SEC, annual reports and current information that follow up on the original Section 12 regis
tration application or statement. An issuer that has engaged in an offering registered under
Section 5 of the Securities Act must, pursuant to Exchange Act Section 15(d), provide on a
continuing basis the same annual reports and current information.
Since the SEC's adoption of its integrated disclosure reforms in the early 1980s, the infor
mation concerning the issuer's management, operations, prospects, and financial status
sought under the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure requirements (Form 10-K for domestic
issuers and Form 20-F for foreign issuers) and under the Securities Act's new issue disclosure
requirements {Form S-1 for domestic issuers and Form F-1 for foreign issuers) is largely the
same. Tue Exchange Act forms and the Securities Act forms each incorporate by reference
the same items in Regulations S-K and S-X. Tue threat of private actions for damages is less
of a deterrent for violations of the Exchange Act's requirements, however. Because the Ex
change Act has no equivalent to the Securities Act Sections 11 and 12, such a violation is
much less likely to lead to substantial private damages awards being imposed against the
issuer or persons such as underwriters or directors contractually related to the issuer. For a
more extensive review of this subject, see Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Dis
closure, and Undenvriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REv. 1005 (1984).
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automatically become subject to the Exchange Act's periodic dis
closure regime.37
The rules for publicly traded foreign issuers not wishing their
shares to be listed on a U.S. exchange are more complicated. Ex
change Act Section 12(g)(1) requires any issuer having assets of
more than $10 million and a class of equity securities held of record
by 500 or more persons to register such securities under the Act.38
The statute makes no distinction between domestic and foreign in
terms of the issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation, the residency of
its shareholders, the location of its assets, or the place where its
shares are primarily traded.39 The SEC has, however, pursuant to
its rule-making power, exempted from these requirements any is
suer that has certain specified foreign characteristics40 and that (i)
has no class of equity with more than 300 holders resident in the
United States,41 or (ii) furnishes the SEC with the disclosure infor
mation required by its home country's regime (this second basis not
being available for issuers first listed on NASDAQ after October
1983).42 Thus, the SEC imposes the U.S. disclosure regime on for37. Section 12(a) prohibits any member, broker, or dealer from effecting on a national
securities exchange any transaction in "any security" not registered on such an exchange in
accordance with the provisions of the Exchange Act.
38. More specifically, Section 12(g)(l) requires every issuer that is engaged in interstate
commerce or whose securities are traded by use of any means of interstate commerce, and
that has total assets exceeding $1 million and a class of equity security held of record by 750
or more shareholders, to register such securities with the SEC, whereby the issuer provides
information comparable to that required by a Section 12(b) registration. Rule 12g-3, how
ever, exempts from these requirements issuers with less than $10 million in total assets.
39. Tue text of subsection 12(g) as a whole, which was added by amendment to Section 12
in 1964, clearly suggests that 12(g)(l) is to apply to foreign issuers as well as domestic ones
because there is an explicit provision in 12(g)(3) for the SEC by rule or regulation to exempt
any security of a foreign issuer. This interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history of
the amendment. See H.R.REP. No.88-1418, at 11 (1964).
40. To qualify, the issuer must be a "foreign private issuer," as that is defined under
Exchange Act Rule 3(b)-4. This requires the issuer to be organized under the laws of a
foreign country and, if its operations are sufficiently connected with the United States, to
have no more than 50% of its voting securities held by U.S.residents.
41. See Rule 12g3-2(a).
42. See Rule 12g3-2(b). The SEC in 1983 amended the Rule to eliminate the availability
of the 12g3-2(b) exemption for all foreign issuers quoted on the automated quotation system
of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NA SDAQ") unless the issuer was already
quoted on NA SDAQ prior to the date of the amendment and was and continues to be in
compliance with the requirements of the exemption. The reasoning behind eliminating the
exemption was that "trading on NA SDAQ is substantially the same as trading on an ex
change and therefore the information available . . . should be essentially the same.. . ."
Exchange Act Release No.20264, 48 Fed.Reg. 46,736 (Oct.6, 1983) [hereinafter Release No.
20264). Tue "grandfathering" of what for the foreseeable future was the vast bulk of
NA SDAQ-quoted foreign issuers is inconsistent with that reasoning. Tue stated fear of the
SEC, however, was the possibility that without grandfathering, a large number of NA SDAQ
quoted foreign issuers, in order to avoid registration, would withdraw from NA SDAQ, which
would injure United States investors who purchased their securities when they were still
quoted. See Release No.20264, supra, at 46,737.

714

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:696

eign issuers wishing to commence listing of their securities on a na
tional securities exchange or NASDAQ. For all others, it in essence
accepts as adequate the disclosure regime of their home countries.43
Foreign issuers that do end up subject to the Exchange Act's
disclosure regime are permitted under the applicable Form 20-F to
provide somewhat less information than are U.S. issuers on matters
such as the results of their separate lines of business, management
compensation, and material transactions. They are also allowed to
prepare their accounting statements based on home country gener
ally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) with less reconciliation
to U.S. GAAP than is required of foreign issuers registering under
the Securities Act to issue new equity.44
2.

U.S. Issuers

For the typical U.S. issuer with shares that are traded or held
abroad, domestic trading or holdings in the United States are by
themselves sufficient to trigger imposition of the Exchange Act pe
riodic disclosure regime. Thus, the question of whether the foreign
trading and holdings would by themselves be sufficient to trigger
the regime need not be faced. The question cannot be avoided,
however, where, perhaps in an attempt to avoid United States disThe same amendment also eliminated, with a two-year phase in, the availability of the
exemption for all Canadian issuers regardless of previous status. The fact that the SEC de
cided not to grandfather Canadian issuers undermines its rationale for grandfathering issuers
of all other foreign countries. The two-year grace period that the SEC granted Canadian
issuers appears to have been a reasonably effective alternative method of protecting U.S.
investors from being hurt by issuer withdrawal from NASDAQ since it provided a period of
continued liquidity in U.S. markets during which those investors who needed such liquidity
could sell to investors who did not - those better positioned to trade in foreign markets.
Thus the fact that the SEC chose the grandfathering rather than the grace period approach
for non-Canadian foreign issuers suggests that it did not want to face the larger implications
of trying to impose its regime on the bulk of NASDAQ foreign issuers: the reduced opportu
nity for Americans to buy as well as sell these shares, the corresponding reduction in business
for U.S. brokers and dealers, and the diplomatic pressures from foreign governments.
43. This acceptance of the disclosure system of the issuer's domicile has been strongly
criticized by Professor Buxbaum. See Richard M. Buxbaum, Securities Regulation and the
Foreign Issuer Exemption: A Study in the Process of Accommodating Foreign Interests, 54
CORNELL L. REv. 358 {1969). Some co=entators have pointed out more recently that the
securities of many issues that qualify for the Rule 12g3-2(b) exemptions are traded within the
United States via "pink sheets." See HAL S. Scorr & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 50 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing J.
COCHRANE ET AL, FOREIGN EQUITIES AND U.S. INvEsTORS: BREAKING DOWN THE BARRI·
ERS AND SEPARATING SUPPLY AND DEMAND, 11-13 (NYSE Working Paper No. 95-04, 1995)).
Pink sheets are stock quotations published twice daily by the National Quotation Bureau that
include the names and telephone numbers of market makers. See id. In 1994, over 7,600
foreign securities, and 440 ADRs, traded through pink sheets. See id. These trades averaged
$136.2 million in daily dollar value. See id.
44. See Securities Act Release No. 6360, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,511 (Dec. 2, 1981) [hereinafter
Release No. 6360). See generally FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 9, 13-14.
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closure rules, a United States issuer with a majority of its assets and
management in this country chooses to become a public company
but to do so abroad, i.e., by engaging in no domestic public offer
ings and by facilitating the trading of its securities only abroad.45
Section 12(a) is not a problem for such an issuer since its regis
tration requirements would only be triggered by a listing of the is
suer's shares on a U.S. stock exchange.46 Section 12(g) would be a
problem, however. Wherever most of the issuer's shareholders re
side the simple fact that it has gone public is enough to trigger im
position of the regime, at least as long as it remains incorporated in
the United States.47 If the issuer reincorporates abroad, it might
45. Research reveals at least one previously nonpublic United States company, Interna
tional Signal and Control Group, that listed and offered its shares on the London Stock
Exchange in order to avoid United States disclosure. See Ehrlich, supra note 24, at 550.
46. A listing on a foreign stock exchange would not under Section 12(a) trigger a need for
such an issuer to register its securities, because Section 12(a) applies only to transactions on a
"national securities exchange." No foreign exchange is currently registered as a "national
securities exchange." See 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 21,310.10, at 15,705 (1989).
No foreign exchange would appear to be required to so register. Given the purposes of
the sections of the Exchange Act relating to the regnlation of "national securities exchanges"
and their legislative history, registration of a foreign exchange would appear to be outside the
contemplation of the regulatory scheme. Exchange Act Section 5 deals specifically with the
legality of trading on unregistered exchanges "within or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States" if that exchange is not otherwise exempted. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1994).
And while the legislative history dealing specifically with that phrase is sparse and uninform
ative, § 30(b) of the Exchange Act sheds some light on Congress's desire to keep the extra
territorial reach of the Exchange Act's regulation of the securities business to a minimum.
Section 30(b) provides that the Act "shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States . . . . " 15 U.S.C. § 78dd.
This clause suggests that Congress intended to distinguish between those exchanges located
within the United States and those exchanges located without.' See Douglas B. Spoors, Com
ment, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Regulations: Territorialism in the Wake of
the October 1987 Market Crash, 1 TRANSNATL. LAW. 307, 317 (1988).
The SEC's Division of Market Regulation, however, in response to a letter of inquiry
concerning proposed activities of a client, has suggested the possibility that a representative
in the United States of a foreign exchange that distributes quotes to subscribers in the United
States and receives and transmits orders for the purchase and sale of securities might have to
register as a national exchange under Section 6 of the Exchange Act. See Irving Marmer,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Market Regulation, ['72-'73 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 79,283, at 82,810 (1973). Even if that is the case, however, it
would be difficult to argue that an issuer listed on the foreign exchange is, by the act of that
representative, listed on the registered exchange as well, especially if the arrangement by the
representative were set up after the issuer listed on the foreign exchange. Such an argument
would be equally applicable to all the foreign issuers listed on that exchange and would sug
gest that all would need to register under the Exchange Act.
47. This assumes that the issuer is not so insignificant that it has less than $10 million in
assets and that after going public it has a class of equity securities with more than 500 holders
located somewhere in the world. In that case, Section 12(g)(l) would appear to require the
issuer to register its securities. Section 12(g)(l), as we have seen, makes no distinction be
tween foreign and domestic security holders. Because foreign issuers are covered unless ex
empted pursuant to a rule or regulation, see supra note 39 an issuer, being from the United
States, surely would, absent such an exemption, be covered as well, even if most of its share
holders are abroad. No exemption is available for this issuer. Rule 12g3-2 is the only exemp
tion that concerns the foreign characteristics of securities potentially subject to Exchange Act
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escape the U.S. disclosure regime, but the requirements for doing
so are strict. Any public offering of its securities must be made ex
clusively abroad, and, from the moment it becomes a public com
pany - whether through a public offering or by its share ownership
growing in some other fashion to 500 or more holders - a majority
of its shares must be held by persons residing abroad.48 If the issuer
meets these requirements, it would be entitled to an exemption on
the same basis as a foreign issuer.49

registration. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text. Neither branch of the rule would
provide an exemption because both require the issuer to be a "foreign private issuer." See
supra note 40. A corporation, to be a "foreign private issuer," must, under Rule 3b·4, be
incorporated under the laws of a foreign country.
At least four issuers that are incorporated in the United States but have fewer than 300
United States resident shareholders have applied, however, pursuant to Exchange Act Sec
tion 12{h), for an order of the Commission exempting them from registration under Section
12(g). Section 12{h) is a catch-all provision that provides for such exemptions where "the
Commission finds, by reason of the number of public investors, amount of trading interest in
the securities, the nature and extent of the activities of the issuer, income or assets of the
issuer, or otherwise, that such action is not inconsistent with the public interest or the protec
tion of investors." In each case, the issuer's argument for an exemption is that the policy
enunciated in Release No. 4708, supra note 22 and accompanying text, - that the primary
purpose of the Securities Act registration requirements is to protect United States investors
- should apply to the Exchange Act registration requirements as well. In each case, the
Commission appears not to have issued the requested order, but the staff of the Division of
Corporate Finance stated that it would not raise any objection if the issuers did not register
their securities under Section 12{g). See Equitable American Property Company, Inc., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1989 WL 246608 (Dec. 19, 1989); Paribas Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1988 WL 233751 {Feb. 29, 1988); States Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987
WL 108725 (Nov. 30, 1987); Petrogen Petroleum, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL
108480 (Oct. 12, 1987).
As of January 1987, there were 14 United States companies traded on the London Un
listed Securities Market. For most of them, however, the reported attraction of London was
the lower costs of an initial public offering rather than avoidance of United States disclosure
rules. See Philip Coggan, Low costs attract, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1987 {Survey), at vi. Since
that time, the London Stock Exchange has closed the Unlisted Securities Market {USM) to
make way for its new creation, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). See Christopher
Price, Opportunities for Investors, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997. Most of the companies previ
ously listed on the USM have found their way to AIM which now has 259 listed issuers. See
id. At least one company, however, moved to NASDAQ. See LBMS to Opt for American
Listing, THE TIMES OF LoNDoN, Sept. 29, 1995.
48. An issuer that is incorporated abroad and meets these requirements is, under Ex
change Act Rule 3b-4(b), a "foreign issuer" despite having a majority of its assets and man
agement in the United States. It can be exempt from registration under Rule 12g3-2 if it has
no more than 300 holders resident in the U.S. or if it furnishes the SEC with the disclosure
information required by authorities abroad, see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text, but
only if it qualifies under Rule 3b-4(c) as a "foreign private issuer." That requires not only
foreign incorporation, but also that no more than 50% of the issuer's outstanding voting
securities be held by United States residents. This might or might not be true of a corpora
tion that was originally owned by its founders, private offering investors, and employees and
that subsequently goes public abroad.
49. See Rule 36-4(c).
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Conclusion

summary, U.S. practice currently works as follows. Issuers

that I categorize as U.S. nationals - those with their economic
center of gravity in the United States - are generally subject to the
U.S. regime. Potential escape is available, but only to those who
can pass through the "eye of a needle": (i) they must be incorpo

rated abroad, (ii) public offerings of their securities must be made
exclusively abroad, and (iii) from the moment they become a public
company, a majority of their shares must be held by persons resid

ing abroad. For those that pass through the eye, actual escape de
pends on the same factors as apply to foreign issuers.
Foreign issuers will be subject to the U.S. disclosure regime if
they offer their shares in the United States or list them on a U.S.
stock exchange or
the U.S. regime.

NASDAQ.

Otherwise they can probably escape

Thus, where an issuer's nationality is U.S., the issuer is very
likely to need to comply with the U.S. regime. Where a significant
number of transactions in an issuer's shares are effected in the
United States, it is fairly likely that the U.S. regime will be applied
as well, even if the issuer is foreign. Where a significant number of
purchasers of an issuer's shares are U.S. residents but the issuer is
foreign and the shares are neither offered in the United States nor
listed on a stock exchange or NASDAQ, the U.S. regime will proba
bly not be applied.
II. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SEC, THE COURTS, AND
CONGRESS IN DECIDING ISSUES OF STATUTORY REACH
The SEC, the courts, and Congress each play a role in determin
ing the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime. The primary focus of
this Article is on what approach would maximize U.S. economic
welfare. Its main function, therefore, is to guide these institutions
as to what constitutes good policy. Before undertaking this analy
sis, however, it is helpful to take a brief look at the existing legal
constraints on each of them in deciding issues of statutory reach.
This look will give us a sense of the scope and practicality of the
reforms necessary to implement the recommended changes.
The SEC, the courts, and Congress, it will be seen, each cur
rently enjoys broad discretion to decide the reach of the U.S. disclo
sure regime. There do not appear to be serious constraints that
would prevent any of them from adopting the issuer nationality ap
proach to statutory reach recommended here, given, as the rest of
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the Article shows, its superior ability to discriminate between issu
ers whose disclosure behavior primarily affects U.S. welfare and is
suers whose disclosure behavior primarily affects the welfare of
other countries.
A.

The SEC

The SEC determines in the first instance which of the world's
issuers are covered by the U.S. disclosure regime and which are not.
It does so through its power to make rules, issue interpretations,
create exemptions, and take enforcement actions.50 Its power to act
in any of these ways must, as a doctrinal matter, be exercised within
the confines of what is authorized by statute. A number of factors,
however, make this a very loose constraint when it comes to SEC
decisions concerning statutory reach.
First, the SEC is an expert agency. Because of this status, its
interpretation of what the securities laws cover is given considera
ble deference by the courts.51 This deference includes SEC deter
minations concerning the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime,52
since the courts consider the question of statutory reach to be a
matter of statutory interpretation.53
Second, Congress has explicitly given the SEC broad powers of
exemption relevant to the reach of the whole U.S. disclosure re
gime, the exercise of which should be given even greater judicial
deference.54 Until 1996, the SEC had these explicit powers only
with respect to Exchange Act section 12(g)(l), which imposes the
Act's ongoing, periodic disclosure requirements on all publicly held
issuers not traded on a national stock exchange. Under these pow

ers, set out in section 12(g)(3) and 12(h) , the SEC may grant such
an issuer an exemption from the requirements of Section 12(g)(l) if
50. For a review of the SEC's actions in this regard, see supra Part I.
51. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (stating that a court should not substitute its construction of a statute for a reason
able interpretation of an administrative agency); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1978); 10 Loms Loss & JoEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION
4812-15 (3d ed. 1996).
52. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 {2d Cir. 1975), cert. de
nied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). Judge Friendly states that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws apply to many transnational transactions not within the registration require
ments. He takes as his starting point for this statement the SEC's own interpretation of the
reach of the registration requirements as articulated in Release No. 4708, supra note 22.
53. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
54. In Chevron, the Court held that agency regulations promulgated pursuant to explicit
gaps left for the agency to fill should be "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 467 U.S. at 843-44.
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the SEC finds that doing so is not inconsistent with the public inter
est or the protection of investors.ss
Part III of this Article establishes that compliance by an issuer
with the U.S. disclosure requirements is not necessary for the prices
at which U.S. investors purchase the issuer's shares to be fair.s6 Ex
empting all such foreign issuers from these requirements is thus not
inconsistent with the protection of investors. The Article as a
whole shows as well that applying the U.S. regime only to U.S. issu
ers is the approach to statutory reach that most enhances U.S. eco
nomic welfare. Such an exemption is thus also not inconsistent with
the public interest.57 Thus, under sections 12(g)(3) and 12(h) the
SEC has ha:d for some time a sufficient basis to exempt from its
periodic disclosure requirements all foreign issuers not traded on a
national stock exchange, if it wishes to do so.
In 1996, Congress explicitly gave the SEC further exemptive
powers relevant, among other things, to the reach of the rest of the
U.S. disclosure regime, i.e, Securities Act new issue disclosure and
Exchange Act periodic disclosure imposed on issuers whose shares
are traded on a national stock exchange.58 The criteria for granting
55. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section 12{g){l) and
the exemptions thereunder currently granted by the SEC. Under Exchange Act Section
12{g)(3), the SEC has the power to exempt from the requirements of Section 12{g){l) any
foreign issuer where the SEC "finds that such exemption is in the public interest and is con
sistent with the protection of investors." More generally, under Exchange Act Section 12(h),
the SEC has the power to exempt from the requirements of Section 12{g){l) any issuer,
foreign or domestic, where the SEC finds "by reason of the number of public investors,
amount of trading interest in the securities, the nature and extent of the activities of the
issuer, income or assets of the issuer or otherwise, that such action is not inconsistent with the
public interest or the protection of investors." The inclusion of the catch-all phrase "or
otherwise" in the list of reasons suggests that, as with Section 12{g)(3), the SEC's main focus
should be on the exemption not being inconsistent with the public interest and the protection
of investors.
56. See infra section 111.A.1. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Fox, Dis
closure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2533-39.
57. The argument that an exemption for all foreign issuers would be available under Sec
tion 12(h) is reinforced by the fact that "the nature and extent of the activities of the issuer"
is listed as one of the reasons to grant the exemption. See supra note 55. As shown in Part
III infra, differences between U.S. and foreign issuers in terms of "the nature and extent of
[their] activities" is a primary reason why it would be welfare enhancing to treat them
differently.
58. The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 amended the Securities
Act of 1933 to add Section 28, providing that:
The Commission by rule or regulation, may . . . exempt . . . any class or classes of per
sons, securities, transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title . . . to the
extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is con
sistent with protection of investors,
15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-3 {1997), and to add Section 2{b) providing that:
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is re
quired to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of in
vestors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
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such exemptions are just affirmatively stated versions of the criteria
discussed above - the protection of investors and the public inter
est.59 Thus, now the SEC has, under explicit powers, a sufficient
basis to exempt all foreign issuers from the whole regime, if it so
wishes. The argument is given added force by a new statutory ad
monition that the SEC, in deciding whether to grant exemptions,
"shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors,
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation. "60
The final reason the SEC has broad discretion is that, as a prac
tical matter, it is usually the final arbiter of the reach of the statute
it administers. There is only a small chance that any SEC determi
nation concerning the reach of its disclosure requirements will be
subject to a court review. Where an issuer is granted an exemption,
it will not want the determination upset. Where an issuer is not
granted an exemption, it will likely find a challenge not worth
while.61 Significantly, research does not reveal a single published
opinion with a holding relating to the reach of the U.S. disclosure
regime.62
15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b) (emphasis added). The 1996 Act made essentially identical amend
ments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the addition of Sections 36 and 3{f). See 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 78c(f); 80a-2(c).
59. See supra note 58.
60. See supra note 58.
61. With regard to new issue disclosure, where the SEC has made a determination that an
issuer wishing to engage in a public offering of securities is covered by Section 5 of the Secur
ities Act, the issuer wants its financing at the time it determines it needs the funds, not after
several years of litigation. Thus, rather than contest the SEC determination, the issuer will
decide either that the advantages of having a public offering are worth the costs of registra
tion or that it will seek the funds some other way. Where the SEC has determined that an
issuer is not covered by the new issue disclosure regime, there is generally no one to com
plain. There is, however, the possibility that if the stock price goes down significantly after
the offering, the legitimacy of the SEC determination could be challenged in a private suit for
recisionary damages under Securities Act Section 12{a)(l). The plaintiffs theory would be
that, contrary to the SEC's determination, the issuer was not exempt and hence its failure to
file a registration statement was a violation of Section 5.
With regard to periodic disclosure, in cases where the SEC has determined that an issuer
is covered, the issuer is not under the same time pressures as with a primary issue. The issuer
would have to weigh, however, whether the costs of protracted litigation concerning a matter
to which the court will give the SEC determination great weight, see supra note 54, is worth
the benefit of avoiding the U.S. disclosure regime. In cases where the SEC has determined
that an issuer is not covered, the issuer is not going to complain. And there is no one else
available to complain because there appears to be no private right of action available to
private litigants where an issuer fails to make periodic disclosure filings that it is legally re
quired to make. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 51, at 4301 n.262.
62. There are reported cases with holdings concerning the reach of the antifraud provi
sions of the securities laws, but they explicitly provide that they are not reliable guides as to
the reach of the disclosure regime. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields v. Minoroco, S.A., 871
F.2d 252, 262-63 (2d Cir. 1989).
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The Courts

Should a court be asked to review or enforce an SEC action
involving the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime, it would treat the
question as a matter of statutory interpretation.63 The same would
be true should the court need to make a decision concerning such a
question arising in a litigation between private parties. Given that
there is no explicit statutory language or clear legislative history
concerning the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime,64 congressional
intent is difficult to discem.65 We can get some idea of how a court
would deal with the issue, however, from decisions concerning the
reach of other statutes where Congress has similarly made no signs
concerning their reach. The starting point is a presumption that unThere is one reported case involving statutory reach issues in which the SEC sought a
preliminary injunction and the appointment of a receiver pendente lite based on a complaint
that the defendant violated Securities Act Sections 5(a) and 5(c) (the mandatory disclosure
provisions), Securities Act Section 17(a) (the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act), and
Exchange Act Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 (the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act).
See SEC v. United Fm. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1973). The district
court granted the relief and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The allegations suggest that several
related issuers incorporated abroad and controlled by the defendant engaged in public offer
ings that were primarily aimed at persons abroad but to which at least a few Americans
responded (perhaps as a result of reading ads in overseas editions of American newsweeklies
while the U.S. purchasers were temporarily abroad). While the Ninth Circuit found that the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under both the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act, it based this conclusion on a finding that a prima facie case of the probable existence of
fraud had been demonstrated due to misleading statements and omissions in the offering
prospectuses. See United Fin. Group, 474 F.2d at 358. The court of appeals does not mention
any showing of a failure to file registration statements for the offerings, see United Fin.
Group, 474 F.2d at 358 n.9, which would be the essence of a Section 5 violation and would be
beyond factual dispute. This suggests that the court did not confront the question of whether
there was subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the Section 5 part of the complaint.
Given the court's finding on the fraud aspect of the case, such a determination was not neces
sary in order to affirm the district court's injunction and appointment of a receiver.
63. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1952)).

64. A partial exception to this statement is necessary with respect to the requirement,
under Exchange Act Section 12(g)(l), for ongoing, periodic disclosure imposed on publicly
held issuers that are not traded on a national stock exchange. The structure of the Act and
legislative history suggest that Congress intended 12(g)(l) to be imposed on every such is
suer, regardless of nationality, unless the SEC exempted it. See supra notes 38-39 and accom
panying text.
65. Judge Friendly, faced with making a determination under similar circumstances con
cerning the reach of the Exchange Act's antifraud provisions under Section lO(b) and Rule
lOb-5, gave the following candid description of the process that he followed:
We freely acknowledge that if we were again asked to point to language in the statutes,
or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would be unable
to respond. The Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the
midst of the depression could hardly have been expected to foresee the development of
off-shore funds thirty years later. . . . Our conclusions rest on case law and co=entary
concerning the application of the securities laws and other statutes to situations with
foreign elements and on our best judgment as to what Congress would have wished if
these problems had occurred to it.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975).
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less the contrary intent appears, Congress intends its statutes to
govern only behavior occurring within the United States.66 There
are two important exceptions to this presumption. One is where
regulation of behavior occurring abroad is necessary to effect the
basic purposes of the statute.67 The other is where the behavior
abroad is intended to, and has, significant effects in the United
States.68
The presumption that statutes govern only conduct in the U.S.
and its two major exceptions combine to give the courts a great deal
of discretion with respect to the regulation of transnational transac
tions. There is often ambiguity as to whether the most significant
behavior potentially subject to regulation occurred at home or
abroad. And in a case in which such behavior clearly did occur
abroad but that involves significant U.S. elements, a case can usu
ally easily be made both for and against the application of each of
the exceptions.
This apparent discretion might appear at least somewhat limited
by a further presumption that absent explicit language to the con
trary, Congress does not intend the reach of the statute to exceed
what is permitted under international law.69 As discussed immedi
ately below, however, this presumption would not pose a significant
constraint on a court trying to decide issues of the reach of the U.S.
disclosure regime on the basis of the criteria set out in this article what would maximize U.S. economic welfare, and whether the is
suer's disclosure behavior affects primarily the welfare of U.S. resi
dents or the welfare of residents of some other country. In
particular, it certainly would not constrain a court from interpreting
the statute as incorporating the issuer nationality approach recom
mended here.
C.

Congress and Its Constraints Under International Law

Congress, through statutory language, can explicitly specify the
reach of its statutes. It should not, however, extend a statute to
reach conduct beyond what international law permits, i.e., conduct
outside of United States "jurisdiction to prescribe." The brief re
view below suggests that the issuer nationality approach recom
mended here produces results that are clearly fully within U.S.
66. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
67. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
68. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
69. See Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 443. Cf. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
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jurisdiction to prescribe.70 The investor residence and location of
transaction approaches, however, call for regulation in some cases
where the presence of jurisdiction to prescribe is only arguable.
The conduct that is the subject of this Article generally involves
some person's affirmative action relating to an issuer's shares com
bined with the issuer's disclosure or non-disclosure of certain infor
mation. The United States regulates the conduct by forbidding the
person from undertaking the affirmative action unless the issuer
discloses the information. The question of the transnational reach
of U.S. disclosure regulation arises because at least one dimension
of the situation - the residency of a share buyer, the location of a
share transaction, or the nationality of the issuer - involves the
United States and at least one other dimension involves another
country.
The process of determining whether the United States has juris
diction to prescribe regulation of any given kind of conduct involves
two steps. The first step is to assess whether the United States has
prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe. The United States has prima
facie jurisdiction to prescribe several categories of conduct that are
defined in terms of the conduct's various national dimensions. If
the conduct in question does not fall into any of these categories,
the United States has no jurisdiction to prescribe. If it does fall into
one or more of the categories, we go on to the second step: assess
ing how great an interest the United States has in the conduct and
how that compares with any other state's interest in the United
States not regulating the conduct. The first step is relatively
mechanical and the second step more nuanced. The nature of the
inquiry called for by the second step is briefly described in this Part,
70. This review is based primarily on the REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA·
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter REsrATEMENT]. A full examination
of the constraints imposed by international law on the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime is
outside the scope of this Article and would need to go well beyond the REsrATEMENT. The
REsrATEMENT, however, is considered an authoritative statement of the general U.S. view of
international law. Its provisions concerning jurisdiction to prescribe provide a useful way of
structuring a discussion of the underlying issues involved in this limit on the reach of the
U.S.
·
disclosure regime.
The Restatement contains three sections of particular relevance. Section 402 sets out sev
eral kinds of conduct with respect to which a state has prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe
regulations. Section 403 prohibits exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe on any of these prima
facie bases if (1) such exercise is unreasonable (an evaluation of which can, in part, be made
by consideration of a stated list of factors) or (2) such exercise is reasonable, but another
state has a conflicting prescription and the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction is
clearly greater. Section 416 applies the general principles set out in 402 and 403 to the reach
of the U.S. securities laws. It lists situations in which exercise of jurisdiction is, in essence,
per se reasonable and lists a set of factors to determine reasonableness for situations outside
that list.
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but much of the . rest of this Article helps provide answers to the
questions that such an inquiry poses.

1. Bases for Prima Facie Jurisdiction to Prescribe
a. Conduct occurring within the territory of the regulating
state. One basis for jurisdiction to prescribe is conduct occurring
within the territory of the state seeking to regulate it.71 This basis
would cover the disclosure behavior of many, but not all, of the
issuers that the transaction location approach calls for reaching.
The United States would, for example, have prima facie jurisdiction
on this basis to prohibit a foreign issuer from offering or selling its
shares in the United States, or promoting their secondary trading
here, unless the issuer provided the required disclosure. This is be
cause such activities - offers and sales of the issuer's shares and
promotion of their trading - each inevitably would require the is
suer (or someone contractually related to the issuer) to undertake
conduct within the United States. Presumably permission to under
take these activities could be conditioned not only on providing dis
closure at the time of the offer, sale, or promotion of trading, but
also on the provision of ongoing, periodic disclosure thereafter.
This first basis would not cover one situation that the location of
transaction approach calls for reaching: where neither the issuer
nor anyone contractually related to it offered, sold, or promoted the
trading of its shares in the United States, but organized trading in
its shares nevertheless developed in the United States. In that situ
ation, the issuer has undertaken no conduct occurring within the
United States.

b. Conduct occurring outside the regulating state that has a
substantial effect within its territory. A second basis for prima facie
jurisdiction to prescribe is conduct that occurs outside of the state
seeking to regulate it, but that has a substantial effect \vithin such
state.72 This category would cover many of the issuers that the in71. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, at §§ 402{l)(a), 416{1){b). This basis is sometimes
referred to as the "territorial principle" and involves "determining jurisdiction by reference
to the place where the offen[s]e is committed." Research in International Law: Drafts of
Conventions Prepared for the Codification of International Law, 29 AM. J.INTL. L. 1, 445
(Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Research in International Law]. The territorial principle "is every
where regarded as of primary importance and of fundamental character." Id.
72. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, at §§ 402{1)(c), 416{1)(c). As briefly reviewed in
Comment d and Reporter's Note 2 to Restatement § 402, the "effects principle" has given rise
to some controversy in large part because of European reaction to the extraterritorial appli
cation of the U.S. antitrust laws. Ultimately, though, the "effects principle," just like the
"conduct within territory" principle, is simply a way of identifying categories of conduct that
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vestor residency approach calls for reaching. The United States
would, for example, have prim.a facie jurisdiction on this basis to
prohibit a foreign issuer from offering or selling its shares or pro
moting their secondary trading, even though its actions are under
taken outside the United States, if, as a result, a significant number
of investors in the United States are reasonably expected to be buy
ers. The United States could condition such an offer, sale, or pro
motion of trading sales upon the issuer providing the required
disclosure. The rationale would be that

if

the issuer undertakes

such a sale, offer, or promotion of trading, the conduct will have a
substantial effect in the United States. Again, presumably the con
dition for allowing such activities could include not only providing
disclosure at the time of the offering, sale, or promotion, but also
providing ongoing, periodic disclosure thereafter.
This second basis would also provide a prim.a facie jurisdiction
for regulating an issuer that offered, sold, or promoted organized
trading of its shares only outside the United States, but where, as a
predictable result of one or more of these actions, organized trading
developed in the United States. Thus, the second basis covers a
situation that the transaction location approach calls for reaching
but for which the first basis does not provide U.S. prim.a facie juris
diction to prescribe.
The more difficult cases even under this second basis are where
an issuer sold, offered, or promoted the organized trading of its
shares only outside the United States at some time in the past when
the issuer could not have reasonably expected that a significant
number of U.S. investors would later be buyers of its shares in the
secondary market or that organized trading in its shares might later
develop in the United States. Now, one or both of these things has
happened. The investor residency approach, where U.S. investors
later become buyers, and the transaction location approach, where
organized trading in the United States later develops, would each

may sufficiently involve the political, social, or economic processes of a particular state as to
justify that state imposing its general regulatory scheme on the conduct. The real issue at
stake with the effects principle is the reasonableness of its application.
More recently, both Germany and the EC seem to have also adopted some form of the
"effects principle" with regard to their own antitrust laws, as evidenced by the "wood pulp"
decision. See Case 89/85, Osakeyhtio v. EC Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5233, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 'l! 14,491. This, at least, is the U.S. view of the case. See, e.g., Charles F. Rule,

U.S. Justice Department Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, in

EUROPEAN/AMERICAN ANrrrn.uST AND TRADE LAw 1-1, 1-14 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1989)
(stating, "Nevertheless . . . the [wood pulp] decision is very close to, if not indistinguishable
from, the so called 'effects' test as applied by U.S. courts").
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call for the issuer to start providing ongoing disclosure.73 Here all
the issuer is doing (absent regulation) is not providing the U.S. level
of disclosure once U.S. investors start to become buyers or organ
ized trading starts to develop in the United States. The earlier of
fer, sale, or promotion of trading could not realistically be called
part of the conduct being regulated.
For the United States to have prima facie jurisdiction to impose
its disclosure regime on such an issuer, inaction standing by itself 
not providing the U.S. level of disclosure - would have to be con
sidered the "conduct" subject to regulation. The rationale for
granting the U.S. jurisdiction would be that if the issuer instead pro
vided the disclosure, it would have a substantial effect in the United
States.74 Broadly applied, such an approach to the substantial ef
fects basis for jurisdiction to prescribe would permit the United
States to command a foreign national anywhere in the world to un
dertake an action he would not otherwise undertake simply because
the action would have a significant beneficial effect in the United
States. The United States could tell every wealthy foreign national
around the world, for example, to send the U.S. Treasury one mil
lion dollars. While I believe it is possible to develop a more refined
theory that could justify imposing the U.S. disclosure regime on
some such issuers without also justifying the other obviously unac
ceptable results, the case for jurisdiction to prescribe is much less
clear cut here than in other situations.75 Yet supporters of the in73. While these approaches would call for imposing the U.S. regime on such an issuer, the
SEC does not in fact currently require it to disclose the information ordinarily required
under the U.S. regime. It is, however, required to file with the SEC under Rule 12(g)(3)-2(b)
the information that it must provide its own authorities. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
74. Doing so would go beyond the examples of effects based justifications for jurisdiction
to prescribe given by authorities on the subject. The examples typically involve some act of
commission in one state which, performed the way it was, had a more negative effect on
another state than if the act had not been performed at all: the intentional or negligent
shooting of a gun in one state where the bullet crosses a state line and injures someone in
another state, see REsTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 402, cmt. d, or delivery of money in one
state solely because of misrepresentations made in another state, see Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972).
75. I argue elsewhere that among such issuers, one can probably justify imposing the U.S.
regime on those that the investor residency approach calls for reaching, but that doing so
requires breaking new ground and going beyond the conventional understanding of what is
covered by the substantial effects basis for jurisdiction to prescribe. See Merritt B. Fox, Reg
ulating Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market 82-100 (Apr. 1992) (unpublished paper
presented at the University of Michigan Law and Economics Workshop, on file with author).
The argument involves a recognition that purely domestic laws often usefully impose require
ments on persons simply because their status suggests that they are in a good position to do
something that is beneficial to someone else. In a world with increasing transnational eco·
nomic interactions, such a regulation should be able to be extended transnationally in situa
tions where it appears that the state seeking the extension is primarily motivated by an
honest and reasonable belief that the regulation's benefits outweigh its costs, not by the regu·
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vestor residency and transaction location approaches do not ad
dress these problems.76

c.

Conduct undertaken by a national of the regulating state.

A

third basis for prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe is conduct by a
U.S. national, whether undertaken outside or inside that state.77
This basis would cover all of the issuers that the issuer nationality
approach calls for reaching. The United States would, for example,
have prima facie jurisdiction on this basis to prohibit a U.S. issuer
from offering or selling its shares, or promoting their secondary
trading, anywhere in the world - inside or outside the United
States - unless the issuer provided the required disclosure.

d. Indirect methods of acquiring prima facie jurisdiction.

The

foregoing analysis suggests that there are foreign issuers that the
investor residency or transaction location approach call for reaching
but for whose conduct there is no clear prima facie jurisdiction to
prescribe direct regulation. Another way of shaping the disclosure
behavior of such issuers is for the United States to prohibit its resi
dents from purchasing their shares and prohibit securities profes
sionals in the United States from taking orders for such shares or
lation's capacity to work a unilateral wealth transfer. This argument would not justify impos
ing the U.S. regime on those among such issuers that only the transaction location protection
approach calls for reaching. This is probably not a practical concern, however, since it is hard
to imagine an issuer for whose shares organized trading develops in the United States, but for
which there are not a significant number of U.S. buyers.
76. The Reporters' Note 4 to Restatement § 416, for example, states "[f]oreign issuers of
equity securities initially sold only outside the United States are also generally required to
make [the disclosures called for by the U.S. regime] if the securities are held by a specified
minimum number of United States residents." See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70. The inclu
sion of this statement implies that the Reporters believe that imposing the U.S. disclosure
regime on these issuers is within the U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe, but the Note provides no
explanation of why this is so.
The SEC, in its justification of the reach of the U.S. disclosure regime under the transac
tion location approach, makes the simple undifferentiated statement that the approach is
based on a territorial approach and that "[t]erritoriality is a fundamental basis under both
international law . . . and the foreign relations law of the United States." See lNmAL PRO
POSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at 89, 128 n.60. It cites Section 402 of the Restatement with
out indicating which basis it is invoking or how inaction in one state, standing alone, justifies
regulation by another state.
Admittedly, Regulation S, the proposal of which was the occasion for the SEC to articu
late the transaction location approach, only imposes the U.S. regime on foreign issuers en
gaging in primary offerings of securities where a significant number of U.S. investors can be
expected to respond. We have just seen that this can easily be justified on the substantial
effects basis. The transaction location approach's underlying goal of market protection is
equally applicable to periodic disclosure, however. See supra section l.A.2 and l.B.
77. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, § 402(2). This basis is sometimes referred to as the
"nationality principle" and involves "determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality
or national character of the person committing the offense." Research in International Law,
supra note 71, at 445. It is described by commentators as "universally accepted." See id.
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participating in their organized trading.78 The United States would
have clear prima facie jurisdiction to do so under one or more of
the three bases. Such prohibitions would induce at least some issu
ers to comply with the U.S. regime in order to have a U.S. market
for their shares.
The effectiveness and enforceability of such an arrangement
may be a problem, however. U.S. investors could try to evade the
ban by placing their orders with brokers abroad, thereby making
the orders difficult to monitor. Also, a regulation that would im
pose sanctions for its violation on the persons it is supposed to pro
tect is likely to engender particularly little voluntary compliance
and particularly intense political opposition.

2. Limitations on Actual Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Considering
the Intensity of U.S. Interest and That of
Other Countries
These bases provide only prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe.

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela
tions Law of the United States, even when one of these bases is pres
ent, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe if (1) its
exercise is unreasonable, or (2) its exercise is reasonable, but an
According to the ALI's

other state has a conflicting prescription and the other state's inter
est in exercising jurisdiction is clearly greater.79

As suggested

earlier, these constraints are really where the more important issues
lie in jurisdiction to prescribe.80 While the constraints are articu78. Such an indirect method of shaping issuer disclosure behavior is in fact how the Ex
change Act's periodic disclosure requirements work for issuers traded on a national stock
exchange. Section 12(a) does not address issuers directly. Instead, it prohibits exchange
members, brokers, and dealers from effecting transactions on such an exchange in the shares
of issuers that have not registered under Section 12(b). See supra note 25. On the other
hand, the new issue disclosure regulations under Section 5 of the Securities Act are effec
tively imposed directly on issuers and on others who might be involved in the distribution
process. Under Section 12(g)(l) of the Exchange Act, the periodic disclosure requirements
for publicly held issuers not traded on a national stock exchange are also imposed directly on
issuers.
79. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 70, § 403.
80. The authors of a leading casebook on international transactions say of the bases for
prima facie jurisdiction to prescribe just reviewed here:
To the extent that such principles permit clearer analysis and comprehension of
problems of legislative reach, they serve a useful purpose. To the extent that they divert
attention from underlying considerations to the mere (mechanical or conclusory) classi
fication of particular legislation as expressing one or another principle, they do not . . .
[11he fact that the transnational reach of a statute can be brought within an existing
"principle" does not of itself argue for or justify that reach . . . .
To resolve these questions . . . [a] more particular and searching inquiry into statutory
purposes, private expectations, and the policies or interests of the concerned govern
ments may be called for . . . [O]ne must identify the various national policies or interests
at issue in a given case and face the problem of resolving any conflicts among them.
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lated in rather vague terms, they have their origins in identifiable
prior practice. They reflect long held notions of comity in interna
tional law.81 They reflect as well recent examples of U.S. courts
determining the reach of the U.S. antitrust laws based not just on
the immediate interests of the United States in regulating the par
ticular conduct involved, but also on considerations about the inter
ests of other countries and the international system.82 Under the
Restatement, determining whether one of these constraints applies
when the United States seeks to apply its regulations to conduct
having foreign elements depends on a variety of factors. These fac
tors are indicators of the importance of the conduct to the United
States and of the likelihood and extent of conflict with the interests
of another state that U.S. regulation of the conduct would
engender.s3
847-48 (1994).
81. Rules of comity have been variously regarded as practices that are "followed not as a
matter of obligation but of courtesy, convenience and neighborly accommodation," I.
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1970); l.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A TREATISE 33 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955), as "neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other," Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), and, at least in the case of rules of comity relating to
concurrent jurisdiction, as part of the rules of international law that bind nations, see RE
STATEMENT, supra note 70, § 403. 1\vo components of Section 403 incorporate the comity
concept of balancing state interests as the basis, in whole or in part, of rules requiring states
to refrain from exercising jurisdiction to prescribe. First, section 403(3) provides that when
more than one state has a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction over a person or activity
"but the prescriptions conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the
other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors . . . [and]
should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater." In addition, Section
403(2) lists the relevant factors to be evaluated in determining whether the exercise of juris
diction is reasonable. A number of these measure the interest of the state in regulating the
activity, but one is "the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity." Section 403(1) prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction when it would be un
reasonable. See also id. § 403 cmt. a.
If one takes a sociological approach to questions of international law, as I do, whether
practices of restraint in such situations of conflicting interest, typically attributed to comity,
do or do not constitute rules of international law appears a rather sterile debate. Under such
an approach, one would ask whether there exists an expectation on the part of participants in
the international legal system that nations should follow these practices and, if so, whether
failure to follow them will result in any sanctions. See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D.
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J.
INTL. L. 1, 8 (1959). Even co=entators who insist on the distinction between comity and
law, such as Lauterpracht and Oppenheim, would answer both these questions affirmatively.
They clearly view rules of comity as ongoing practices. The existence of an ongoing practice
of restraint on the part of most states when confronted with certain situations of concurrent
jurisdiction will certainly lead over time to the expectation that the practice should be fol
lowed. States which do not follow the practice are likely to be subject to a reciprocal lack of
courtesy, a response suggested by the references to "neighborliness" in the traditional formu
lation of comity. Thus there are sanctions for failure to follow the practice.
82. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979);
Tlillberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. See REsrATEMENT, supra note 70, § 403(2)-(3).
HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
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These concerns correspond closely to the criteria suggested here
for choosing the best approach to statutory reach: the approach's
ability to enhance U.S. economic welfare generally - counting in
the calculation of U.S. welfare the effect on the United States of the
reaction of other countries - and, in particular, the approach's
ability to discriminate between issuers whose disclosure behavior
primarily affects U.S. welfare and issuers whose disclosure behavior
primarily affects some other state. The economic analysis of the
transnational distribution of the effects of issuer disclosure behavior
undertaken in this Article demonstrates, according to these criteria,
the superiority of the issuer nationality approach.

Thus

if

the

United States adopted this approach, it would clearly appear to be
acting within the constraints imposed by international law.
Ill.

THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH
OVER THE INVESTOR REsIDENCY APPROACH

In these next three Parts, I consider how the choice of approach
affects U.S. economic welfare through the selection of which of the
world's issuers will fall within the reach of the U.S. regime. The
issuer nationality approach is clearly superior to the investor resi
dency approach in this regard. The United States, it will be seen,

has a strong interest in the disclosure behavior of all U.S. issuers.

This includes even those whose shares are only publicly sold to or
traded among foreign investors, the group reached by the issuer na
tionality approach but not by the investor residency approach. In
contrast, the United States has at best only a subsidiary interest in
the disclosure behavior of foreign issuers. This includes even those
whose shares are publicly sold to or traded among U.S. residents,
the group reached by the investor residency approach but not
reached by the issuer nationality approach.
The issuer nationality approach is also clearly superior to the
transaction location approach as well. No U.S. interest in determin
ing the disclosure behavior of any issuer is affected by the country
in which transactions in their shares takes place. The transaction
location approach thus utilizes as its criterion for selecting issuers to
which to apply U.S. law a factor wholly unrelated to U.S. interests.
It would thereby arbitrarily cut out from U.S. application some issu
ers whose disclosure behavior is of strong interest to the United
States - U.S. issuers whose shares are publicly sold or traded only

abroad. In fact, it would create an incentive for U.S. issuers to put
themselves in this group. At the same time, it would arbitrarily in
clude others whose disclosure behavior is at most of subsidiary in-
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terest to the United States - foreign issuers whose shares are sold
or traded in the United States. Furthermore, it will diminish the
volume of transactions effected in the United States.
Nationally based regulation utilizing the issuer nationality ap
proach is, it

will

be seen, also superior to any achievable uniform

international regime.
There is an implicit assumption behind the normative conclu
sions that issuer nationality is superior to the other two approaches
or any achievable international disclosure regime. This is the as
sumption that for entirely domestic U.S. issuers - those whose en
trepreneurs, operations, and shareholders exist exclusively in the
U.S. and whose shares are exclusively sold or traded there - the
U.S. regime's current required disclosure level is closer to what
would maximize U.S. economic welfare than is the required disclo
sure level of any other country's regime. This assumption is exten
sively explored in Part VII.

Its use at this point, however, is

sufficiently justified by the observation that compared to foreign
officials, U.S. officials have greater expertise about the tradeoff be
tween the costs and benefits of the disclosure behavior of entirely
domestic U.S. issuers and are the officials politically responsible to
the persons most affected by such behavior. These three parts can
therefore be seen as identifying for which of the world's other issu
ers U.S. officials are similarly the superior regulators. The answer is
that U.S. officials are the best regulators for all remaining U.S. issu
ers - those that are not entirely domestic - and no foreign issuers.
The argument is laid out as follows. In Part III, I show why
applying the U.S. regime to the set of issuers selected under the
issuer nationality approach enhances U.S. economic welfare more
than would applying the U.S. regime to the set of issuers selected

under the investor residency approach. This is so even if other
countries do not adopt the same approach.84 In Part IV, I show
84. This recommendation involves identification of policies that are in the economic long
term best interests of the United States and is not intended to address what policy constitutes
the best strategic bargaining position in the short term. In this regard, there is a parallel
between the policy recommended here and the policy, recommended by classical trade the
ory adherents, that the United States is better off engaging in free trade even if other coun
tries do not. See RICHARD E. CAVES & RONALD W. JoNES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS:
AN lNTRooucnoN 12-19 (1985). In both the disclosure regulation case and the trade one,
the United States would be even better off if other countries too adopted the recommended
policy, and the other countries would be worse off if the United States does not. Therefore,
strategic bargaining considerations may call for the United States temporarily not to adopt
the recommended policy - even though adopting it would make the United States better off
- in order to pressure the other countries to act in a way - adoption of the recommended
approach - that would make the United States even better off than it would be by adopting
the policy alone.
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why the issuer nationality approach has the same superiority com
pared to the transaction location approach. In Part V, I show why
adopting the issuer nationality approach enhances U.S. welfare
more than adopting any achievable international regime. In all
three Parts, I assume that the choice of approach will have no effect
on the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime. The implica
tions of relaxing this assumption will be explored in Parts VI and
VIII.
A.

The United States Has a Strong Interest in Determining the
Disclosure Behavior of U.S. Issuers Even When Their
Shares Are Publicly Sold to and Traded
Among Only Foreign Investors
1. The Basis of the U.S. Interest

Greater disclosure can, through its positive effects on manage
rial motivation and the choice of real investment projects, increase
the returns generated by capital-utilizing productive activity.as
Three groups share in the overall returns generated by such activity:
the public suppliers of capital, the original suppliers of en
trepreneurial talent, and the suppliers of the other factors of pro
duction - primarily labor. Publicly supplied capital, however, is
much more mobile transnationally than entrepreneurial talent or
labor. As a result, competitive forces push capital toward receiving
a single global expected rate of return (adjusted for risk) regardless
of the disclosure practices of the particular issuers involved.86 The
85. The benefits of greater issuer disclosure are discussed infra in section 111.D.1.b.i.
86. According to the efficient market hypothesis, the price at which an issuer's shares
trade will be unbiased whether there is a great deal of information available about the issuer
or very little. By "unbiased," I mean that the price is on average equal to the share's actual
value, i.e., what the future income stream accruing to the holder of the share - its dividends
and other distributions - turns out to be, discounted to present value. Speculators - the
persons whose actions in the market set prices - assess what this future income stream will
be based not only on what information is available about the issuer but also on what is not.
The empirical literature testing the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the inferences
that speculators draw from issuer disclosures are in fact unbiased. Since there is no reason to
believe that their inferences from issuer absences of comment are any more likely to be
biased than their inferences from issuer disclosures, this literature suggests as well that the
inferences they draw from issuer absences of comment are also unbiased. I discuss these
points in considerably more detail elsewhere. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market,
supra note 1, at 2533-39. If share prices are unbiased and the world's investors have a global
set of issuers to choose from, each investor will receive the same risk-adjusted expected rate
of return whatever issuer's shares she purchases, whether the issuer discloses at a high level
or a low one. Professors Choi and Guzman and Professor Romano agree. They suggest that
an issuer's share price will reflect a market discount for the applicable disclosure regime. See
Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 220-21; Romano, supra note
15, at 2366.
The efficient market hypothesis has been attacked by adherents of noise theory. The
noise theorists believe that share prices are affected by the irrational expectations of naive
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increase in returns resulting from greater issuer disclosure therefore
largely accrues to the latter two groups.s7

A typical issuer, even if labeled "multinational," will still have a
distinct nationality, an identifiable economic center of gravity in a

single country where its original entrepreneurial talent and the larg
est portion of its management and workers are concentrated.ss
Thus most of the gains from greater disclosure will be enjoyed in an
issuer's home country, regardless of where in the world its public
shareholders reside.
Greater disclosure also has costs that must be weighed against
its capacity to increase the returns generated by capital utilizing ac
tivity. Again, because of capital's greater mobility, the costs of dis
closure, too, will fall largely on the latter two groups.
Thus the gains and costs of the disclosure behavior of U.S. issu
ers are concentrated among U.S. residents. U.S. economic welfare
is maximized when the level of disclosure for issuers of U.S. nationspeculative traders, who are activated by fads, fashions, and irrational psychological predis
positions. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986). Since noise is as likely to
cause prices to be too low as too high, the proposition that share prices on average equal
actual value stiJJ holds even if the noise theorists' description of the world is correct. For a
more extensive discussion of why noise theory does not undermine the argument that the
issuer's home country has the greatest interest in its disclosure level, see Fox, Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2536-37 & n.76, 2555 n.103.
87. If a country's issuers represent only a small portion of all equities available to inves
tors in the world, investors would share in none of these gains. Tue country would be analo
gous to a single small firm in a perfectly competitive industry. Such a firm's level of
production has no effect on price. Following this analogy, what the country produces is in
vestment opportunities - dollars of future expected cash flow - just like the firm produces
products. A disclosure improvement's positive effects on managerial motivation and choice
of real investment projects will increase the number of dollars of future expected cash flow
that the country's issuers have to sell. This benefits both the entrepreneurs, who are selling
the cash flow, and labor, who gain from the overall increase in the country's economic effi
ciency. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2561-69. Because the
country is like a small firm, however, the increase in the amount supplied is not great enough
to lower the price at which a dollar of future expected cash flow is sold. Thus there is no
benefit to investors, the "buyers" of these dollars of expected future cash flow.
If a country's issuers represent a substantial portion of all equities available to investors in
the world, as is the case with the United States, investors will share in some of these gains. A
disclosure improvement's increase in the number of dollars of future expected cash flow that
the country has to offer would be great enough to lower the price at which a dollar of future
expected cash flow is sold, at least slightly. Thus investors would gain from the improvement.
This is equally true of foreign investors as U.S. iµvestors, however, and foreign investors own
almost two-thirds of all the shares of publicly traded issuers in the world. See id. at 2525 n.51.
Moreover, it is equally true of disclosure improvements of U.S. issuers whose shares are
primarily sold to, or traded among, only foreign investors
as it is of U.S. issuers with primar·
ily U.S. shareholders.
88. In 1990, profits from foreign operations of U.S. corporations amounted to only about
one-sixth of all corporate profits. See 72 SURv. CURRENT Bus., Dec. 1992, at 14 (NIPA Table
6.16c). In 1989, overseas assets of even U.S. corporations designated as "multinational" were
only about one-fifth of their total assets. See J. Lowe & R. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Direct Invest
ment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey Results, 71 SURv. CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1991, at 29
(data from Table 1).
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ality, wherever their shareholders reside, is set at the point where
the marginal social costs of additional disclosure equals the margi
nal increase in returns generated by that disclosure.89
Market forces are not likely to lead firms to disclose at a level
this high,9° hence the need for a government to consider regula
tion.91 The question for this study is which government. The bene
ficiaries when U.S. issuers disclose at the socially optimal level their entrepreneurs and workers - are concentrated in the United
States and U.S. officials have the greatest familiarity with U.S. firm
governance structures. U.S. officials, therefore, have both greater
motivation and greater expertise than do officials of any other
country to decide whether disclosure regulation is called for and, if
so, what the optimal level is. This is just as true of U.S. issuers
whose shares are publicly sold to, or traded among, only foreign
investors - issuers not reached by the investor residency approach
- as it is of U.S. issuers with only U.S. shareholders. And the U.S.
residents' stakes in the regulators getting the required level of dis
closure right are equally great for both types of firms.

89. The proposition that the United States has a strong interest in the disclosure behavior
of all U.S. issuers, regardless of where in the world their shareholders reside, holds whether
or not the text's simplifying assumption of a single global expected rate of return on capital is
correct. A country whose issuers disclose at the optimal level of disclosure will have capital
utilizing enterprises that produce higher returns net of costs of disclosure. If the single rate
assumption is correct, th� gains from getting the disclosure level right will primarily be en
joyed by the less mobile claimants on these returns, domestic entrepreneurs and labor, not by
the suppliers of capital, who, wherever in the world they live, will at best enjoy a slight in
crease in the overall global expected return on capital. See supra note 87. If the assumption
is incorrect, the reason would be that each country's investors still have a degree of bias
against issuers from other countries. In that event, U.S. investors, for example, might share
disproportionately in the gains from moving the U.S. issuer disclosure level toward its opti
mal level. The bias of foreign investors against U.S. issuers would mean that the increase in
the number of expected dollars of future cash flow resulting from the change in required
disclosure would be offered to a somewhat. restricted market and push the price for them
down more for U.S. investors than for other investors. See supra note 87. To the extent that a
U.S. issuer has U.S. shareholders, the fact that U.S. investors will share disproportionately in
the gains from optimal disclosure simply creates an additional U.S. interest in the level of the
issuer's disclosure. As for U.S. issuers whose shares are sold to and traded among only for
eign investors, entrepreneurs and labor in the United States would, just as if there were a
single global expected rate of return on capital, enjoy most of the gains from optimal disclo
sure. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2561-69. Thus, the United
States interest in the disclosure behavior of this second set of issuers would be as strong as it
is shown to be under the assumption in the text.
90.
91.

This market failure is discussed extensively

infra in

section IV.A.2.

After consideration, a government might conclude that despite this market failure,
disclosure regulation would nevertheless on balance be undesirable. Again, the question is,
for any given issuer, which government should decide this question.
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The conclusion that it is in the best interests of the United States
to extend the reach of its regime even to U.S. issuers whose shares
are only publicly sold to or tradec;l among foreign investors is not a
parochial one that ignores U.S. foreign relations. -Extending the
statute's reach in this fashion would not threaten the legitimate in
terests of any other country. Foreign shareholders of U.S. issuers
will receive the saine global expected rate of return (adjusted for
risk) regardless of the level at which U.S. issuers disclose92 and so
foreign concerns about U.S. issuer expected returns cannot form a
sound basis for objections to U.S. regulation. It is U.S. residents,
not those of any other country, who enjoy the increased project re
turns from greater disclosure by U.S. issuers and who pay its extra
cost.
For less than fully diversified foreign investors, the risk in hold
ing shares in U.S. issuers is affected by these issuers' level of disclo
sure.93

The U.S. regime's level of disclosure, however, has a

positive effect on the welfare of these investors. The U.S. regime is
the most rigorous in the world,94 and so its imposition is a cost-free
benefit to these foreign investors. Thus, effect on risk is also not a
sound basis for a foreign country to complain about the United
States applying its regime to U.S. issuers whose shares are sold to or
traded among the foreign country's investors.
92.

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.

93. While the amount of information available in the public domain about an issuer does
not affect the proposition that the issuer's share price will be unbiased, see supra note 89 and
accompanying text, it is related to the accuracy of the issuer's share price. A share price can
be unbiased - no more likely to be above than below the share's actual value - but still
have a low expected accuracy in the sense that there is a significant likelihood that there is a
substantial difference one way or the other between the price and actual value.

With less information about a U.S. issuer, speculators will have greater uncertainty about
its future and, as a consequence, the issuer's shares will have lower expected price accuracy.
Put another way, with less information the issuer's shares will have greater total risk associ
ated with them because there is a greater likelihood that what an investor receives from
holding such a share - distributions and price at resale (both discounted to present value) will deviate substantially, one way or the other, from what she pays for it This increased risk
means that any investor holding shares of the issuer, unless she is fully diversified (by also
holding shares of a substantial number of other issuers) will have a more risky portfolio than
would have been the case if more information were available about the issuer. Some portion
of all the foreign buyers of the U.S. issuer's shares will in fact be Jess than fully diversified
and consequently, with lower disclosure, suffer lower expected utility - assuming, as the
capital asset pricing model suggests, that the issuer's shares will be priced in such a fashion
that its expected return is unaffected by the greater company specific risk resulting from a
low level of disclosure. Again, I have considered these points in more detail elsewhere. See
Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2540-44.
94.

See infra notes

103 and 149.
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The only foreign groups who would be injured by extending
U.S. disclosure requirements to U.S. issuers whose shares are sold
to or traded among only foreign investors are those who profit from
the volume of securities transactions effected in their home coun
tries. With the issuer nationality approach, U.S. issuers will no
longer have an incentive to evade U.S. disclosure rules by offering
and promoting the trade of their shares abroad. Thus the proposed
switch in approach would diminish the volume of U.S. issuer trans
actions in other countries. But this injury is not a legitimate basis
for other countries to protest the proposed extension. Between
countries, volume is a zero-sum game. It should be won or lost
based on the cost and quality of the transactional services available
in each country, not on the ability of one country to offer a way to
evade regulations of another country aimed at behavior that pri
marily affects the welfare of residents of the country whose regula
tions are being evaded.

The U.S. Has, at Best, Only a Weak Interest in Determining
the Disclosure Behavior of Foreign Issuers Even When Their
Shares Are Publicly Sold to or Traded Among U.S. Investors

B.

1.

The Basis of the Interest

As shown by the discussion above, the expected rate of return
that U.S. residents receive from investments in the shares of a for
eign issuer will be capital's overall global expected rate of return
(adjusted for risk). It will be largely unaffected by the issuer's level
of disclosure. Thus, notwithstanding the traditional concern of the
SEC and many commentators with investor protection,95 expected
return considerations cannot constitute a serious basis for applying
the U.S. disclosure regime to a foreign issuer.96
95. See supra notes 19-24.
96. See supra section III.A.1. If there were an overall improvement in disclosure in the
sense that issuers around the world all moved closer to their respective optimal levels of
disclosure, investors would share in some of the resulting gains. This is because the increase
in the number of dollars of future expected cash flow offered to the global market of inves
tors would lower the price at which a dollar of future expected cash flow is sold. See supra
note 87. This fact, however, does not create a special U.S. stake in the disclosure behavior of
foreign issuers. To start, foreign investors would enjoy this decrease in the price of a dollar of
expected cash flow as much as would U.S. investors, and foreign investors own almost two
thirds of all the shares of publicly traded issuers in the world. See Fox, Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2525 n.51. Moreover, for reasons parallel to those set
out in section III.A.1 concerning the strong U.S. interest in the disclosure of U.S. issuers,
each other country does have a special stake in the disclosure behavior of its issuers because
of the effect of such disclosure on entrepreneurs and labor concentrated in its country. Offi
cials of each other country also have superior expertise on what would be the socially optimal
disclosure level for its issuers, which is likely to differ substantially from one country to the
next. See infra sections V.A and V.B. This creates a presumption that extending the U.S.
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will benefit less than fully diversified U.S. in

vestors holding such shares by reducing the unsystematic risk in
their portfolios.97 This potential for reducing U.S. investors' risk is,
however, the basis for only, at best, a weak U.S. interest in applying
its regime to foreign issuers. Unlike the benefits U.S. residents re
alize from greater issuer disclosure by U.S. issuers (discussed just
above), greater disclosure by foreign issuers provides benefits to
U.S. residents achievable in other ways. There is no obvious alter

native for achieving the benefits to U.S. residents from greater U.S.
issuer disclosure - the increased returns to capital utilizing activi
ties from more accurate price induced better project choice and im

proved managerial motivation. In contrast, the benefit from foreign

issuer disclosure - the reduction of unsystematic risk - can be
achieved by another strategy: a program of educational and institu
tional reform that

will

encourage U.S. investors to diversify. If an

investor is fully diversified, the greater unsystematic risk associated
with her having in her portfolio shares of a foreign issuer that dis

closes less than the U.S. level will not have a negative impact on her

welfare. Given the availability of this alternative strategy, the U.S.
ability to regulate foreign issuer disclosure is less vital.

2.

Countervailing Domestic Considerations

Furthermore, the full effect on U.S. investor welfare of imposing
the U.S. regime on foreign issuers cannot be ascertained by consid
ering its risk reduction impact in isolation. Investors are made bet

ter off when shares of additional issuers are made available, even if
regime to these issuers would move their disclosure away from, not toward, the optimal level
for them.
The proposition in the text again does not depend on the text's simplifying assumption of
a single global expected rate of return on capital. If the assumption is incorrect, the reason
would be that each country's investors still have a substantial degree of bias in favor of their
country's issuers. See supra note 89. That means that the impact of improved foreign issuer
disclosure on U.S. investors
be even smaller. The increased supply of expected future
dollars would lower their price less for U.S. investors since U.S. investors are buyers in a
market that behaves, because of the bias, as if the availability of this increased supply were
partially restricted.
A special situation exists with Canada. U.S. investors feel significantly more comfortable
purchasing shares of Canadian issuers than purchasing shares of other foreign issuers, and
the United States has a much larger pool of investors than does Canada. This, however,
suggests a situation of sufficiently intense interaction between these two economies that dis
closure regulation would, and as a practical matter can, best be handled by bilateral agree
ments establishing a joint regime, rather than by general rules parceling out authority
between the two countries as to which national regime should govern. The United States and
Canada are working toward such an arrangement by undertaking a degree of coordination of
their two regimes and then providing for reciprocal recognition for qualified issuers that reg
ister under the other country's regime. See supra notes 21, 24.

will

97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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these additional issuers only disclose at a very low level.98 If the
U.S. policy imposes its regime on all foreign issuers whose shares
are publicly sold to or traded among U.S. investors, many foreign
issuers will seek to avoid the U.S. regime by making their shares
unavailable to U.S. investors. The loss in U.S. investor utility from
reduced availability of foreign issuers' shares may be greater than
the gain in investor utility from the increased disclosure by the for
eign issuers that do make their shares available. U.S. investors can

therefore actually be made worse off if the U.S. regime is applied to
foreign issuers.

3. Foreign Relations
When U.S. foreign relations are taken into account, the U.S. in
terest in applying its regime to foreign issuers becomes even more
problematic. Imposition of the U.S. regime requires the issuer to
disclose more than officials in the issuer's own country have deter
mined is cost effective. At least in the eyes of these foreign offi
cials, the higher level of disclosure required by the United States
costs more than it is worth and thus reduces the net returns to capi
tal utilizing productive activities in their own country. The imposi
tion of the U.S. regime damages the issuer country's entrepreneurs,
suppliers of labor, and,

if the

issuer has previously gone public at

home, suppliers of capital.
This foreign relations problem is going to be severely exacer
bated by the growing globalization of financial information and the
declining difficulty and expense of effecting share transactions
abroad. There will be increasingly large numbers of foreign issuers
whose shares will be publicly sold to and traded among U.S. inves
tors.

Under the investor residency approach, the U.S. regime

would thus apply to foreign issuers with greater and greater fre
quency. Each additional application is objectionable to the issuer's
home country since its residents suffer the welfare loss when the
issuer discloses more than is socially optimal. This is particularly so
since the U.S. regime is imposed to cure the purely domestic U.S.
problem of inadequate investor diversification.
98. Whatever level of disclosure is imposed on the issuer, each additional investment op
portunity available to investors that a share value maximizing firm finds worth selling into a
market with unbiased pricing represents an increase in demand for savings. It therefore mar
ginally raises the overall market expected rate of return available to investors. Also, each
additional investment opportunity has a future return generated by a probability distribution
with somewhat different variance-covariance characteristics than any existing opportunity
and therefore permits investors to compose portfolios with more favorable tradeoffs between
risk and return than otherwise would have been available. For a more formal elaboration of
these points, see Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at 2542-44.
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This foreign relations problem is not ameliorated in any rational
way by making a distinction between foreign issuers that take vol
untary steps to make their shares available to U.S. investors, for
example by listing them on a U.S. stock exchange, and those that
have done nothing to promote the availability of their shares.99 The
investor protection rationale calls just as strongly for application of
the U.S. regime to both, since the impact of low disclosure on the
riskiness of the portfolios of less than fully diversified investors is
the same whether or not the issuer has promoted its shares' availa
bility. And the imposition of the U.S. regime should be equally
unpalatable to the foreign issuer's country in either case. The fact
that a foreign issuer voluntarily takes steps to promote U.S. availa
bility may rhetorically strengthen the argument for imposing the
U.S. regime, but it does not strengthen the argument on substantive
economic grounds. The taking of voluntary steps does not affect
the strong presumption that an issuer's home country requirements
are closer to the issuer's particular socially optimal disclosure level
than are the U.S. requirements. It simply means that the issuer's
gains from having a U.S. market for its shares exceed the extra
costs, not that the extra costs are justified. Thus, whether or not a
foreign issuer has done anything affirmative to promote the availa
bility of its shares to U.S. investors, it is objectionable to the issuer's
home country that its residents suffer a welfare loss from the issuer
disclosing more than what its government believes is socially
optimal.

4.

Qualifications for IPOs and Foreign Issuers Trading in
Immature Markets

The recommended switch to the issuer nationality approach
should be qualified in the case of an initial public offering (IPO) by
a previously privately held foreign company. There is an extensive
literature about the pricing of U.S. issuer IPOs in the United States,
99. The SEC has long held to the principle that a distinction should be made between
foreign issuers that voluntarily enter the United States securities markets and those whose
securities are traded in the U.S. market without their encouragement. See, e.g., Release No.
6360, supra note 44, at 58,512. This principle is at least partially reflected in practice - for
example, the distinction for Exchange Act periodic disclosure purposes between foreign issu
ers whose shares are listed on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ and issuers whose shares are not,
see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text, and the distinction for Securities Act new offer
ing disclosure between foreign issuers that engage in selling efforts directed at the United
States and those that do not, see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
While, as argued in the text, such distinctions do not in any rational way reduce the dam
age to other countries from an investor protection approach, they do keep the United States
on stronger ground in terms of making the formal claim of prima facie jurisdiction to pre
scribe. See supra section II.C.1.b.
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some of which &uggests that shares purchased in such offerings are
priced inefficiently high.10° Certainly the mechanisms needed to
100. A large number of studies show that initial public offerings {IPOs) are offered at a
"discount" in the sense that there is on average a significant jump from the offering price to
the price at which the shares trade in the initial days or weeks after the offering. See James
R. Booth & Lena Chua, Ownership dispersion, costly information, and !PO underpricing, 41
J. Fm. EcoN. 291, 306-07 (1995) (surveying empirical studies establishing the discount and
testing possible explanations); Roger G. Ibbotson et al. Initial Public Offerings, 1 J. APPLIED
CoRP. Fm. 37 (1988) {similar survey); Roger G. Ibbotson & Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Of
ferings, in NORTH-HOLLAND HANDBOOKS OF OPERATIONS REsEARCH AND MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE: FINANCE (RA. Jarrow et al. eds., 1992) {showing underpricing in other countries).
The fact that on average IPO prices are discounted relative to the prices at which the
shares initially trade does not necessarily mean, however, that they are discounted relative to
their actual value. The studies are more mixed on this latter question. Ibbotson, in perhaps
the most frequently cited study establishing the existence of the discount relative to initial
trading price, looked as well at prices thereafter for various periods up to five years and
found returns on a risk adjusted basis were normal, thereby suggesting that the initial trading
price was efficient and that the offering price was discounted relative to actual value. See
Roger G. Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. Fm. EcoN. 235,
250-58, 265; see also Seha M. Tmic, Anatomy ofInitial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43
J. Fm. 789, 815 {1988). Loughran and Ritter recently came to a different conclusion. In a
study that matched a large number of firms doing IPOs with comparable firms that were
already publicly traded and had made no offering in several years, they found that it would
on average require a 44% larger investment in the IPO at its initial trading price to end up
with the same wealth five years later as with investing in the non-offering matching firm. See
Trm Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 32 (1995). This inferior
return swamped the initial discount of the offering price relative to the initial trading price so
that one would still have to make a 30% larger investment in the IPO at the offering price to
end up with as much wealth in five years. See id. The Loughran and Ritter study thus sug
gests that relative to actual value, IPOs are not offered at a discount but at a large premium.
See id.; see also Hans R. Stoll & Anthony J. Curley, Small Business and the New Issues Mar
ket for Equities, 5 J. Fm. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 309 (1970). Stoll and Curley studied
issuers registering very small offerings under the SEC's Regulation A - at the time $300,000
or less - and found that the offering prices were on average discounted relative to initial
trading prices, but that over the longer run, investments in these shares at the offering price
underperformed, even without risk adjustment, a portfolio of larger stocks. See id; see also
George Stigler, Comment, 37 J. Bus. 414, 421 (1964). Stigler compares, for new issues of
fered in the periods 1923-1927 (before the Securities Act) and 1949-1955 (after passage of the
Act), the average ratio of the price of the new issue shares five years after an offering to
market prices generally. He finds that the ratio for the post-Act period is not statistically
significantly better than for the pre-Act period. He uses this result to argue that the Act led
to no improvements. He also finds, however, without comment or a test for statistical signifi
cance, that in both periods the new issues, five years out, had underperformed the market as
a whole, again even without risk adjustment.
The possibility, raised by these studies, that IPOs are offered at prices in excess of actual
value suggests the existence of a market inefficiency that is systematically working to the
advantage of issuers and to the disadvantage of investors. Without a better understanding of
why such an inefficiency has arisen, if in fact it has, and why the market has not realized it
and corrected for it, we cannot tell whether the level of disclosure affects the extent of the
problem and, if so, which way. It must also be kept in mind that these findings may represent
the pricing of an as yet unidentified risk factor that is less prevalent with firms offering new
issues than with comparable ones that do not, rather than an unfairness-creating market inef
ficiency. In addition, for the last three years of the Loughran and Ritter study (1988-1990),
the wealth shortfall from investing in new issues disappears. This could be consistent with
the market having "caught on" and corrected for the inefficiency, although the authors feel
that given the particular features of these three years, this period is too short to reach such a
conclusion. See Loughran & Ritter, supra, at 49. In sum, the studies are simply reason for
more caution in changing IPO disclosure policy than other disclosure policies.
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generate price efficiency in the market for IPOs a'.ie more compli
cated, and their existence less well established empirically, than the
mechanisms that appear to generate price efficiency in secondary
markets. Caution, therefore, may suggest that contrary to the gen
eral recommendation here, the United States should not, at least
initially, switch to the issuer nationality approach in the case of for
eign issuer IPOs. On the other hand, a new share offering by an
established public foreign issuer does not involve the same
problems since the offering's price will be determined primarily by
the prevailing price in the secondary market for the issuer's already
outstanding shares.

Like the secondary market in the United

States, the secondary market abroad for this issuer's shares can be
assumed efficient, at least in the case of other developed capitalist
economies.1°1
The recommended switch to the issuer nationality approach
should also be qualified for both new issue and periodic disclosure
in the case of foreign issuers whose shares trade primarily in the
more immature secondary markets found in developing countries
and newly emerging economies. While there is evidence that many
foreign secondary markets display the same kind of efficiency that
U.S. ones do, the testing of this proposition, especially with respect
to markets outside Europe, is certainly not as extensive as with U.S.
markets.102 We cannot be sure that the more immature markets
found in developing countries and newly emerging economies have
the same level of efficiency as markets in the United States and
Europe. Moreover, the mechanisms that appear to generate price
efficiency in the United States and Europe are not as firmly in place
in such markets. Caution again suggests that at least initially the
issuer nationality approach not be extended to these issuers.

101. See Gabriel Hawawini, European Equity Markets: A Review of the Evidence on
Price Behavior and Efficiency, in EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS 3 (Gabriel A. Hawawini &
Pierre A. Michel eds., 1984); see also William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant
Regulation of Foreign Security Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, in KENNETH LEHN &
ROBERT KAMPHUis JR. MooERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION 35-51 (1992) (collect
,

ing studies showing the efficiency of a variety of foreign secondary markets).
102.

See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 101.
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The Analysis of U.S. Interests Does Not Depend on Other
Countries Also Adopting the Issuer
Nationality Approach

Why There Is No Need for the Foreign Issuer's Home Country
to Switch
My analysis above still holds true even

if

other countries con

tinue to adhere to the investor residency approach to statutory
reach. Consider first the proposition that the U.S. has a strong in
terest in applying its regime to all U.S. issuers, including those
whose shares are only publicly sold to, or traded among, foreign
investors. The whole argument in support of this proposition is
based on the idea that there is an optimal level of disclosure for
such an issuer and that U.S. officials have both greater motivation
and greater expertise than do officials of any other country in ascer
taining what that optimal level is. When the United States, in ac
cordance with the issuer nationality approach, imposes its regime
on a U.S. issuer, the issuer will in fact be disclosing at what in the
U.S. judgment is the optimal level, whatever any other country
does. If another country, in continued adherence to the investor
residency approach, imposes its regime on the U.S. issuer as well,
there is unlikely to be a material effect on the issuer's disclosure
behavior since the U.S. disclosure requirements, with which the is
suer is already complying, are the most comprehensive in the
world.103
103. This statement reflects a reasonable approximation of reality. See generally
MICHAEL BoWE, EUROBONDS 115 (1988) ("[T]he US has what are generally considered to be
the most extensive disclosure and regulatory requirements of any major capital market.");
FREDERICK G. FISCHER III, THE EURODOLLAR BOND MARKET 86 (1979) (describing the
SEC's registration requirements as involving "a degree of disclosure of both the issuer's busi·
ness and its financial position, well beyond what is customary in the Euromarkets"); see also
infra note 149. For imposition of the foreign regime to have absolutely no effect, all the
information required by the foreign regime must be a subset of what is required by the U.S.
regime. This condition that the U.S. and foreign regime be in a linear relationship is not
literally satisfied. While most of the information sought by the foreign regime typically
would be information sought by the U.S. regime, it might need to be presented in a some
what different form. And some of the information sought by the foreign regime would in fact
not be sought by the U.S. regime. Thus if the foreign regime as well as the U.S. regime is
imposed on a U.S. issuer, the issuer will be forced to disclose more than what the U.S. calcu
lation of costs and benefits would deem justified.
Nevertheless, linearity is an acceptable working assumption. Most U.S. issuers that are
already subject to the U.S. regime and decide to sell securities in the Eurobond or Euro
equity market find that preparation of the necessary disclosure documents for the foreign
authorities largely involves a simple markup of their U.S. disclosure documents. See, e.g.,
Accounting for Global Stocks, THE EXCHANGE, Jan. 1996, at 6 ("American companies listing
in overseas markets rarely have to make major adjustments in their reporting because other
countries usually accept it as satisfying their requirements."). Foreign country officials are
aware of the greater rigor of the U.S. regime. They have motivations to be flexible about
what is required of U.S. issuers so as not to put impediments in the way of having U.S. issuers
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The second proposition - that the U.S. has at ·best only a weak
interest in applying its regime to foreign issuers whose shares are
publicly sold to or traded among U.S. residents - also does not
depend on other countries adopting the issuer nationality approach.
Consider the bases of the argument supporting this second proposi
tion: that a foreign issuer's level of disclosure will not affect the
expected return available to U.S. investors; that greater disclosure's
risk reduction can also be achieved through greater investor diversi
fication; that applying the U.S. regime to foreign issuers may on
balance actually hurt U.S. investors by reducing the number of for
eign issuers whose shares are available to them; and that applying
the U.S. regime to foreign issuers may harm U.S. relationships with
other countries by forcing their issuers to disclose more than their
home countries believe is optimal. Each of these is true even if the
foreign issuers are not subject to the disclosure regimes of their
home country and is certainly unrelated to whether the foreign
country imposes its regime on U.S. issuers.
2.

Qualifications

Two qualifications are in order here as well. First, while diversi
fication is more potent than imposition of the U.S. regime for re
ducing the risk to U.S. investors associated with holding a foreign
issuer's shares (and this is true whether or not the issuer is subject
to its home country's disclosure regime), some U.S. investors, either
not understanding this fact or choosing to ignore it, will still not
fully diversify. These investors will suffer a greater increase in risk
if the U.S. stops applying its regime even to issuers not subject tq
their home country regimes, than they will if it stops applying its
regime only to those that are still subject to their home country
regimes. Where the issuer is not subject to the home country re
gime, the U.S. switch from the investor residency to the issuer na
tionality approach means a switch from a higher level of mandated
disclosure to none, rather than from a higher level to a lower one.
The second qualification is that while another country may re
sent application of the U.S. regime to those of its issuers that are
complying with its own regime, it may appreciate the application of
the U.S. regime to those that are not. The resentment where the
issuers are complying with the home country regime is based on its
shares offered to, and traded among, their residents. Tuey do not want such impediments
because, if their actions do keep such shares out of their country's market, their investors lose
additional investment opportunities and their securities industry loses business. See Choi &
Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 238-39.
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issuers being forced to disclose at a higher level than the home
country has determined is cost effective. But where the issuers are
not complying with the home country regime and the U.S. fails to
apply its regime as well, the issuers are likely to be disclosing at a
level lower than the home country officials would determine is cost
effective in terms of home country welfare. The under-disclosure
when the U.S. regime is not imposed may represent a greater devia
tion from what is optimal than the over-disclosure when the U.S.
regime is imposed.

Furthermore, officials of the other country

might also be unhappy because imposing neither regime on foreign
issuers whose shares are only offered and traded in the United
States is likely to result in a loss of transactions in the home coun
try. Its issuers will seek to evade its regime by promoting transac
tions in the U.S. instead.

These concerns of foreign officials

however, will be at most transitory for any country. The only time
when foreign officials will be concerned about the under-disclosure
and volume loss resulting from the United States not applying its
regime would be when they understand the rationale behind the
issuer nationality approach but are prevented from S\vitching to it
themselves by actors in the larger political environment who still
adhere to an investor protection goal for mandatory disclosure.
These two qualifications suggest that the U.S., in adopting the
issuer nationality approach, may wish to condition removal of U.S.
disclosure requirements from foreign issuers on their compliance
with the disclosure requirements of their home countries. Imposing
this condition would not much alter the overall impact of the
United States switching to the issuer nationality approach. As far
as the Exchange Act periodic disclosure requirements are con
cerned, most foreign issuers, even from countries continuing to ad
here to the investor residency approach, would meet this condition
because there is a public market for their shares at home that would

continue even if their shares started to trade in the United States.104
As far as Securities Act primary offering disclosure is concerned,
although compliance with the home regime may not be compelled
by an issuer's home country - for example in the case of an issuer
from an investor residency country making a primary market public
offering entirely abroad - presumably nothing stops the issuer
from voluntarily submitting itself to the home country regime in
order to avoid regulation under the more onerous U.S. regime.
Also, I have already suggested that the issuer nationality approach
104. See infra note 172.
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to statutory reach not be applied to foreign issuer IPOs, at least for
now.
JV.

THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISSUER NATIONALITY OVER THE
TRANSACTION LOCATION APPROACH

The discussion so far has concluded that U.S. residents have a
strong interest in the disclosure behavior of all U.S. issuers, even
those with no U.S. investors, and at best only a weak interest in the
disclosure behavior of all foreign issuers, even those with U.S. in
vestors. These conclusions point to the superiority of the issuer na
tionality approach to statutory reach over the investor residency
approach. We have yet, however, to evaluate the transaction loca
tion approach. While this approach plays a substantial role in cur
rent U.S. practice10s and some commentators believe it should play
an even larger role,106 the analysis below suggests that its use is
misguided.
The transaction location approach has three disadvantages com
pared to the issuer nationality approach. First, it imposes the U.S.
regime on foreign issuers whose shares are offered or traded in the
United States. The impact of this has already been fully discussed
above.107 That analysis shows that U.S. residents have at most only
a weak interest in the disclosure practices of foreign issuers.

In fact,

when we factor in the resulting reduction in the availability of for
eign securities and foreign relations problems, the practice of im
posing the U.S. regime on such foreign issuers will in all likelihood
be contrary to U.S. interests.
Second, the transaction location approach removes some U.S.
issuers from the reach of the U.S. regime. The analysis above
shows that U.S. entrepreneurs and the U.S. resident suppliers of
non-capital factors of production have a strong interest in the level
at which each U.S. issuer discloses. Under the transaction location
approach, a U.S. issuer's decision where to offer, sell, and promote
trading of its shares will determine which country's disclosure re
gime governs its disclosure. The approach thus gives U.S. issuers a
degree of control over the level at which they disclose. We will see
105.

See supra Part II.

106. The SEC, for example, in its release first proposing Regulation S, advocated that
"laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States [should] define disclosure require
ments for transactions effected offshore." lNmAL PROPOSING RELEASE, supra note 8, at
89,128. Similarly, Professor Choi and Guzman argue against what they refer to as the "extra
territorial" application of U.S. securities law including its disclosure rules. See Choi & Guz
man, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 221-23.
107.

See supra section 111.B.
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that they have incentives to choose regimes that require less disclo
sure than is in the best interests of these U.S. residents.
Finally, use of the transaction location approach negatively in
fluences the volume of transactions effected in the United States.
Issuers, in deciding whether to offer, sell, or promote trading of
their shares in the United States, know that doing so would result in
imposition of the U.S. regime, the strictest in the world, and many
do not want this. Reduced volume will have a negative impact on
the one group of U.S. residents whose interests we have not yet
considered, persons directly or indirectly associated with the securi
ties industry or securities exchanges, since their rents depend on
this volume.
A. The Transaction Location Approach Gives U.S. Issuers
Increasing Freedom to Choose Which Country's Regime Governs
Them and Their Preference Is for a Regime Requiring Less
Disclosure Than Is Socially Optimal

1.

The Issuer's Increasing Freedom to Choose Its
Disclosure Regime

Under the transaction location approach to statutory reach, a
U.S. issuer's choice of where to offer, sell, and promote the trading
of its securities will determine the disclosure regime under which it
operates. Admittedly, other factors also influence this choice be
sides its effect on what disclosure regime governs the issuer. Tradi
tionally, for the typical U.S. issuer, U.S. residents have been their
most likely potential investors. Moreover, U.S. residents have been
significantly more likely to purchase shares that are offered and
traded in the United States than those that are not.

Combined,

these two other factors have almost required such an issuer to have
its shares offered and traded in the United States, however much
the issuer is required to disclose as a result. The importance of
these other factors is weakening, however. Financial information is
becoming increasingly diffused globally, enlarging a U.S. issuer's
pool of likely potential investors to include many foreigners. And
the cost and difficulty of effecting orders abroad is going down, di
minishing the bias of U.S. investors against shares not available in
the U.S. market. As a result, a U.S. issuer's preference concerning
its governing disclosure regime will, in the future, be of relatively
greater importance in its choice of where to have its shares offered

and traded than it is today.ms
108.

These changes are discussed in more detail infra in Part VI.
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2. Market Failure: The Issuer's Preference for a Socially
Suboptimal Disclosure Regime109
An issuer's entrepreneurs or managers are the individuals who
actually choose where an issuer's shares are offered, sold, and
traded. Consequently, under a transaction location approach, they
choose which country's disclosure regime applies. It is their prefer
ences on which we must focus. Greater disclosure involves both
added costs and added benefits to them. Their preference will be
for the regime that requires the issuer to disclose closest to the level
at which the marginal increase in cost to them (the issuer's private
marginal cost or PMC) equals the marginal increase in benefit to
them (the issuer's private marginal benefit or PivIB). This point the issuer's "privately optimal level of disclosure"

-

will be below

the issuer's socially optimal level of disclosure. This is because, as I
show below, over the whole range of levels at which an issuer could
disclose, the social marginal cost of the issuer's disclosure (SMC) is
below its private marginal cost, and its social marginal benefit
(SivIB) is above its private marginal benefit (PivIB ).110 Tb.us, given
the choice, the issuer's entrepreneurs or managers would prefer the
issuer to be bound by a disclosure regime requiring less disclosure
than is socially optimal.

109. I discuss the matters considered in this subsection more extensively in Fox,
Empowering Issuers, supra note 15.
110. Over this whole range both SMC and PMC are assumed to be increasing and SMB
and PMB are assumed to be decreasing. This somewhat stylized model thus involves the
issuer disclosure level being measured cardinally and having associated with it a rising margi
nal cost curve and a falling marginal benefit curve. This is a reasonable depiction of what in
fact likely happens. The issuer first releases the piece of information that is most beneficial
relative to its cost, then the piece of information that is next most beneficial relative to its
cost, and so on.
corresponds to a situation where marginal private benefit is decreasing
and marginal cost is increasing. Since there is no reason to believe that the differences be
tween the marginal social benefit and marginal private benefit, or between the marginal so
cial cost and marginal private cost, would increase substantially as an issuer discloses more,
the marginal social benefit should also be decreasing and the marginal social cost should also
be increasing.

This
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$

PMB

/

Privately optimal
level of disclosure

a.

Costs.

For each

Level of disclosure

Socially optimal
level of disclosure

individual U.S. issuer, a disclosure involves

two different kinds of costs, "operational" costs and "interfirm"
costs. Operational costs are the out of pocket expenses and diver
sions of management and staff time that issuers suffer to provide
the mandated information. Interfirm costs arise from the fact that
the information provided can put the issuer at a disadvantage rela
tive to its competitors, major suppliers, and major customers.111
Operational costs are both private and social costs. Interfirm costs
are only private costs. They are not social costs because the in
terfirm disadvantages to the issuer from the disclosure are counter
balanced by the advantages it confers on the other firms. An
issuer's private marginal cost will therefore exceed its social margi
nal cost at all levels of disclosure.112 Thus even managers who com111. A review of SEC Regulation S-K, which provides the questions that are incorpo
rated by reference into its forms 10-K (periodic disclosure) and S-1 (initial public offering
disclosure), shows that it calls for a wide variety of information the disclosure of which on the
one hand would be useful for predicting an issuer's future cash flows, but on the other would
hurt the issuer because of the advantages it confers on other firms. Examples include profits
and sales of each significant individual line of business conducted by the issuer, future capital
spending plans, research and development spending, cost ratios, liquidity constraints, and
information on backlogs, inventories, and sources of supply. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, 17
CFR § 220.10l(a)(2)(iii)(B)(2); § 220.lOl(c)(l)(vi); § 229.lOl(b); § 229.lOl(c)(l)(iii);
§ 229.lOl(c)(l)(viii); § 229.lOl(c)(l)(xi); § 229.303(a)(l); § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (1998).
112. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1490-91 (1992); Coffee, supra
note 10; Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and The Protection of
Investors, 10 VA. L. REv. 669, 684-85 (1984); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763 (1995).
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pletely identify with existing shareholders - managers for whom
costs to the shareholders are equivalent to costs to them - would,

if they were free to choose the disclosure level at which to bind the
issuer, choose a level below the social optimum.
This divergence between private cost and social cost becomes
accentuated by the fact that disclosure increases the threat of a hos
tile tender offer

if managers

do not act to maximize share value.

This is because more disclosure makes a takeover less risky for po
tential acquirors.113 This consequence of disclosure is not a cost to
the issuer in terms of shareholder welfare; quite to the contrary. It
is, however, a cost to an issuer's entrepreneurs or managers - its
actual disclosure level decisionmakers - who would prefer to pur
sue their personal goals under fewer constraints.114

b. Benefits.

The market failure associated with this diver

gence between social and marginal cost is compounded on the ben
efit side of the equation. The private marginal benefit associated
with an issuer's disclosure will not equal its social marginal benefit
unless (i) the social benefits of the level chosen are fully reflected in
the issuer's share price, and (ii) this share price improvement is
fully enjoyed by the persons making the choice - the issuer's en
trepreneurs or managers. Under many circumstances one or both
of these conditions will not be met and the private marginal benefit
associated with an issuer's disclosure will be below the social margi
nal benefit.
Disclosure results in two major social benefits, improved choice
of capital projects and reduced agency costs of management.

i. Improved project choice.

How disclosure improves choice

among proposed new investment projects in the economy can be
seen most easily in a simplified world in which each new investment
project is undertaken by a new issuer that raises the necessary funds
through an IPO. Ideally, society would want to implement all proProfessor Romano, who favors a system under which issuers can choose the regime by
which they are bound, dismisses the importance of this difference between private and social
costs, suggesting that it is "a tenuous rationale for securities regulation." See Romano, supra
note 15, at 2426.
113. See MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND lNouSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC
ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND PouCY 84-91 (1987).
114. Greater managerial discipline would have a positive influence on share price. Ai; my
discussion of private benefits immediately below indicates, however, while this share price
improvement may derivatively be enjoyed by the entrepreneur or managers, in many cases
this benefit would not be sufficient to cancel out the cost to them of having to work under
greater discipline. See infra section IV.2.b.iii.
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posed projects in rank order of their risk-adjusted expected returns
- based on all available information including what is known by
the entrepreneurs proposing each project. The marginal project
that just exhausts society's scarce savings for investment would set
the risk-adjusted expected return on capital. Whichever issuer's
shares an investor purchased, she would receive a risk-adjusted ex
pected return just equal to that of the marginal project.
This ideal will not be achieved in the real world because some of
the information possessed by the entrepreneurs proposing each
project will not be public and hence not reflected in share price.
Some projects inferior to what in the ideal world is the marginal
project will be implemented because their issuers' share prices are
inaccurately high. Likewise, some projects superior to the ideal
world's marginal project will not be implemented because their is
suers' share prices are inaccurately low. With these projects, a pub
lic offering of even all of the issuer's equity would not produce
sufficient cash to fund the project.
An increase by all issuers in their disclosure would increase the
accuracy of all of their prices.

The resulting reduction in the

number of such misallocations would be a social gain. The question
for us, however, is what kind of incentives exist for the entrepre
neurs of each individual issuer to produce the disclosure that is
needed to achieve this social gain. In essence, to what extent is the
social gain produced by a single issuer's increased disclosure re
flected in its share price?

If we were to pick one issuer at random and command an in
crease in the amount of disclosure it provides, its entrepreneurs
would not on averag� enjoy any perceptible gain. Its share price
without the increased disclosure would be an unbiased estimate of
the future cash returns to the shareholder and so would the share
price with the increased disclosure.115 If, however, we were to ob
serve an issuer self-selecting to provide more disclosure than other
issuers provide, we would expect the issuer's share price to go up
and its entrepreneurs to enjoy a greater entrepreneurial surplus.
Market participants would reason that because the issuer's entre
preneurs choose to reveal more, the issuer probably has better
prospects relative to issuers disclosing less.
Thus it is the fact that an issuer chooses to disclose, not disclo
sure itself, that leads to the association between greater disclosure
115. The issuer's increased disclosure may result in better capital allocation and hence
influence the overall expected rate of return on capital at which this cash flow is discounted,
but in a large economy with many proposed projects this price effect would be imperceptible.
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and higher share price. This concept is the basis of signaling theory:
issuers that have good news signal this fact by disclosing their news
and those that do not have good news signal this fact by their inabil
ity to make comparable disclosures.116
While the signaling phenomenon means that the market will be
better informed in a system of voluntary disclosure than might first
appear, it will not be as well informed as

if

all issuers were com

pelled to disclose at the higher level that some issuers choose volun
tarily. Silence is not a complete substitute for disclosure because
the market knows that there are reasons why an issuer will not dis
close besides lack of good news. 117 As we have seen, an issuer may
choose not to disclose because revealing the information might put
it in an inferior position vis a vis competitor, major supplier, or ma
jor customer.
Projects therefore are not as well chosen in a signaling world 
where issuers are free to disclose or not and the market draws infer
ences from the decision of the issuers that do not - as in a world
where all issuers disclose at a high level. Moving from the first
world to the second produces social benefits because the list of
projects implemented would be closer to the ideal. The entrepre
neurs that do not disclose at a high level in the first world would
not, through higher prices, fully capture these social benefits from
their increased disclosure in the second world. Part of the benefits
would instead accrue to the entrepreneurs who disclose at a high
level in both worlds, because the improved allocation of capital
would mean a higher percentage of their projects would be imple
mented. In essence, to price each IPO properly, the market needs
information about all potential projects so that it can make the rele
vant comparisons accurately.
This public-goods aspect of issuer disclosure does not end here.
There are other ways in which information disclosed by one issuer
about itself can be useful in analyzing other issuers. It could, for
example, reveal something about possible industry-wide trends.118
Again, these are social benefits that the issuer disclosing the infor
mation cannot appropriate through higher share price.

116. Signaling theory is the theory of self-induced disclosure in the context of an IPO. No
one has offered any other plausible argument as to why voluntary disclosure alone could be
sufficient. The classic statement of signaling theory is found in Ross, supra note 10.
117. See Easterbrook & FISchel, supra note 112, at 687-88.
118. See id. at 685.
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A second benefit of

issuer disclosure is a reduction in the extent to which managers of
public corporations place their own interests above those of their
shareholders. Here I am talking primarily not about disclosure at
the time of an initial public offering but about what is provided pe
riodically thereafter. Greater ongoing disclosure increases the ef
fectiveness of the hostile takeover threat as a deterrent to such
behavior.119 Disclosure also assists in the effective exercise of the
shareholder franchise and in shareholder enforcement of :fiduciary
duties.
In determining the extent to which an issuer's entrepreneurs
and managers will be able to capture the social benefits from its
ongoing, post-IPO disclosure, we should start by observing that,
like IPO disclosure, this information too has "public goods" as
pects. It will aid both in the analysis of the prospects of issuers just
going public with IPOs and in the disciplining of managers of other
established public issuers through its assistance in the functioning of
the takeover threat against them and of their share price based
compensation incentives. These benefits will not be captured in the
price of the individual issuer making the disclosure.
In contrast, an issuer's share price should reflect the social bene
fit arising from its disclosure's disciplining effect on its own manag
ers. For private benefit to equal social benefit, however, the issuer's
entrepreneurs or managers must fully capture this price improve
ment. This can only happen

if the

issuer can bind itself at the time

of its IPO in an ironclad way to provide periodic disclosure at a
given level for the life of the

finii.

The higher the promised level,

the less the market would expect management decisionmaking to
deviate from what is in the shareholder's best interests and the
higher, net of the costs of this disclosure, the market price for the
issuer's initial offering. The entrepreneurs would capture this price
improvement through its resulting dollar-for-dollar increase in the
size of the entrepreneurial surplus.120
Issuers operating under a transaction location system of statu
tory reach, however, are not able to provide this kind of commit
ment. Thus, the internalization of the benefits from the disciplinary
effects of disclosure will not be complete because the market will
not be confident that the issuer is totally bound to disclose at the
119. The reduction in managerial discretion is, as discussed above, a direct cost to manag
ers even though it produces social gains through better resource allocation. The question
here is the extent to which entrepreneurs and managers feel these social gains.
120. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 112, at 684.
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chosen level forever.121 The market knows that managers will be
subsequently tempted to switch to a lower disclosure regime and,
by switching where their shares trade, have the capability of doing
so. This temptation arises because lower disclosure's reduction in
the risk of takeover provides managers with room to make more
decisions that satisfy their own objective functions at the expense of
the interests of shareholders.
Admittedly, when the managers switch to a lower disclosure re
gime, the share price in the secondary market will decline because
of the expected decline in managerial discipline. The managers,
however, will often find the added takeover protection worth the
share price decline.122 After all, their biggest concern with secon
dary market share price is often the takeover threat. The switch
would also increase the issuer's cost of seeking additional capital
through new share issues. Many established firms, however, never
raise new capital in this fashion. Even for those that do, the cost of
the lower share price will largely or wholly be borne by the existing
public shareholders, not the managers.

3.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion clearly demonstrates that the transac
tion location approach creates a potential market failure. The ap
proach permits U.S. issuers to exercise their preferences as to which
disclosure regime they wish to be governed by. Over time they will
be increasingly likely to exercise this preference and, to the extent
that they do, they will choose regimes requiring them to disclose
less than is socially optimal. In essence, the same reasons that call
for the maintenance of a mandatory disclosure regime in the first
place call for its statutory reach not to be determined on a transac
tion location basis. Assuming that U.S. officials attempt to act in
the best interests of the United States in setting the level of re
quired disclosure,123 this market failure means that the transaction
121. As a result, the case for signaling theory is inherently harder to make for periodic
disclosure than IPO disclosure. Steven Ross, in his classic exposition of the theory, assumes
that managers are a dollar better off for every dollar they increase the value of the firm. See
Ross, supra note 10, at 185. Any story as to why this might be so in the case of periodic
disclosure is much more complicated than in the case of an IPO, since, unlike the IPO, the
entrepreneurs are not in essence selling a portion of the equity of the company previously
belonging to them.
122. Managerial share ownership and stock options can ameliorate, but not eliminate,
this problem. Since such holdings constitute only a fraction of the issuer's outstanding shares
- in most cases a small fraction - most of the reduction in share value from non-share
value maximizing decisions is externalized onto other persons.

This

123.
is a reasonable and conventional assumption in a study of the regulation of
behavior with transnational effects. Even if U.S. officials have a bias toward requiring too
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location approach will, compared to the issuer nationality approach,
lower U.S. welfare.
B.

The Transaction Location Approach Will Reduce the Volume
of Share Transactions Effected in the United States

1. The Transaction Location Approach Will Discourage Issuers
With Privately Optimal Disclosure Levels Below What Is Required
by the U.S. Regime from Entering the U.S. Market
The United States has the strictest disclosure regime in the
world.124 A transaction location approach to the reach of this re
gime would, compared to the issuer nationality approach, reduce
the volume of share transactions effected in the United States and
thus lower the welfare of U.S. residents whose rents depend on this
volume. The transaction location approach determines whether an
issuer is subject to the U.S. disclosure regime based on whether or
not the issuer's shares are offered, sold, or traded in the United
States. Such a policy will discourage the entrepreneurs or managers
of any issuer having a privately optimal disclosure level below U.S.
requirements from establishing a U.S. market for its shares. The
additional disclosure to meet U.S. requirements would involve
more costs than benefits to them.
The typical foreign issuer is going to fall into that group. The
starting point for seeing why is the fact, just established, that every
issuer's privately optimal level of disclosure is lower than its socially
optimal level. The next step is that the socially optimal level of
disclosure of the typical foreign issuer is, in turn, lower than the
socially optimal level of the typical U.S. issuer. This is because issu
ers from different countries, as discussed in more detail in Part V,
show significant divergences in terms of both their internal decision
structures and external environments. These divergences suggest
differences in the extent to which disclosure will be effective in
helping to align managerial and shareholder interests and to assure
the best choice of proposed real investment projects. For a variety
of reasons, disclosure is likely to be less effective in these regards

high a level of disclosure, as might be predicted by public choice theory, the transaction
location approach will still lower U.S. welfare unless the bias is so strong that the required
level is more suboptimally high than the level chosen by issuers is suboptimally low. These
points are discussed in more detail infra in Part VII.

124. See supra note 103

and

infra note 149.
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with foreign issuers than with U.S. issuers, and so the socially opti
mal level of disclosure will be lower for the typical foreign issuer.125
The last step is that each country can appropriately be assumed
to regulate in its own best interest. Thus the level of disclosure re
quired by the U.S. regime will be an unbiased estimate of what is
socially optimal for the typical U.S. issuer. We will examine this
assumption in more detail in Part VII, where I argue that it is the
reasonable and conventional one to make in a study of the regula
tion of behavior with transnational effects. Moreover, as we will
see, to the extent that this assumption has been subject to criticism,
it is that the U.S. required level is too high, not too low. Thus it is
safe to say that the level of disclosure required by the U.S. regime is
at or above the socially optimal level for the typical U.S. issuer.
In sum, a substantial majority of foreign issuers will be discour
aged from making their shares available in the U.S. market under
the transaction location approach. This is because the typical for
eign issuer's privately optimal level of disclosure is well below what
is required by the U.S. regime. Its private level is below its socially
optimal level, which is below the socially optimal level for the typi
cal U.S. firm, which, in turn, is at or below the U.S. requirements.
Under the transaction location approach, a significant number
of U.S. issuers will be discouraged from having a U.S. market for
their shares as well. The reason for that discouragement closely re
sembles the reason for foreign issuers. Every U.S. issuer will have a
privately optimal disclosure level that is below its socially optimal
one. The level required by the U.S. regime will be at or above the
socially optimal level of the typical U.S. issuer. Thus the typical
U.S. issuer would prefer to be bound by a disclosure regime requir
ing less than the level required by the U.S. regime. Under the
transaction location approach, the impact of this preference on an
issuer's choice of where to offer, sell, and promote the trading of its
securities may not be great today, but, as discussed above, it will
grow.126 This is because of a likely weakening over time of the
other factors that influence this choice, as financial information be
comes increasingly diffused globally and the cost and difficulty of
effecting orders abroad goes down.

125. There is no reason to believe that the typical foreign issuer's costs would be compa
rably lower as well, and so social marginal cost should equal social marginal benefit at a
lower level of disclosure than with the typical U.S. issuer.
126. See supra section IV.A.1 and infra Part VI.
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2. Issuers Having Privately Optimal Disclosure Levels at or
Above What Is Required by the U.S. Regime Will Not Be
Attracted to the U.S. Market by the Transaction Location
Approach
Most of the world's issuers of any significance would want to
have their shares offered and traded in the United States absent
such transactions triggering imposition of the U.S. regime. This is
because United States markets provide better access to U.S. resi
dents, the biggest single pool of investors in the world. U.S. ex
changes also provide superior execution to that of their foreign
counterparts.127 Consequently, issuers with privately optimal dis
closure levels at or above the level required by the U.S. regime
would have their shares offered and traded in the U.S. market
whether or not that resulted in imposition of the U.S. regime. Thus
the transaction location approach does nothing to attract such issu
ers, because they will be in the U.S. market regardless.
The approach fails to attract such issuers for another reason as
well. At least as far as periodic Exchange Act disclosure is con
cerned, nothing appears to prevent such issuers from registering
their shares, and hence gaining the advantages of binding them
selves to the world's strictest regime, whether or not their shares
trade in the United States.128

3.

Conclusion

The transaction location approach to statutory reach reduces
the volume of share transactions effected in the United States and
thus the welfare of U.S. residents whose rents depend on such vol
ume (those associated with the securities industry and the ex
changes ) .

The

appro ach discourages

all issuers whose

entrepreneurs or managers find that their costs of compliance with
the U.S. regime are greater than their benefits, a group that proba
bly includes a substantial majority of all the world's issuers. And it
127. Tue total costs of executing a trade (including the effect of the order itself on the
price) is significantly lower on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ than on foreign
markets. See Amar Bhide, Efficient Markets, Deficient Governance, HARV. Bus. RE.v., Nov.
Dec. 1994, at 129; Joel Chernoff, London Trading Costs Rise, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, July
25, 1994, at 20;
128. Professors Choi and Guzman argue that an issuer having its shares trade in the
United States would, under the transaction location approach, econoinically communicate to
the market that the issuer is disclosing at the U.S. level. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous
Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 229-30. This is true. However, the mere fact of registra
tion alone econoinically communicates the same thing and, under the efficient market hy
pothesis, should be fully reflected in share price even if not all market participants are aware
of it.
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does nothing to attract issuers for whom the benefits from compli
ance do equal or exceed the costs. This second group of issuers is
likely to have their shares trade in the United States whatever ap
proach to statutory reach the United States adopts. In any event,
members of this second group can register their shares under the
Exchange Act and obtain the benefits of compliance without having
their shares trade in the United States.
V.

THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH
OVER ANY ACHIEVABLE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
A.

National Differences in Issuer Decision Structures

There are likely to be important differences among issuers
worldwide in terms of the level of disclosure that will maximize the
returns (net the costs of this disclosure) that their capital utilizing
productive activities generate. These differences in their socially
optimal disclosure levels are significantly related to the nationalities
of the issuers involved.
The operating and project choice decisions of an issuer that is
publicly held or is seeking public financing are the product of both
the internal decision making structure of the issuer and the external
environment that provides the inputs that make this structure func
tion - most important for our concerns, shareholder votes and new
capital. The internal decision making structure arises out of a com
bination of the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation and the is
suer country's traditional business customs and practices.129 The
129. For a classic survey of the differences among countries in terms of these internal
decisionmaking structures, see Al.FRED F. CONARD, CoRPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE (1976).
See also MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976). The statutory differences among countries are obvious, but differences in traditional
business customs and practices are also important in determining these internal decisionmak
ing structures.
The influence of traditional business customs and practices is reflected in part in differ
ences among countries in their corporations' typical basic constitutive documents (their arti
cles of incorporation or equivalent). Large, publicly held corporations of a given country are
likely to have constitutive documents that have more in co=on with each other than with
those of corporations of other countries. This is in part because the "network externalities"
associated with hay;.ng sinillar constitutive documents are stronger domestically than transna
tionally. There is a degree of path dependency in the development of typical terms for any
given country, and the factors that determine the starting point have chance qualities that will
vary from one country to another. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and
Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995).
The influence of traditional business customs and practices are reflected as well in the
behavior that occurs within the legal structure set up by statute and the basic constitutive
documents. Thus, for example, the board of directors of the typical U.S. public corporation is
given the power to manage the corporation and direct its policy, but traditionally the board
has done neither. This is in part because of the limited amount of time that outside directors
have expected to devote to the job, the limited amount of information they have expected to
receive and review, and their reluctance to meet separately from full-time management. See
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external environment is determined by a number of factors includ
ing the degree of concentration of share ownership, the nature of
the holders of any such concentrated blocks, the rules and practices
under which these holders use their voting power singly and in co
operation with others, the extent to which the legal system and sup
pliers of finance facilitate or hinder hostile takeovers, and the
relative availability of financing in different forms (equity versus
debt) and from different sources (private versus public markets).
Comparative corporate governance has become an important
subject for legal and financial scholars in recent years and the re
sulting studies show significant contrasts among countries in both
internal decision structures and external environments.130 These
contrasts suggest differences in the extent to which disclosure will
be effective in helping to align managerial and shareholder interests
and in assuring the best choice of real investment projects. That, in
turn, suggests that the optimal level of disclosure, where the social
marginal benefits just equal the social marginal costs, may be higher
in one country than in another.
By way of illustration, a set of rough contrasts can be made be
tween, on the one hand, the United States and Canada (and, to a
lesser extent, the United Kingdom), which have relatively strict dis
closure regimes, and, on the other, Germany and Japan, which have
more lax ones.131 These contrasts suggest significant differences in
the value of disclosure. Voting power in U.S. issuers is less concen
trated, and institutional investors in U.S. issuers are less inclined,
separately or together, to exercise their voting power to influence
JOHN c. BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 12-18 {1945); EISENBERG, supra, at 13948; ROBERT A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LAROE CORPORATION 79-146 {2d
ed. 1961); MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY {1971); Bayless Manning, The
Business Judgment Rule and The Director's Duty ofAttention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW.
1477 {1984). Starting in the early 1990s, however, some boards have begun to take a more
aggressive stance, as indicated by the firing of some prominent chief executives. See, e.g.,
Brett D. Fromson, American Express: Anatomy of a Coup, WASH. PoST, Feb. 11, 1993, at
Al; Doron P. Levin, Stempel Quits Job As Top G.M. Officer in Rift with Board, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 1992, at Al; Steve Lohr, Big Business in Turmoil: Upheavals at I.B.M., Sears and
Elsewhere Underline Fundamental Shifts in Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at Al; Steve
Lohr, I.B.M. to Replace Its Top Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at Al. While increased
pressure by institutional investors is an important factor in this shift, it appears to reflect as
well an underlying change in business culture as directors reconceptualize their role and
change their expectations concerning the time they devote to the job, the information they
receive, and their overall separateness from their companies' full-time managers.
130. See, e.g., MARK J. RoE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
RooTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE {1994); Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REv.
1997 (1994).
131. See infra note 149.
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corporate decisions.132 Debt/equity ratios are lower133 and there is
more use of publicly offered equity as a source of finance,134 partic
ularly by relatively new companies financing major projects. Hos
tile tender offers are more frequent, as are solicitations of public
shareholders in proxy fights.135 In contrast, in Germany and Japan,
132. See, e.g., RoE, supra note 130, at 22, 169-70.
133. See, e.g., F.X. Browne, Corporate finance: stylizedfacts and tentative explanations, 26
APPLIED EcoN. 485, 488 (1994) ("[Non-financial f]inns in securities-based financial systems
{the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada . . . ) have quite low debt/equity ratios
compared to those in the bank-based systems of Japan, Germany and France.").

134. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 133, at 494 (stating that internal funding is significantly
greater in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada than in Japan and continental
Europe).
135. With respect to Germany, for example, see RoE, supra note 130, at 172. According
to Roe, a concentration of voting power in the hands of banks makes an American style
proxy fight nearly impossible. German banks maintain control over stock in three ways: (1)
they own the stock themselves; (2) they control mutual funds, which own stock; and, most
importantly, (3) they possess authority to vote stock that the bank's brokerage customers
own, but deposit with the bank. See also Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Take

overs: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61
Comparative Analysis of the Proxy
Machinery in Germany, Japan, and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 58 U. Pm. L. REv. 145, 181-82 (1996).
FORDHAM L. REv. 161, 181 (1992); Douglas G. Smith, A

The difficulty of conducting a hostile takeover offer in Germany is illustrated by Pirelli's
well publicized 1991 attempt to take over the German tire company Continental, the only
attempt to take over a major German firm in recent memory. Continental recruited Ger
many's largest co=ercial bank to mount its takeover defense and persuaded other German
companies, such as Daimler-Benz, to purchase large quantities of its stock. When sharehold
ers repealed a five percent cap on individual shareholder voting, Continental successfully
challenged the action in the German courts. Pirelli reportedly spent $290 million in connec
tion with the failed merger. See Ferdinand Protzman, Costly German Lesson: Pirelli's Failed
Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1991, at D2; Mark R. Wmgerson & Christopher H. Dom,

Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective,
1992 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223, 250; Tire Maker Calls OffMerger Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1991, at D5.

The absence of hostile takeovers in Japan has been noted by many co=entators. A
number of writers point out that because of a complex network of inter-corporate and bank
equity holdings, it is exceedingly difficult for outside companies to acquire controlling blocks
of shares in a target company. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., In Defense of Management
Buyouts, 65 TUI.. L. REv. 57, 83 n.74 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 1277, 1299-300 (1991);
Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions
Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 328 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corpo

rate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REv. 73, 81, 100 (1995); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the
Market: The Ministry ofFinance and Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INrL. L. 423,
437-38 (1994).

It is a matter of debate whether these hostile takeover defeating stockholding arrange
ments represent a mechanism for self-serving management entrenchment, as some of these
co=entators imply, or an efficient response to the complex problem of corporate govern
ance. Mark Ramseyer has argued that the lack of hostile takeovers in Japan might illustrate
some of the inefficiencies inherent in the hostile takeover mechanism. Ramseyer argues that
hostile takeovers, by allowing shareholders to renege on implicit bargains struck with man
agement, allow shareholders to capture any organizational rent the firm earns. Moreover,
Ramseyer suggests that in reducing the levels of future managerial compensation, hostile
takeovers reduce the incentives for managers to make firm-specific investments. See J. Mark
Ramseyer, Takeovers in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology and Corporate Control, 35 UCLA L.
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institutional investors play a larger role both in monitoring manage
rial behavior136 and in supplying finance, mostly debt.137
B.

National Practice Reflects Resulting Differences in Optimal
Disclosure Levels

The picture painted here suggests that the socially optimal level
of disclosure for U.S. issuers would be higher than for German and
Japanese ones. U.S. institutional investors monitor less carefully
the way managers of U.S. issuers make both operating and project
choice decisions. They collect, analyze, and act on less information
(both public and non-public) concerning these matters. Thus, more
of the work of aligning managerial and shareholder interests with
respect to these decisions falls to the hostile takeover threat and
share price based managerial compensation, both of which are as
sisted by greater public disclosure. Greater disclosure and its en
hancement of share price accuracy is also of more assistance to
good project choice in the United States because of the greater reli
ance by U.S. "start-up" companies on the public equity markets .138
The choice of required disclosure levels by these different countries
conforms with what this rough illustration calls for. The United
States and Canada require the most, Germany and Japan the least,
with the United Kingdom somewhere in between.139
C.

Implications for the Likelihood of an International Regime

The preceding discussion suggests that there are different opti
mal levels of disclosure for issuers of different countries and that
countries have recognized and acted on these differences. This
makes unlikely the adoption of an international regime imposing a
REv. 1 (1987); see also Corrine A. Franzen, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Corpora
tions: ls Bank Monitoring the Answer?, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 292 (1993) (sug
gesting that Japan may not need hostile takeovers since greater bank involvement in
corporate management is more efficient than the takeover market discipline system of the
United States).
136. See RoE, supra note 130, at 169 (noting that senior managers in Germany and Japan
share power with active intermediaries who control large blocks of a company's stock).
137. Japanese firms borrow $5.33 from banks for every dollar they raise in the capital
markets, German firms $4.20, and American firms $0.85. See Macey & Miller, supra note
135, at 85, 89.
138. Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black show that the prospect of a vibrant market for
initial public offerings in the United States for issuers that have shown a certain degree of
success greatly facilitates the earlier provision of venture capital to get them off the ground in
the first place. This, they argue, explains why there is so much more venture capital available
in the United States. See Ronald Gilson & Bernard Black, Venture Capital and the Structure
of Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. EcoN. 243 (1998).
139. See supra note 103; infra note 149.
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uniform level of disclosure for all issuers around the world:
whatever level might be proposed, it will, for most countries, be
inferior - either too high or too low - compared to the level
called for by their current regimes. Most countries would therefore
be disinclined to agree to adoption of the regime. For some of
them, there would be some attractions as well to having a uniform
international regime, but, as discussed below, these attractions
would, for now, in most cases appear insufficient to overcome their
likely opposition.

1. Administrative Convenience
The primary attraction of a uniform international regime cited
by commentators is administrative convenience: issuers would be
saved from having to comply with multiple national regimes .14o
This problem is also avoided, however, by a nationally based system
of disclosure regulation as long as the countries use the issuer na
tionality approach to statutory reach advocated here. In fact, a na
tionally based system using the issuer nationality approach would
be significantly more convenient administratively than an interna
tional regime since dealings between the entrepreneurs or manag
ers of the issuers and the officials regulating them would be
between persons who share a common culture and understanding
of business practices.141

2.

Common Language

A second possible attraction of an international regime would
be the creation of a common language and format used by all issu
ers around the world in their mandated disclosure. Having a group
of issuers use the same language and format facilitates comparisons
and makes communicating at any given level of precision more eco
nomical for both the sender and receiver. Indeed, this is one ration140. See, e.g., Release No. 6568, supra note 21 (suggesting agreement among several
countries on a single prospectus format and co=on disclosure standards as one possible
approach to facilitating multinational offerings); see also John M. Fontecchio, The General

Agreement on Trade in Services: Is It the Answer to Creating a Harmonized Global Securities
System?, 20 N.C. J. lNn.. LAW & CoM. REG. 115, 123 (1994) (suggesting that GATS be con
sidered as a means to pull the governments of the world toward a harmonized global securi
ties market); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HAR.v. !Nn.. L.J. 185, 187 (1990).
141. Professors Panto and Karmel conducted a survey of foreign issuers that had regis
tered their shares with the SEC. Their results provide an example of this kind of problem.
Some of the surveyed issuers complained that the SEC staff was unfamiliar with the business,
accounting and legal practices in their countries, thereby generating more lawyer involve
ment and expense. See PANTO & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 32-35.
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ale for mandatory disclosure in the first place.142 Without any
regulation, each of the tens of thousands of public issuers around
the world would be speaking its own language. Already today with
national regulation, however, this babel is being largely reduced to
"languages" associated respectively with the regimes of the rela
tively small number of major capitalist countries. A major portion
of the capitalized value of the world's publicly traded equities is
issued by issuers subject to these regimes.143 There is evidence that
a sufficient number of speculators are "multilingual" that share
price accuracy for these issuers will not be significantly enhanced by
further movement to the single language of an international disclo
sure regime.144

3.

Transborder Externalities

The third possible attraction to a global regime arises from posi
tive transborder externalities in a nationally based system produced
by the disclosures of each country's issuers. These externalities,
which would be eliminated under a global regime, bias each coun142. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 112, at 685-87. They argue that while stan
dardized information fosters comparison across investments, no firm will offer such informa
tion on its own because the benefits of comparison spill over to the firm's competitors. They
suggest that mandatory disclosure rules promulgated by the government are one form of
collective action available to solve this problem.
143. At year-end 1994, seven countries-the United States, Canada, the United King
dom, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany-together accounted for 75% of the world's total
market capitalization of nearly $15.2 trillion. See INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
EMERGING STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 1995, at 15 (1995).
1994 Year-End Capitalization
Market

US$ millions

Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
U.K.
U.S.

$

G7 Total

$11,428,895
$15,185,607

World Total

315,009
451,263
470,519
180,135
3,719,914
1,210,245
5,081,810

See id. (based on data presented in the Developed Markets capitalization chart).
144. One way to test this proposition is to compare, for foreign issuers listed on a U.S.
exchange, the response of their share prices when they originally announce their earnings
prepared on the basis of home country conventions, with the response of their share prices
when they subsequently announce these earnings reconciled with U.S. GAAP. Gary Meek
performed such a test and found that the price response to the first announcement suggests it
has considerable information value, while the price response to the second announcement
suggests that it does not add anything significant. See Gary K. Meek, U.S. Securities Market
Responses to Alternate Earnings Disclosures of Non-U.S. Multinational Corporations, THE
Acer. REv., Apr. 1983, at 394.
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try's decision concerning its level of required disclosure toward a
level lower than what is optimal from a global welfare perspective.
While real, this attraction is probably not sufficient to overcome the
obstacles to a uniform regime.

a.

The trarzsborder externality bias.

To understand the bias in

duced by transborder externalities, recall from Part IV that for each

individual

issuer, disclosure involves two different kinds of costs,

"interfirm" costs and "operational costs." 145 Interfirm costs arise
from the fact that the information provided can put the issuer at a
disadvantage relative to its competitors, major suppliers, and major
customers. They are not, in general, social costs because the disad
vantage to the issuer is counterbalanced by the advantages con
ferred on the other firms. For the typical issuer, as long as it and its
competitors, major suppliers, and customers are all subject to the
same regime, the existence of a mandatory disclosure regime in
volves a wash in terms of these interfirm disadvantages and advan
tages. Where this is the case for all issuers subject to regulation,
national officials, in determining what level of disclosure will maxi
mize national welfare, can ignore interfi.rm costs and focus on the
tradeoff between greater disclosure's efficiency gains from better
management and project choice, on the one hand, and its higher
operational costs, on the other.
In a world with international trade and multinational corporate
operations, however, some of an issuer's competitors and major
suppliers and customers may not share the issuer's nationality and
so will not be subject to the same disclosure regime as the issuer is.
This problem biases a national government downward when it sets
its required disclosure level because it knows that its issuers will
suffer all of the interfirm costs, but receive only part of the interfirm
advantages, from the disclosures it mandates. Thus, in calculating
the optimal level of disclosure in terms of the welfare of its resi
dents, it will consider not only its operational costs but also the
cross-border portion of interfirm costs.
The cross-border interfirm costs that national governments con
sider in their calculations are not, however, social costs from a
global welfare point of view. Each issuer's interfi.rm disadvantages
from disclosing information will be fully counterbalanced by advan
tages to its competitors, major suppliers, and major customers, once
foreign as well as domestic firms are included in the calculation.
145. See supra section IV.A.2.a.
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if the officials determining

required disclosure levels did not consider cross-border interfi.rm
costs.

b.

The improbability of a single, uniform regime solution.

Creation of a single, uniform international regime would eliminate
consideration of all interfi.rm costs. Each of the world's issuers
would then be subject to the same regime as all of its competitors,
major suppliers, and major customers.146 Thus the same officials
would determine the required disclosure level for all of them, and
the decision setting their level of disclosure would be subject to no
externalities.147
There is good reason to believe, however, that this third attrac
tion of a uniform regime, while the most real,

will be insufficient to

gain the agreement of all parties. To start, the gain from eliminat
ing externalities is probably less than the problem with a uniform
international regime that led to our skepticism about its adoptabil
ity in the first place. An indication that these externalities are not a
matter of intense concern is the fact that large U.S. corporations
146. This problem could theoretically be solved without scrapping the world's current
nationally based system of regulation. An international agreement could provide that each
country would receive a subsidy for the interfirm advantages abroad arising from its chosen
level of mandatory disclosure. This would eliminate the bias toward underdisclosure, while
preserving the capacity to tailor mandated disclosure levels to reflect national differences
among the world's issuers. Like any global welfare enhancing proposal, such an agreement is
potentially attractive to all parties because, at least in theory, it is possible to split up the
consequent wealth gain in a way that leaves every country better off. Such an ngreement
seems very unlikely, however. Just as a threshold matter, it is hard to imagine a consensus
forming on a way of measuring extraterritorial interfirm advantages.
147. The elimination of the externalities results from the fact that the regime is interna·
tional, not that it is uniform. My colleague James Krier has made the point in the context of
federal versus state environmental regulation that the United States could have federal regu·
lation but with non-uniform standards. This would eliminate externalities while permitting
rules to be tailored to the particular regulatory costs and benefits of each area. See James E.
Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA
L. REv. 323, 328-30 (1974); James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental
Standards in a Federal System - and Why it Matters, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1226, 1236-37 (1995).
In theory, the same could be said about international versus national regulation of disclo·
sure, but some critical differences render the idea inapplicable here. Compared to federal
officials assessing the environmental situation in the states, international officials are likely to
be at a much greater distance - physically, culturally, linguistically, and experientially from the particular features in each country that lead to differences in regulatory costs and
benefits of disclosure regulation. Also, these distances matter more since the national differ·
ences in the disclosure area are entirely institutional whereas in the state, differences in the
environmental area are, to some extent, physical and more describable in generally accepted
technical terms. Most importantly, there is no overarching world governmental organization
that would enhance the political accountability of international disclosure regulation officials
in a way comparable to the role of the federal government in the lives of federal environmen
tal regulators. This kind of accountability would be essential in a system where the officials
were making decisions about differential treatment based on different national needs and
transborder effects.
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have voiced almost no opposition to propqsals by the New York
Stock Exchange to permit the listing of major foreign issuers with
out reconciling their :financials to U.S. generally accepted account
ing practices.148
Assume for argument, however, that the externality problem,
which a uniform regime eliminates, is in fact more serious than the
untailored disclosure level problem that a uniform regime creates,
so that a uniform regime would lead to a global wealth gain. Even
then, adoption is unlikely. Many countries - the ones whose cur
rent required disclosure levels are lower than the uniform level of
the international regime - would still in fact lose, not gain, from
elimination of the externality. Issuers from these countries would
be hurt two ways. First, their increased disclosure would increase
the harm they suffer as a result of competitors, major customers,
and major suppliers abroad finding out additional things about
them. Second, they would find out less about their competitors,
major suppliers, and major customers that are from countries whose
current required disclosure levels are higher than the uniform one.
Admittedly, with a global wealth gain, the winning countries' gains
would more than match the losing countries' losses. And so, in the
ory, transfers could be arranged from the winners to the losers that
would leave every country better off. Effecting such transfers
would be difficult as a practical matter, however. Unlike a trade
pact, for example, adoption of a uniform regime would not involve
a complex of terms each of which has its own distinct pattern of
impacts on the necessary parties, so that every party can be given
enough points of particular importance to it to find the agreement
as a whole worthwhile.
148. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC) are negotiating a proposal that would allow foreign issuers to
list their shares on U.S. exchanges by following international rather than U.S. accounting
standards. The New York Stock Exchange has been instrumental in moving the proposal
forward. It has found a sympathetic ear with Congress, which provided in the National Se
curities Market Improvement Act of 1996 that the SEC prepare within one year a report "on
progress in the development of international accounting standards and the outlook for suc
cessful completion of a set of international standards that would be acceptable to the Com
mission for offerings and listings by foreign corporations in United States markets." Pub. L.
No. 104-290, § 509, 110 stat. 3416, 3449 (1996). The SEC staff, however, has stated that the
Commission will not accept international accounting standards which depart significantly
from the philosophy, coverage, and specificity of U.S. standards. See Richard Leftwich, Ob
stacles to Global Accounting Deal, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1997 (Mastering Fmance Supple
ment), at 2. A search of the popular press reveals no opposition from large U.S. corporations
to the Exchange-backed plan despite the fact that foreign issuers would be required to dis
close Jess than U.S. corporations must. The New York Stock Exchange does note objection
by U.S. accountants and foreign issuers already using U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles. See Jim Kelly, World Accounting Wins More Converts, FIN. TIMES, June 9, 1997,
at 4.
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VI.

How GLOBALIZATION INCREASES POLITICAL PRESSURE TO
LOWER U.S. DISCLOSURE STANDARDS UNDER THE INVESTOR
RESIDENCY AND LOCATION OF TRADE APPROACHES BUT NOT
UNDER THE ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH
We have just seen that the issuer nationality approach to select

ing issuers covered by the U.S. regime will result in a higher level of
U.S. economic welfare than will the investor residency or location
of trade approaches, at least under the simplifying assumption in
Parts III-V that the choice of approach will not affect the future
content of that regime. In fact, though, the choice of approach will
affect the regime's future content. Thus, the welfare implications of
the choice of approach are more complex than they have been por
trayed so far. Consideration of this more complex picture, how
ever, ultimately reinforces the conclusion that issuer nationality is
the superior approach to statutory reach.
The United States has the strictest mandatory disclosure regime
of all the major capitalist states.149 In these last two parts of the
149. The United Kingdom is a critical country for comparison with the United States.
The United Kingdom is the home of the International Stock Exchange (formerly the London
Stock Exchange), which, along with the New York Stock Exchange and the Tokyo Stock
Exchange, is one of the world's three major stock exchanges. The United Kingdom is consid
ered by the SEC to have disclosure requirements that are closer to those of the United States
than those of other countries (except Canada). See Release No. 6568, supra note 21. Never
theless, a detailed comparison between the disclosure requirements of the United States and
the United Kingdom for companies that issue equity securities reveals that the U.S. requires
significantly more information. Differences in requirements include the amount of detail that
must be provided describing the nature of the issuer's business, the need to provide data
concerning the results of the different lines of business in which the issuer participates, the
need to discuss trends that management identifies as affecting the issuer's future liquidity,
capital needs or operating results, and the need to provide information about management
compensation and share ownership. See SEC Proposals to Facilitate Multinational Securities
Offerings: Disclosure Requirements in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U.
J. lNTL. L. & PoL. 457, 459-68 (1987); see also GEORGE BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL
D1scLosuRE IN 1HE UK AND 1HE USA 20-21, 37 {1976); Report ofthe Staff of the U.S. Secur
ities and Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban
Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on the Internationalization of the
Securities Market III-91 (1987) [hereinafter SEC Internationalization Report]. European
countries in general put much less emphasis on full disclosure. See Peter Widmer, The U.S.
Securities Laws - Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to Messrs. Loomis and Grant), 1 J.
CoMP.CoRP. L. & SEC. REG. 39 (1978). Japan, the home of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, has a

securities statute that closely parallels the Securities Act and the Exchange Act of the United
States. However, the staff responsible for promulgating and implementing regulations and
enforcement is very small compared to that of the SEC, and many provisions of the statute
are treated as inoperative. The emphasis is on de facto screening of issuers by regulatory
authorities rather than full disclosure. See Kunio Hamada & Keiji Matsumoto, Securities
Transaction Law in General, in 5 DoING BusINESs IN JAPAN VIII 1-1, §§ 1.02[1] and 1.02[4]
{Zenturo Kitagawa ed., 1987); SEC Internationalization Report, supra, at III-127.
The United States, in addition to having a set of regulations and an administrative appara
tus that solicit more information from issuers than those of other countries, has a liability
system as well that prods more information out of issuers. Under Section 11 of the Securities
Act, the issuer is absolutely liable for materially false or Inisleading statements in the regis
tration statement. The underwriter is liable as well unless it sustains the burden of proof that
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paper, I show that in the face of increasing globalization, a relaxa
tion of this regime is likely if the United States stays on its current
path of determining statutory reach in significant part on the basis
of residency of the buyers and the place where the transactions oc

cur. This relaxation will be the consequence of increasing political
pressure by persons seeking to maximize the number of transac
tions effected in the United States, most significantly persons asso
ciated with the U.S. securities industry and the U.S. exchanges.
This relaxation

will occur even if, as seems likely, it diminishes U.S.

welfare. A switch to a pure issuer nationality approach would avoid
these pressures and hence this welfare diminishing relaxation.
This Part analyzes how, without the switch to the issuer nation
ality approach, the level of U.S. disclosure requirements is inversely
related to the volume of transactions effected in the U.S. (at least in
the absence of reaction by other countries) and how growing

globalization will increase the sensitivity of this inverse relationship.
Growing globalization

will

therefore increase political pressure to

relax the requirements since, with this increased sensitivity, a given
decrease in the level of required disclosure

will lead

to a larger im

provement in U.S. volume.
Securities globalization consists of two trends. First, investors

everywhere will be at a diminishing information disadvantage con
cerning issuers from other countries. Second, effecting share trans

actions abroad will become increasingly inexpensive and easy. As a

result of these trends, the market for securities of issuers of any
significance

will become an increasingly global one in the future.

If

the United States switches to a pure issuer nationality approach, as
recommended here, this trend toward globalization

will

not result

in any pressures to reduce the rigor of the U.S. mandatory disclo
sure regime. If, however, the U.S. adheres to its current approach,
with its emphasis on investor residency and transaction location,
these same trends will increasingly have just that result.
Why this disparity in result? When issuers choose whether or
not to have their shares offered, sold, or traded in the United
States, they may be sensitive, to one extent or another, to the level
of disclosure required by the U.S. regime. The greater this sensitiv
ity, the greater the number of issuers that, while unwilling to have
their shares offered or traded in the United States under current
after conducting a reasonable investigation ("due diligence"), it had reason to believe and
did believe that the registration statement contained no materially false or misleading state
ments. The liability system in the United Kingdom, for example, is not as far reaching. See
SEC Internationalization Report, supra, at III-116.
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if these

stan

dards were relaxed by some given amount. Thus greater issuer sen
sitivity leads to a greater desire to have the U.S. standards relaxed
by interests whose well being depends on the volume of transac
tions effected in the United States. Globalization's effect on this
sensitivity

will depend on the

approach the United States adopts to

statutory reach.
A.

The Issuer Nationality Approach

Under a pure issuer nationality approach, an issuer's choice of
whether or not to have its shares offered or traded in the United
States would have no impact on whether the U.S. regime would
apply to it. Thus, with regard to this choice, issuers are completely
insensitive to the required disclosure level of the U.S. regime. The
regime would either apply or not, depending on factors entirely in
dependent of this choice. Since the U.S. regime's required level of
disclosure is irrelevant to issuers' choices as to where to have their
shares offered and traded, it has no effect on the volume of transac
tions effected in the United States.

Globalization in no way

changes this and so, as it intensifies, persons whose welfare depends
on this volume

will

not put increased pressure on U.S. officials to

lower U.S. disclosure requirements.
The desensitizing effect of a switch to the issuer nationality ap
proach

will

also be welfare enhancing in terms of issuer choices as

to where to have their shares offered and traded. The choice of
each issuer, rather than being guided by an effort to come under the
regulatory regime it prefers,

will instead

depend solely on the eco

nomic fundamentals of the situation: the efficiency with which dif
ferent markets effect trades, the country or countries of residence
of their most likely investors, and the extent to which such investors
find markets in their own country or countries the cheapest and
most convenient places to transact.
B.

The Investor Residency and Transaction Location Approaches
1.

General Considerations

When, as now, factors relating to the residence of the buyers
and where the transactions occur are taken into account in deter

mining whether to apply the U.S. regime, the issuer will be sensitive
to the level of U.S. disclosure standards. The issuer can often avoid
being subject to the U.S. regime by not offering shares in the
United States and by not promoting their secondary trading there.
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The efficacy of this strategy of avoidance arises in part because the
U.S. explicitly uses the place where transactions in an issuers'
shares are effected as a factor in determining whether or not to ap
ply its regime.150 The strategy also helps an issuer avoid the U.S.
regime because, without offerings or secondary trading in the
United States, two other factors used by the United States in deter
mining whether or not to apply its regime - the percentage of the
issuer's shares held by U.S. residents and the absolute number of
such U.S. holders151 - are likely to be lower as well.
As discussed in Part IV, the world's issuers fall into two groups:
a minority whose privately optimal level of disclosure is at or above
the level required by the U.S. regime, and a substantial majority
whose privately optimal level is below the U.S. requirements.152
Whichever group they are in, most of the world's issuers of any
significance would want to have their shares offered and traded in
the United States absent the fact that such offering or trading would
trigger imposition of the U.S. regime.153 United States markets
provide better access to the huge investor pool of U.S. residents
and superior execution.154 Both lead to a higher share price.155
Under the current approach, however, the U.S. regime, with the
highest level of required disclosure in the world, is in general im
posed on issuers whose shares are sold or traded in the United
States.156 The first group of issuers - those that prefer a regime at
150. Location is an explicit factor not only when we try to implement the goal of market
protection (where location represents the whole concern), see supra notes 25-35 and accom
panying text, but also where we try to implement the goal of investor protection. See supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Tue rationale here is presumably that the effecting of a
significant number of transactions in an issuer's shares in the United States is an indicator
that there are a significant number of U.S. resident investors in need of "protection."
151.
152.
153.
154.

See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
See infra section IV.B.2.
See Romano, supra note 15, at 2419.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note

155.
9, at 225. A recent
paper by two economists at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) suggests that a foreign
issuer that lists on the NYSE will enjoy an 8% increase in share price. See KATHERINE SMITH
& GEORGE SoFIANos, THE IMPACT OF AN NYSE LISTING ON THE GLOBAL TRADING OF
NoN-U.S. STOCKS 9 (NYSE Working Paper 97-02, 1997).
156. As discussed in Part I, compliance with the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure re
quirements is necessary for any foreign issuer's shares to trade on a U.S. stock exchange.
Through a grandfathering provision, a number of foreign issuers that were trading on
NASDAQ prior to October 6, 1983 have been permitted to continue to do so by meeting a
substitute, minimal disclosure requirement. Any foreign issuer wishing to commence NAS
DAQ trading now, however, must undertake full compliance. Full compliance is not neces
sary for a foreign issuer's shares to be traded in the United States in a forum other than an
organized U.S. exchange or NASDAQ. Such an issuer can commence having its shares
traded among U.S. brokers on the basis of the "pink sheets" simply by meeting the same
substitute minimal requirements imposed on the grandfathered NASDAQ issuers. Tue

770

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:696

least as strict as the existing U.S. regime - will be neither attracted
nor discouraged by the current approach because they would wish
to be in the U.S. market in any event. The second, majority group
of issuers - those that prefer a regime less strict than the existing
U.S. regime

-

will

be discouraged by it. The focus of the rest of

Part VI is on this second group since only with them is there, under
the current U.S. approach to statutory reach, a relationship be
tween the rigor of the U.S. regime and the volume of transactions
effected in the United States. Their entrepreneurs or managers
would find compliance a burden.151
In deciding whether to have their shares offered or traded in the
United States, the entrepreneurs or managers of this second group
must compare this burden with the advantages of better access to
U.S. investors and better execution. Those that find the advantages
less than the burden of compliance

will

avoid the U.S. market.

These issuers' avoidance of the United States represents for
gone rents for U.S. persons whose welfare depends on the volume
of transactions effected in the United States. In order to minimize
the number of issuers avoiding the U.S. market, these persons can
be expected to exert ongoing pressure on U.S. officials for lower
U.S. disclosure requirements.158 Current disclosure standards are
the product of a combination of this pressure and the purely domes
tic forces that, but for the existence of foreign issuers and foreign
markets, would by themselves set U.S. disclosure requirements.
Despite the burden of compliance, avoiding the U.S. market tra
ditionally has not made sense for U.S. issuers since the United
spreads associated with this kind of trading are considerably larger, however, and thus inves·
tors purchasing these shares will experience a lower expected return and Jess liquidity. See,
e.g., Iain Jenkins, 'Pink Sheets' Mix Risk With Rewards, lNTI... HERALD TRin., Nov. 19·20,
1994, at 19 (noting that the spread in the OTC market for ADRs can be as much as 10%).
157. By definition, the entrepreneurs or managers of an issuer with a privately optimal
level of disclosure below the U.S. regime's required level would find the U.S. regime a bur·
den. See supra section IV.A.2. The burden that U.S. disclosure requirements impose on
many foreign issuers has been noted by others. See, e.g., FANTO & KARMEL, supra note 21, at
32-33, 39; James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropri
ate?, 17 FORDHAM INTL. L.J. S58 (1994); Franklin R. Edwards, SEC Requirements for Trad
ing of Foreign Securities on U.S. Exchanges, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES
REGULATIONS 57 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1991) (noting that there
had been no growth in the total number of foreign issuers listed on the U.S. exchanges and
NASDAQ since the imposition of the Exchange Act's periodic disclosure regime on new
NASDAQ issuers, despite the rapid growth in the trading of foreign securities); Greene et al.,
supra note 12; Roberta S. Karmel & Mary S. Head, Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S.
Markets, 24 LAW & POLY. INn.. Bus. 1207; Romano, supra note 15, at 2419.
158. A number of co=entators agree that the securities industry and the stock ex·
changes will pressure U.S. officials to adopt disclosure rules that maximize volume. See, e.g.,
FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 5; Choi & Guzman, National Laws, supra note 9, at
1874.
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States is the residence of a large portion of their most likely poten
tial investors. Hardly any U.S. issuers have chosen to do so.159 The
converse of this proposition is that for many foreign issuers, avoid
ing the U.S. market often does make sense given the burden of
compliance. In fact, only about 700 out of about 28,900 foreign
public issuers have chosen to comply with U.S. requirements. 160
The analysis below suggests that this picture is likely to change.
The trends toward globalization will decrease the advantages to
U.S. issuers who choose to have their shares sold or traded in the
U.S. market and increase the advantages to foreign issuers making
the same choice. Thus,

if the U.S. disclosure requirements are kept

the same, the shares of more foreign issuers and fewer domestic
issuers will be sold and traded in the United States. The net effect
of the trend toward globalization on the volume of transactions ef
fected in the United States is ambiguous. We will see, however,
that the effect on issuer sensitivity to the U.S. level of disclosure is
unambiguously positive.

This means that as the trend toward

globalization progresses, a given relaxation of standards would lead
to a greater and greater increase in the volume of transactions ef
fected in the United States and in the resulting gain in the rents to
persons whose welfare depends on this volume. Thus the political
pressures to relax these standards will grow.161

2.

The Impact of the Global Diffusion of Financial Information
The increasing global diffusion of financial information is going

to diminish the information disadvantage that investors everywhere
159. See supra note 45.
160. According to the International Fmance Corporation's annual survey of world stock
exchanges, the total number of listed domestic companies worldwide in 1995 was 36,572. See
lNTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, supra note 2, at 23. Of these companies, 10,884
were in the world's developed markets outside of the United States; 7,671 were U.S. compa
nies. See id. As of September 1995, there were 602 SEC-registered and reporting foreign
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and
NASDAQ. See JAMES L. COCHRANE ET AL., FOREIGN EQUITIES AND U.S. INvEsTORS:
BREAKING DowN THE BARRIERS SEPARATING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 10 (New York Stock
Exchange Working Paper No. 95-04, 1995). One hundred registered and reporting foreign
companies were trading over-the-counter. See id. at 10 n.8. Another 1,173 unregistered for
eign companies were trading over-the-counter, exempt from the SEC's reporting require
ments under 12g3-2(b). See id. at 10. The 242 foreign companies currently being traded on
the New York Stock Exchange represent only about one-tenth of the overseas companies
that could meet the Exchange's listing qualifications. See id. at 2.
161. A number of academics and practitioners believe that the SEC will eventually lower
its standards in order to keep stock exchange and investment bank business in foreign securi
ties from moving abroad. See, e.g., FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 5; Bevis Longstreth,
A Look at the SEC's Adaption to Global Market Pressures, 33 CoL. J. TRANSNATL. L. 319
(1995). It is significant that Congress seems to be pressuring the SEC to react in just this
fashion. See supra note 148.
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face with regard to issuers from countries other than their own. In
order to analyze the impact of this trend on the level of trading in
the United States and on pressures to reduce the rigor of the U.S.
regime, we need to separate it out from the impact of the other
major component of the trend toward globalization - the reduc
tion in the cost and difficulty of effecting orders abroad. To do this,
assume for now that it is impossible to effect orders abroad: all
initial purchases and subsequent secondary trades by U.S. residents
occur in the United States. In such a world, a policy of U.S. inves
tor protection and one of U.S. market protection are completely
coextensive. An issuer, whether U.S. or foreign,

will have

to com

ply with U.S. disclosure rules to have a significant number of U.S.
resident investors. The larger the number of the world's issuers
that choose to comply, the larger the total volume of transactions
effected in the United States.162
The following picture emerges, as demonstrated more rigor
ously in the model in Appendix I.
a.

United States issuers.

Today, with the current incomplete level of global diffusion of
:financial information, almost all publicly traded U.S. issuers choose
to comply with U.S. disclosure rules and have their securities sell
and trade in the United States. They are less well known abroad,
and thus their share price would suffer significantly

if they

relied

exclusively on a foreign investor pool. The sacrifice that wo_uld be
involved is sufficiently great that the burden of compliance with the
U.S. regime is worthwhile. Relaxing U.S. standards to lower this
burden of compliance cannot add to the volume of transactions ef
fected in the United States by bringing U.S. issuers home, because
almost all U.S. issuers are at home already.
What

will

happen in the future as we move toward full global

diffusion of :financial information? If current disclosure standards
are maintained, the near universal compliance by publicly traded
U.S. issuers is likely to cease. Exclusive reliance on foreign inves

tors will entail less of a price disadvantage, and a significant number

of U.S. issuers

will find it worth the

sacrifice of having no U.S. in

vestors in order to be freed of the burden of complying with the
162. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that if U.S. residents have made available
to them the shares of a greater array of the world's issuers, they will both save more and
invest a larger portion of their savings in equities. This seems plausible given the significant
improvement in equity investing's tradeoff between risk and return that can be attained
through international diversification. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note
1, at 2509-12, 2523-25.
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the volume of transactions effected in the U.S.

now, relaxation of U.S. disclosure standards would prevent some or
all of this loss of issuers.
b.

Foreign issuers.

Today, with the current incomplete global diffusion of :financial
information, only a small percentage of foreign issuers comply with

U.S. disclosure requirements. The others know that if they were to

comply, the demand for their shares would be higher because then,
in addition to their shares being sold and traded at home, they
could also be sold and exchanged or NASDAQ traded in the
United States.163 The resulting price advantage derived from access
to U.S. investors is not, however, as great as it is for U.S. issuers
because foreign issuers are less well known among U.S. investors.
These noncompliers have calculated that this smaller price advan
tage is not large enough to justify the burden of complying with the
U.S. regime. However, the existence of some foreign issuers that
do comply under current standards suggests the existence of others
that do not, but are at the margin. If today the U.S: standards were
relaxed, thereby reducing this burden, the number of foreign issuers
complying would, unlike with U.S. issuers, increase.
What

will

happen in the future as we move toward full global

diffusion of information? The price advantage to foreign issuers of

having access to U.S. investors will increase. If U.S. disclosure stan
dards are maintained at current levels, an increasing number of for

eign issuers will find that the price advantage of having U.S.
investors has become sufficiently large to be worth the burden of
compliance.164 If the standards were relaxed, the increase in the
number of foreign issuers would be that much greater. This means
that a lowering of U.S. standards, whether now or after further
global diffusion of information, would increase the number of for
eign issuers complying and hence the volume of transactions ef
fected in the United States.
163. Any issuer trading on a U.S. exchange must comply. Any issuer not currently trad
ing on NASDAQ that wishes now to start such trading much comply also. See supra notes
36-49 and accompanying text.
164. These trends are already in place. In the period 1986-96, there has been a general
increase in foreign issuer common stock listings on both the New York Stock Exchange and
NASDAQ, particularly in the latter part of the period. See FANTO & KARMEL, supra note 21,
at 18-23.
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Aggregate effects.

If U.S. standards are maintained at current levels, a move to
ward full global diffusion of financial information will decrease the
number of U.S. issuer share transactions effected in the United
States and increase the number of foreign issuer ones. The net ef
fect is ambiguous. Relaxing U.S. disclosure requirements right now
would result in a greater number of issuers choosing to access the
U.S. market than do so under the current requirement. Relaxing
U.S. disclosure requirements in the future, when financial informa
tion becomes more globally diffused, would have a larger positive
effect. Today it would only increase the number of foreign issuers
choosing the U.S. market, whereas in the future it would increase
the number of both foreign and U.S. issuers making that choice.
Thus the future's greater global diffusion of information will in
crease the pressure by the securities industry to lower U.S. stan
dards because the gains to its members from such a lowering will be
greater than they are today.

3. Reductions in the Cost and Difficulty of Effecting Transactions
Abroad
a.

Irrelevance of reductions in cost and difficulty under a
perfectly implemented exclusive investor residency
approach to statutory reach.

Analyzing the impact of the reduction in the cost and difficulty
of effecting orders abroad - the other component of the trend to
ward globalization - requires being very specific in describing the
U.S. approach to statutory reach and how it is implemented. If the
United States were to adopt an exclusive investor residency ap
proach to statutory reach and to implement it perfectly (i.e., did not
rely on evidence concerning where transactions in an issuer's shares
occur as proxy for the residency of the shares' buyers), a reduction
in the cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad would
have no effect on the pressures for a lower U.S. standard because
imposition of the U.S. regime would in no way depend on the loca
tion of transactions in an issuer's shares. In that situation, only the
increasingly global diffusion of information would have an effect on
pressures to lower the U.S. standard and the analysis in the immedi
ately preceding section would describe the whole story. Any issuer
wanting to have a significant number of U.S. buyers or holders
would have to comply with the U.S. regime regardless of whether
or not it was selling its shares in the United States or promoting
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their secondary trading there. Therefore it might as well do so since
there would always be some loss of potential U.S. investors if the
shares were not offered in the United States or traded there, even
after the substantial reductions in the cost and difficulty of purchas
ing securities abroad. As in the analysis above, an issuer's decision
that it is worth incurring the burden of compliance to have access to
the pool of U.S. investors is therefore tantamount to a decision to
offer its shares in the United States and have them trade there.
b.

Effects of reductions in cost and difficulty under the current
approach to statutory reach.

In reality, however, the United States does not rely exclusively
on the investor residency approach to statutory reach. Investor
protection does not reflect the exclusive rationale guiding U.S. pol
icy as to statutory reach; market protection concerns are involved as
well.165 Even

if

investor protection were the exclusive rationale,

perfect implementation of an approach based on such a goal is diffi
cult because the residence of the parties to a share transaction is not
easily monitored. Also, the investor residency approach, applied
with sufficient rigor, would create problems with other countries. A
country's issuers, while having a fairly direct and powerful ability to
control the geographic location of trades in their shares, have less
control over the residence of persons initially buying publicly of
fered shares and little control over the residence of subsequent pur
chasers. Thus they could easily become subject to the U.S. regime
even though they took no steps to encourage U.S. investors beyond
becoming a public company through primary share sales occurring
in their own country.
The U.S. approach, therefore, includes a component of transac
tion location as well.166 This creates incentives for issuers to avoid
the United States. As it becomes cheaper and easier for U.S. inves
tors to effect transactions abroad, these incentives increase. Issuers
are no longer foregoing as much of the U.S. pool of investors

if

their shares are only offered, or traded, abroad and so the sacrifice
from only being public abroad is less. In a certain portion of cases,
the fact that an issuer's shares are being sold or traded only abroad

will

tip the balance and the U.S. regime will not be applied. The
lowering of the sacrifice associated with having shares sold or of
fered only abroad

will

induce more issuers, both U.S. and foreign,

165. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Part I. There is also a component of issuer nationality in the current U.S.
approach, but that does not add to these incentives.
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reduce the volume of transactions

effected on U.S. markets relative to what it would be absent the
United States using place as a factor in determining whether to ap
ply its regime.
The ultimate question again concerns the political pressures on
U.S. officials to relax the U.S. regime's required level of disclosure.
To figure out how reductions in the cost and difficulty of effecting
transactions abroad, when added to the further globalization of fi
nancial information,

will

affect these pressures requires a compari

son of the positions today and in the future of both U.S. and foreign
issuers.

i.

U.S. issuers.

Suppose first that the United States continues

to maintain its current high level of required disclosure. We just
saw that while almost all U.S. issuers today comply with the U.S.

will change with further globalization of financial infor
will increase. With
this increased demand, even if it were impossible for U.S. investors

regime, this

mation. Foreign demand for U.S. issuer shares

to effect transactions abroad, some U.S. issuers will find the sacri
fice involved in avoiding the sales and trading of their shares in the
United States sufficiently reduced to be worth enduring in order to
avoid the burden of U.S. disclosure regulation.167 When we take
account of the additional facts that in reality it is possible for U.S.
investors to effect transactions abroad and that the cost and diffi
culty of doing so

will go

down, we can expect even more U.S. issu

ers to make this choice since doing so

will not force them to give up

completely access to the pool of U.S. investors, as we had assumed
in the analysis above.
Now suppose that the U.S. at some point lowers its level of re
quired disclosure. Lowering the required level of disclosure today
will still have no immediate effect, just as we determined in the
analysis in the section above focused solely on global information
diffusion. Again, almost all public U.S. issuers currently comply
and so there are none to be attracted home by a relaxation of stan
dards. Lowering the required level of disclosure in the future, how
ever, which we determined in the prior analysis would increase the
number of U.S. issuers staying home, would have an even bigger
effect once we account for the reduction in the cost and difficulty of
167. As long as the issuer incorporates abroad, focuses its public offerings abroad, and is
not (and, through secondary trading, does not become) more than 50% beneficially owned
by U.S. residents, the issuer would not need to supply any more information than that re
quired of it by foreign authorities. See supra sections I.A.2.a; I.B.2.
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effecting transactions abroad. With these reductions, less of a trans
formation in an issuer's investor pool is needed to avoid having any
transactions in its shares occurring in the United States and thus a
greater percentage of U.S. issuers would be on the margin as to
whether or not to make this choice. A given lowering of U.S. stan
dards will persuade a larger number of U.S. issuers to stay home
who would otherwise choose to be public only abroad. Thus adding
to the analysis globalization's second component - the reduction
in the cost and difficulty of effecting transactions abroad - suggests
that globalization

will

have an even greater effect on future U.S.

issuer sensitivity to a lowering in U.S. standards.

ii. Foreign issuers.

We saw in the analysis in the section

above focusing solely on global information diffusion that today
some foreign issuers comply with the U.S. regime in order to have
their shares offered and traded in the United States and more
would do so

if the U.S. disclosure requirements were lowered.

The

foreign issuers that choose to comply do so because they wish to
eliminate the additional costs and difficulties that U.S. investors
would otherwise experience effecting transactions in their shares. If
there were further global diffusion of financial information but no
easing of the cost and difficulty of effecting share transactions
abroad, U.S. investor demand for foreign issuer shares would in
crease. As we have seen, that would increase the price gain to for
eign issuers from having their shares offered and traded in the
United States. More foreign issuers would think it worthwhile to
endure the burden of complying with the U.S. regime and the vol
ume of transactions in foreign issuer shares would increase. On the
other hand, with an easing of cost and difficulty of effecting share
transactions abroad but no further global diffusion of information,
fewer foreign issuers would comply with the U.S. requirements
since, in theory at least, they could have access to an increasing

number of U.S. investors without complying.16s

Thus, with the United States maintaining its current required
disclosure level, the size and direction of the combined effect of
increasing globalization's two components on the volume of foreign
issuer transactions appear to be ambiguous. Resolving that ambi
guity requires looking at the different stages in the trend: the "in168. Professors Fanto and Karmel surveyed substantial foreign issuers that choose not to
in the United States. Many mentioned that they felt no pressing need for such a listing
because U.S. investors, at least the institutional ones, have shown a willingness to make
purchases on these issuers' home markets. See FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 37.

list
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terim" stage, when global information diffusion has increased and
effecting a transaction abroad is easier and cheaper than it is now
but still significantly more difficult and expensive than doing so at
home; and the "culmination" stage, when the differential in the
ease and cost of effecting transactions has been greatly reduced and
there is full global diffusion of financial information.
In the interim stage, the effect of the decreased cost and diffi
culty of effecting transactions abroad may be largely illusory. At
this stage, U.S. investor demand for a foreign issuer's shares is re
ally more potential than actual until the issuer attracts the interest
of one or more U.S. analysts. The most likely candidate is an ana
lyst associated with a firm making a market in, or that is a specialist
for, the issuer's shares. No such firm is likely to exist unless the
issuer's stock is offered or traded in the United States.169 Thus, the
effect of the first component of the trend toward globalization the increasing diffusion of financial information - is likely to domi
nate. The preceding section's analysis of that component in isola
tion is thus a reasonable description of what will happen in the
presence of both components of globalization. As analyzed above,
there will be an increase in the number of foreign issuers whose
shares are offered and traded in the United States even if U.S. dis
closure standards are not lowered. And there is no strong reason to
believe that foreign issuer sensitivity to a relaxation of U.S. disclo
sure standards will change in either direction.
As we approach the culmination of the trend, however, things
will switch, with the second component predominating instead.
When effecting a transaction abroad becomes almost as easy and
cheap for a U.S. investor as effecting one at home, there is no rea
son for foreign issuers to put up with the burden of higher U.S.
disclosure requirements to the extent that the U.S. does not use a
perfectly implemented investor residency approach to statutory
reach. This will be true no matter how much global diffusion of
information has added to U.S. investor demand for their shares. In
such a world, the analyst attention necessary to turn potential de
mand into actual demand is unlikely to continue to require trading
on a U.S. market. Brokerage firms will become increasingly trans
national. For most of the significant foreign issuers that choose to
be traded only outside the United States, there will be at least one
169. Professors Fanto and Karmel surveyed foreign issuers that obtained United States
listings and found that numerous respondents listed attention from analysts as an important
reason for the listing. See FANTo & KARMEL, supra note 21, at 31.
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brokerage firm making a market or being a specialist in its shares
that has an analyst trusted by U.S. investors.
In discussing this culmination stage, we are assuming for the
moment that U.S. disclosure standards remain unchanged and that
transaction location continues to play its current role in determin
ing application of the U.S. regime. Notwithstanding increases in
U.S. investor demand for foreign issuer shares, the second compo
nent of the globalization trend

will

ultimately decimate the secon

dary U.S. trading of shares of foreign issuers that do not engage in
primary offerings in the United States.17° Primary offerings in the
United States would decline significantly also.171 Marginal reduc
tions in the level of disclosure required by the United States would
not help much, but a total elimination of the difference between the
U.S. level and what is called for abroad would help a great deal.
With a total elimination, the execution efficiency of U.S. markets
and the residual cost and convenience advantages to U.S. investors
from investing in shares offered or traded in U.S. markets would be
sufficient to attract most significant foreign issuers to the United
States.
m.

Aggregate Effects.

In the interim stage, adding the reduc

tion in the cost and difficulty of effecting transnational transactions
to the increased global diffusion of financial information

will

en

large U.S. issuer sensitivity to a relaxation of U.S. disclosure stan
dards. It will not diminish foreign issuer sensitivity to such a
relaxation. Thus the aggregate effect is that issuer sensitivity to- the
U.S. level of required disclosure, and hence the sensitivity of the
volume of transactions effected in the United States,

will

increase

even more with globalization than was suggested by the analysis in
the section above, which only considered knowledge diffusion.
Along with this larger increase in sensitivity

will

come a larger in

crease in political pressures to relax U.S. standards.
170. A foreign issuer that engages in a primary offering in the United States must thereaf
ter provide periodic disclosure under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Thus, as long as it
is even slightly cheaper and more convenient for a U.S. investor to trade shares at home, any
issuer that engages in such an offering might as well promote secondary trading of its shares
in the United States.
171. Suppose that a foreign issuer during this culmination stage engages in a primary
offering only abroad. Investors in the markets where the shares are offered know that U.S.
investors will have easy access to its shares once secondary trading develops in those markets.
This means there is greater potential secondary market demand for the issuer's shares than
would be the case today when U.S. investors do not have such easy access. The issuer's
shares will therefore suffer less of a price penalty for being initially offered only abroad than
would be the case today.
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In the culmination stage, adding the reduction in the cost and
difficulty of effecting transnational transactions to the increased
global diffusion of financial information

will

again enlarge U.S. is

suer sensitivity to a relaxation of U.S. disclosure standards. The
effect on the sensitivity of foreign issuers at the culmination stage is
trickier. Many might be almost entirely insensitive to a minor re
duction in the U.S. standard but very sensitive to a major reduction
that takes the U.S. level all the way down to the level of other coun
tries. In the absence of a switch to the issuer nationality approach,
the political pressure

will

involve a

mix

of demands for a major

reduction in U.S. requirements and demands for a move, as far as
practical, away from transaction location type tests for determining
statutory reach, i.e., toward a pure investor residency approach.

mix of demands suc
will result in a radical reduction in U.S. disclo

To the extent that the first element of the
ceeds, globalization

sure standards. To the extent that the second element succeeds, the
analysis of the effects of globalization goes back to the analysis in
the section above, which was devoted to the pure effects of global
diffusion of information.

Under a pure investor residency ap

proach, transaction location

will not influence whether the U.S. re

gime is applied. Thus the reductions in the cost and difficulty of
effecting transactions abroad

will not matter.

The residual cost and

convenience advantages to U.S. investors from investing in shares
traded in U.S. markets

will

be enough to attract to the United

States any issuer that calculates that having U.S. investors is worth
the burden of complying with the U.S. disclosure regime. Thus the

effects of globalization are the same as if we were to assume that it
is impossible for U.S. investors to effect orders abroad - the as
sumption of the analysis in the section above concerning the impact
of global diffusion of information alone. That discussion concluded
that globalization would increase the sensitivity of issuers to the
U.S. disclosure level. Thus if pressures to move to a pure investor
residency approach succeed, the move

will

,

combined with global

ization, increase the pressures to lower the U.S. disclosure level,
though not necessarily as radically as

if the pressures

to move to a

pure investor residency approach fail.
c.

Effects of a switch from exchange based trading to
electronic trading.

Today the shares of most, though not all, issuers of any signifi
cance are traded on a stock exchange such as the New York Stock
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Exchange or the Tokyo Stock Exchange.172 It is possible, however,
that in the next decade or so the shares of most or all such issuers

will be traded not on stock exchanges but instead electronically via
computer.113 The irrelevance of the place where a transaction is
172. In the United States, for example, the market capitalization of the approximately
2,675 issuers listed on the New York Stock Exchange was $6.01 trillion in 1995. See NEW
Yoruc STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BooK 42 (1996). This still dwarfs non-exchange based trad
ing. At the end of 1994, the market capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange was
roughly three and one half times the capitalization of all other equity markets in the United
States including NASDAQ. See 1995 SEC ANN. REP. 154; NASDAQ FACT BooK 1 (1996).
Non-exchange-based trading facilities, most notably the NASDAQ, are posing increasing
competition, however. In 1995, the New York Stock Exchange held 50.2% of the annual
dollar trading volume of U.S. equity markets ($3.08 trillion) while the NASDAQ captured
39% of the U.S. market ($2.40 trillion). See NASDAQ FACT BooK, supra, at 8; NEW Yoruc
STOCK EXCHANGE FACT B OOK, supra, at 13.
A stock exchange maintains a trading floor at a single physical location. Buyers and sell
ers, wherever located, place orders through brokers that send them to the exchange floor
representatives who in turn participate in some form or other of auction for the stock in
question. See 5 Loms Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 2506 (1990). On
some exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange, members may make "upstairs"
trades off the floor of the exchange if (1) the stock was listed on or after April 26, 1979, or (2)
a member is executing a block trade (10,000 or more shares or a market value of $200,000 or
more) as an agent for the buyer or seller, but not both. See id. at 2576 n.266; Rule 390,
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 'l[ 2390 (prohibiting members from trading listed stocks in over-the
counter markets, i.e., off the exchange floor); Regulation 19c-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-3 (1996)
(allowing members to trade listed stocks over the counter, provided the stock became listed
after April 26, 1979); Regulation 19c-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-1 (allowing off the board trading
for a block positioner acting as an agent for either the buyer or the seller); Rule 127, N.Y.S.E.
Guide (CCH) 'l[ 2127 (block trading).
Thus, as a general matter each trade in an exchange listed stock trade has a physical place
where execution occurs, and, in that sense, can be said to occur in a particular, identifiable
nation. And while the issuer's stock may be listed on more than one exchange, typically the
bulk of trading occurs at just one of them. In the case of a stock with a multiple listing, the
exchange that starts with the largest volume of trading has the self-perpetuating advantage of
continuing to be the most attractive place to trade because it offers the greatest liquidity. See
MoRRis MENDELSON & JUNros W. PEAKE, ELEcrRONic EXECUTION SYSTEMS: MYTH vs.
REALITY 1, 2 (University of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econs. Discussion Paper No. 93, 1990). This
tendency for investors to confine their trades to the exchange with the largest volume is
illustrated by the fact that where computer links have been established between two ex
changes in the same time zone, for example between the American Stock Exchange and the
Toronto Stock Exchange, orders for stocks listed on both exchanges have tended to flow
primarily in one direction, toward the "primary" exchange (the more established exchange
for trading the issuer's stock). See William C. Freund, Electronic Trading and Linkages in
International Equity Markets, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 1989, at 11-12. Where the links
have been between exchanges in different time zones, orders made during the hours that the
primary exchange has been closed tend to be offset only against pre-existing quotations from
the primary exchange. See id.
173. It is a matter of debate whether this current exchange-based structure of secondary
trading will continue into the foreseeable future or whether there will be a move to electronic
trading. Exchange trading and computer trading are each institutions that centralize order
flow. Computer trading has a number of advantages: easy investor access from anywhere
through computers with real time displays of bids, offers and volume, low cost of operation,
and ease of transaction reconstruction leading to more reliable clearance and settlement and
more effective enforcement of regulations. A number of observers predict that the replace
ment of exchange trading by computer trading is probable or at least possible. See
MENDELSON & PEAKE, supra note 172; JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
WORLD'S SECURITIES MARKETS: ECONOMIC CAUSES AND REGULATORY CoNSE
QUENCES - OR - BEWARE THE UBER-REGULATOR 19-20 (Stanford Law and Econimics
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effected for the question of what country should regulate an issuer's
disclosure would then become transparent. The computer might
actually match purchase and sale orders (like the CATS program
currently operated by the Toronto Stock Exchange and several
others), or it might simply provide the bid and offer prices of mar
ket makers and facilitate execution once a broker has chosen with
which market maker to deal (as NASDAQ does domestically to
day).174 Either way, though, it would be impossible to say there is
any particular location where the transaction is effected.175 Such a
development would absolutely require elimination of transaction
location-type tests for determining statutory reach. If there is no
switch to the issuer nationality approach, the only approach left is
investor residency. The analysis would then follow that of the sec
tion above that focuses solely on the global diffusion of financial
information. In that discussion, we assumed that any issuer wishing
access to a significant number of U.S. investors would need to regis
ter under the U.S. regime. The conclusions there that globalization
will increase the sensitivity of issuers to the U.S. disclosure level
and hence increase pressure to lower U.S. requirements would
therefore apply also to a world dominated by computer trading.176

H. Maynard, What is an "Exchange?" - Proprietary Elec
tronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of an Exchange, 49 WASH. &

Working Paper, 1990); Therese
LEE L. REv. 833, 862 (1992).

The key question is whether a computer trading system can provide liquidity comparable
to one based on specialists operating on an exchange floor. See Freund, supra note 172, at
12-14; Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Technology on the Trading ofSecur
ities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation, 24 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 299, 318-19 (1991). There are real questions as to whether specialists in fact provide
such liquidity, however, since their obligation to do so is vague and the capital at their dispo
sal is small compared to the largest traders. See Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock

Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock
Exchanges, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 1007, 1026-34 (1990). Macey and Kanda point out that the

Tokyo Stock Exchange essentially works without specialists who attempt to provide liquidity
since the "satori" firms, the ones that most resemble specialists, act as pure conduits that
match buy and sell orders and are not allowed to trade on their own account in the stocks
assigned to them. See id. at 1043-44. Macey and Kanda speculate that the functions that the
satori firms do provide could be largely done by computer. See id. at 1046.

174. See MENDELSON & PEAKE, supra note 172, at 2-3; Solomon & Corso, supra note 173,
at 309-22.
175. This problem has been noted by others.
at 330.

See, e.g., Solomon & Corso, supra note 173,

176. See supra section VI.B.2. In such a world, the fortunes of the U.S. securities industry
would depend on the volume of shares purchased and traded by U.S. investors, which would
increase if the shares of more foreign issuers were made available to them. See supra note
162.
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VII. How THE INCREASING PRESSURES UNDER THE lNvEsTOR
REsIDENCY AND LOCATION OF TRADE APPROACHES TO LOWER
THE LEVEL OF U.S. REQUIRED DISCLOSURE CAN LEAD TO
SUBOPTIMAL REGULATION
A.

How Increased Pressure to Lower U.S. Disclosure Standards
May Succeed Even If It Lowers National Welfare

We have just seen how, if the United States fails to switch to the
issuer nationality approach to statutory reach, further globalization

will create stronger political pressures

to relax U.S. disclosure stan
dards. That conclusion is only a cause for concern, however, if

there is reason to believe that the pressures

will

succeed and the

result will be a level of required disclosure that lowers U.S. eco
nomic welfare. What follows is a story of how this might well hap
pen even if the U.S. political system functions in a way that
attempts to maximize the interests of its residents.

1.

The Quest for Rents and the Adoption of an Inefficiently Low
Required Disclosure Level
The starting point to this story is to differentiate between two

different concepts of what is the optimal level of required disclo
sure. The first concept, "substantive optimality," is the level at
which the marginal social costs of disclosure just equal its marginal
social benefits in terms of efficient allocation of capital and reduc
tion in the agency costs of management. The second concept, "total
optimality," adds to this the effect of the level chosen on the rents
of persons whose welfare depends on the volume of transactions
effected in the United States, such as those associated with the se
curities industry or the stock exchanges.
In an entirely domestic economy, the two concepts are identical
since the level of required disclosure should have no . effect on the
volume of transactions effected. The introduction of transnational
securities transactions, however, permits a divergence. As we have
seen, with our current approach to statutory reach, a relaxation of
the level of required disclosure would increase the volume of trans
actions effected in the United States and the size of this potential

increase will grow as globalization proceeds.177 It is perfectly possi
ble that the resulting welfare gains to those whose welfare depends

on volume would exceed the resulting losses to entrepreneurs and
labor from the decrease in the economy's efficiency. In that event,
177. See supra sections IV.B; VI.B.2.c; VI.B.3.b.
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the totally optimal level of required disclosure would be lower than
the substantively optimal one. This lower, totally optimal level will
be the one adopted by a political system that attempts to maximize
the interests of its citizens but continues to operate under the con
straint of the current approach to statutory reach.
Operating under this constraint is unfortunate. A switch to the
issuer nationality approach would permit retention of the substan
tively optimal level of required disclosure, thereby maximizing the
welfare of entrepreneurs and labor, while still permitting persons
whose welfare depends on volume to maximize their rents.

2.

The Race to the Bottom

The problems with failing to switch do not end here, however.
We need to take account of likely foreign reaction to the relaxation
of U.S. standards. When we do, we see a perfect example of a "race
to the bottom" scenario in which the United States will ultimately
end up with a substantively suboptimally low required level of dis
closure and no greater rents for its financial industry than before
the race started.
The scenario involves the classic "prisoner's dilemma" from
game theory. The countries would maximize their joint welfare by
respectively adopting their substantively optimal levels of required
disclosure. The problem is that for each, the dominant position in
the game is to adopt a lower level. Each is better off adopting the
lower level whatever the other country does. The result is an equi
librium in which both are worse off.
The scenario, more formally set out in Appendix II, posits two
countries, A and B, each initially having an entirely domestic econ
omy with no transnational securities transactions possible. Each
chooses the level of required disclosure that is substantively optimal
for it. Then transnational securities transactions become practical.
Country A lowers its disclosure level, seeing that by doing so, a
larger volume of transactions will be effected within its borders and
that the resulting increase in rents exceeds the welfare declines
from having a substantively suboptimal disclosure level. Country
B, as a result, faces a welfare decline because of the loss to Country
A of transactions that would otherwise have been effected within
B's borders. Country B then lowers its disclosure level, seeing that
by doing so it can recapture the lost transactions and that the rents
from the recaptured transactions exceed the welfare decline from it
also switching to a substantively suboptimal disclosure level. Each
country has now suffered the welfare loss from having a substan-
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tively suboptimal disclosure level and in the end does not receive
any compensating increase in rents. The result would be the same if

B moved first. The result is an equilibrium because for each coun
try the lower level of required disclosure is the dominant strategy:
it is better off choosing the lower level whatever the other country
chooses.
B.

The Appropriateness of Assuming Current U.S. Disclosure
Standards Are Optimal and the Question of Regulatory
Competition

The discussion in Part VI shows that maintaining the current
U.S. approach to statutory reach

will

result in increasing political

pressure to relax the U.S. disclosure regime as the market for secur
ities globalizes further. The same would be true of other countries
using this approach. The current approach permits an issuer to in
fluence which disclosure regime will govern it through its choice of
where its shares are going to be offered and traded. The United
States and each other country wishes to maximize the volume of
transactions effected in its own market, thereby increasing the rents
earned by its residents. It would thus endeavor, everything else be
ing equal, to set its level of required disclosure to attract as many
issuers as possible.

The rewards for doing so

will

intensify as

globalization proceeds. Such an endeavor is inherently competitive
since a gain in transaction volume by one country can only come
from a loss by another. Switching to the issuer nationality approach
would stop this competition.
I concluded in Parts III and IV that the issuer nationality ap
proach is superior to the current U.S. approach to statutory reach
because it selects more discriminatingly which among the world's
issuers have disclosure practices that affect primarily the welfare of
U.S. residents and which primarily the welfare of residents of other
countries. U.S. officials have greater expertise than foreign officials
about the tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of the disclosure
behavior of the issuers so selected. They are also politically respon
sible to the people most affected by these issuers' disclosure behav
ior. Thus, for these issuers, the level of disclosure selected by U.S.
officials is likely to be closer to what is optimal than the level se
lected by officials of any other country.
This preliminary conclusion, however, is based on the simplify
ing assumption that the choice of approach to the reach of the U.S.
regime would have no effect on the level of disclosure that U.S.
officials select. As discussed in these last two Parts, this assumption
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is not entirely accurate. Retaining the current approach will lead to
intensifying regulatory competition, whereas a switch to the issuer
nationality approach

will

terminate such competition. Thus, com

ing to a final conclusion about the best approach to statutory reach
requires us to address the potential effect of regulatory competition
on the overall analysis.11s
The race to the bottom model presented above suggests that the
effect of regulatory competition on U.S. welfare is bad, thus rein
forcing the conclusion in Parts III and IV. The model shows that
globalization's increasing pressure to lower U.S. disclosure stan
dards can result in a level below what is substantively optimal. The
model is premised, however, on the U.S. political system acting to
maximize the interests of its residents. Accordingly, we would ex
pect that the system, prior to significant influences from trans
border transactions, would choose a level of required disclosure for
entirely domestic issuyrs that is an unbiased estimate of what is op
timal in terms of U.S. economic welfare. This premise suggests that
the current level is substantively optimal since it was largely estab
lished in such an era. I argue below that this is a reasonable prem
ise for a study of this type. I also argue that even if this premise
turns out to be incorrect, the likely reasons for its inaccuracy do not
mean that we should revise the preliminary conclusion that a switch
to the issuer nationality approach would increase U.S. economic
welfare.
178. Professors Choi and Guzman, for example, extol the benefits that competition
among securities regimes could bring. They state, "competitive pressures between regimes
[lead] to beneficial results as countries compete for both issuers and investors." Choi &
Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 223. Such pressures, in their view,
"restrain[ ] the ability of regulators to pursue their own bureaucratic goals or cater to specific
industry interests." Id. at 227.
Romano is similarly enthusiastic, stating that "[a]s a competitive legal market supplants a
monopolist federal agency in the fashioning of regulation, it would produce rules more
aligned with the preferences of investors, whose decisions drive the capital market."
Romano, supra note 15, at 2362. She takes as her model state competition for corporate
charters, which she characterizes as "a responsive legal regime that has tended to maximize
share value." Id. at 2362; see also ROBERTA RoMANo, THE GENWS OF AMERICAN CoRPO·
RATE LAW {1993).
The proposition that state competition for corporate charters enhances U.S. economic
welfare is in fact a controversial one and has been the subject of one of corporate law's most
intense debates in the last 20 years. See Fox, Empowering Issuers, supra note 15, at 15-26 for
a discussion of this controversy.
Moreover, even if Romano is correct that state competition for corporate charters is
share-value maximizing, Romano overstates her case when she says that "there is no reason
to expect state competition to operate differently for securities law than corporate law." Ro.
MANO, supra, at 2585. Unlike a firm's decision to include certain corporate governance terms
through its choice of where to incorporate, a firm's decision to commit to a higher level of
disclosure, through a securities regime choice, has positive externalities. See supra section
IV.A.2. This can have a crucial effect on the workings of regulatory competition. See
Bebchuk, supra note 112, at 1490-91.
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One consideration should be noted at the outset. If regulatory
competition is desirable, the reason is because, without it, the U.S.
would require too much disclosure, not too little. With the current
U.S. approach to statutory reach, if the United States lowers its dis
closure requirements, more issuers are likely to promote the sale
and trading of their shares there. This flows from the fact, as estab
lished in Part IV, that issuers with privately optimal disclosure

levels below U.S. requirements - the substantial majority
will
be deterred from the U.S. market, but issuers with privately optimal
-

will not be attracted by the
will be there already. Thus the

levels at or above the U.S. requirements
strictness of the U.S. regime. They

engine of regulatory competition under the current U.S. approach
- the desire to maximize the number of transactions effected in the
United States - creates pressure to lower the country's required
level of disclosure.

2.

The Starting Presumption: For Regulating Each State's
Entirely Domestic Activities, Its Rules Are Superior to
Those of Any Other State

Where, as here, the issue under study is how to regulate a given
kind of behavior with transborder effects, it is conventional to pre
sume that countries act in their own best interests when regulating
entirely domestic versions of the same behaviors.179 This conclu
sion seems a reasonable starting presumption in the construction of
a positive theory of such behavior and its regulation. Everything
else being equal, a simpler model is preferred to a more compli
cated one. A model on the international plane must in any event
take account of interactions that one on the domestic plane does
not, and so there is a greater premium for parsimony in the descrip
tion of what goes on within each state. Thus the government of
each country is assumed to act in the country's own best interest
rather than in accord with some more complicated theory of gov-

179. This, for example, is a fundamental assumption behind the governmental interest
method for identifying "true conflicts" of law. See William F. Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1990).
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ernmental behavior180 such as public choice theory.181 Under this
assumption, as just discussed, the current level of U.S. required dis
closure is optimal. Given this, it would be a mistake for the United
States to maintain the current approach to statutory reach as
globalization proceeds. If it does so, as demonstrated in Part VI,
the political pressures to lower U.S. standards will increase. As
shown in the first section of Part VII, these pressures can succeed
even though the government tries to act in the country's best inter
ests. The resulting level of welfare is lower than what would prevail
under the issuer nationality approach. Moreover, when the reac
tions of other countries are taken into account, a race to the bottom
develops, leaving the United States even worse off.
What, though, would be the implications of incorporating the
more complicated public choice theory of governmental behavior
into the analysis? Public choice theory suggests that concentrated
interest group action will cause a country to regulate more than is in
its national interest. Public choice theory, applied within a purely
domestic context, has in fact been used by some commentators to
suggest that mandated disclosure represents overregulation at the
behest of the securities industry.182 As a result, the required level
of disclosure is, in their view, suboptimally high. If these commen
tators are correct, regulatory competition might be a useful counter
force. Such a conclusion would cut against my preliminary conclu180. Economists can appreciate this point by considering the following analogy. Here we
are constructing a theory of statutory reach with respect to transborder interactions and
make the assumption that nations regulate entirely domestic interactions of the same kind in
a welfare maximizing way. We do this to help prevent the model from becoming overly
complicated, notwithstanding the existence of public choice theory, a respectable, albeit con
troversial, theory of domestic regulation that suggests otherwise. Economists do the same
kind of thing. In constructing the orthodox theory of industrial organization, for example,
they assume that firms - the component parts of each industry - act to maximize share
value, see, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID N. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
EcoNoMic PERFORMANCE 38-39 & n. 43 (3d ed. 1990) (collecting studies), notwithstanding
the existence of respectable, albeit controversial, theories of the firm that they do not. For
examples of theories of the firm not based upon profit maximization, see WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL, BusINESs BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GRoWIH 45-52 (rev. ed. 1967); 0LJVER E. Wn.
LIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR (1964); Robin Marris, A Model of
the "Managerial" Enterprise, 77 Q. J. OF EcoN. 185 {1963); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of
Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. EcoN. REv. 253 (1959).
181. For examples of public choice theory, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCIC, THE CALCULUS OF CoNSENT: LoGJCAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DE
MOCRACY {1962); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOV
ERNMENT (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. &
MGMT. Sa. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).

182. See SusAN M. PHJLLIPs & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE Pusuc INTER
EST 22-23 (1981); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 922 (1994).
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sion in Parts ill and IV that a switch to the issuer nationality ap
proach would increase U.S. welfare, since the issuer nationality
approach stifles regulatory competition. A desire to promote regu
latory competition would suggest instead that we maintain the cur
rent approach to statutory reach or even adopt something more
radical, such as a pure transaction location approach183 or an ap
proach giving issuers the right to choose the disclosure regime by
which they are governed irrespective of the issuer's nationality, the
residence of its investors, or where its shares are offered or
traded.184
Advocates of approaches intended to promote regulatory com
petition must, however, establish two things to overcome the con
ventional and reasonable presumption that states act in their own
best interests. First, they need to show that within a purely domes
tic context, concentrated interest group action in fact results in too
high a level of mandated disclosure. Second, assuming that it does,
they need to show that regulatory competition at the international
level would be a helpful antidote to the problem. Neither

will

be

easy to show.

3.

The Public Choice Critique in the Purely Domestic Context
Several factors cast doubt on the story that within a purely do

mestic context concentrated interest group actions result in too high
a level of mandated disclosure. To start, there is debate about the
effectiveness of public choice theory in explaining regulation gener
ally. There is hardly a consensus that most political action consists
of self-interested rent seeking.185 Moreover, even if one believes
that public choice theory has considerable explanatory value gener
ally, the story may err when applied to securities disclosure. The
story does not correctly identify all of the interests of the securities
industry. Some members may well desire a high level of mandatory
disclosure in order to reduce their costs of collecting information.
Others, however, may prefer a low level. For example, if only a low
level is required, more firms would be willing to be public compa
nies, thereby resulting in more fee-generating initial public offerings
and secondary trades. The story also omits consideration of con183. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 221-23.
184. See id. at 231-35; Romano, supra note 15.
185. For critical reactions to public choice theory, see Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility
Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179
(1996); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
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centrated interest groups outside of the securities industry, such as
the managements of established public corporations, whose inter
ests are likely to favor low levels of required disclosure.186 Finally,
it does not account for the possibility that the interests for more
disclosure attributed to persons in the securities industry may ser
endipitously coincide with correction of important market failures
in issuer disclosure due to the public goods nature of information
and agency problems between the managements of established issu
ers and their stockholders.187 The actual beneficiaries of such a cor
rection would, under public choice theory, be too diffuse to be
politically effective.

4. Even If the Public Choice Critique Is Valid in the Purely
Domestic Context, Regulatory Competition Is Not
Necessarily a Helpful Antidote
Assume now that the public choice theorists' story is correct:
within a purely domestic context, the forces they identify result in
too high a level of required disclosure. That does not necessarily
imply that promoting regulatory competition is a helpful antidote to
the problem. Promoting competition means giving issuers some de
gree of freedom to choose the regime they prefer, i.e., maintaining
the current approach to regulatory reach or something more radi
cal.

Issuer entrepreneurs and managers are the ones who will

choose.188 Authorities in each country

will

thus try to have a re

quired level of disclosure that is attractive to the entrepreneurs or
managers of as many issuers as possible. Most U.S. issuers would
therefore likely have the option of binding themselves to provide
something close to their respective privately optimal levels of dis
closure regulation.189
186.

See supra sections IV.A.2.a; IV.A.2.b.ii.
See also Coffee, supra

187. See supra section IV.A.2.
supra note 112, at 684-85.
188.

note 10; Easterbrook

&

Fischel,

See supra section IV.A.1.

189. The exact pattern of national regimes that would develop with regulatory competi
tion is difficult to predict because the possible reactions of each country to the moves of each
other country are complex. The final pattern could be a situation in which each country tries
to satisfy the preferences of the entrepreneurs or managers of a different niche group of
issuers, or it could be a situation in which each country converges on the same single level
that would attract the maximum number of issuers. See Choi & Guzman, National Laws,
supra note 9, at 1869-82. Whichever occurs, entrepreneurs and managers drive the process,
and, as we have seen, would prefer to bind their firms to a level of disclosure below the level
that would maximize social welfare. See supra section IV.A.2. Thus the typical U.S. issuer
will end up disclosing at a suboptimally low level.
It is useful to consider an example of the pattern of national regimes that might develop
in a plausible world of the future if the recommended switch to an exclusive issuer nationality
approach to statutory reach is not undertaken. Assume that it is still modestly more expen-
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Whether it is desirable to give U.S. issuers this option depends
on a comparison of two ways in which society can choose the level
at which each issuer discloses. One way - the way of regulatory
competition - is to rely on the decisions of issuer entrepreneurs
and managers, decisions based on their calculations of the benefits
and costs privately experienced by them. The other - the way of
the issuer nationality approach - is to rely on the decisions of the
U.S. government, which represents the persons who primarily expe
rience the actual benefits and costs of U.S. issuers' disclosures. In
making this comparison, concern should be with how close the level
chosen is to each issuer's socially optimal level, i.e., where the social

marginal costs of the issuer's disclosure equals the

social marginal

benefits of its disclosure.
As we saw in Part IV, the entrepreneur and manager calcula
tions of private benefit and cost are not likely to correspond closely
to the social benefits and costs: private costs of disclosure are likely
to be larger than social costs and private benefits less than social
benefits.190 Thus their calculations will be biased: they will want to
sive and inconvenient for investors to place orders abroad. It is thus still more advantageous
than not, everything else being equal, for an issuer to have its shares offered and traded in the
United States, where there is a huge pool of potential investors. Suppose, in such a world,
the United States lowered its level to just above the level of the next major capitalist country
- the United Kingdom. As long as the United Kingdom does not raise its level to one above
the reduced U.S. level, the United States would lose no old issuers, see supra section IV.B.2,
and it would pick up a substantial number of new ones - those that find the old strict U.S.
level of disclosure tQo burdensome to be worth better access to U.S. investors but not the
substantially less strict new U.S. level. It is very unlikely that the United Kingdom would in
fact raise its standards above the reduced U.S. level. Doing so would prompt issuers with
privately optimal disclosure levels above the new lowered U.S. level to register in the United
Kingdom, but that would not add much to U.K. trading volume since such an issuer could
also register without additional burden in the United States, which is a much larger market.
It is much more likely that the United Kingdom, if it responds at all, would lower its required
level too. This would pick up issuers with privately optimal disclosure levels below the low
ered U.S. level that find better access to U.S. investors worth the U.S. disclosure burden if
the next less strict regime of a country with an important market is only slightly less strict
than the U.S. regime, but would not find such better access worth the U.S. disclosure burden
if the next less strict regime is significantly less strict. If the U.K. did lower its level, the U.S.
could further lower its level, again gaining more issuers. They might ratchet down together in
this fashion. How far this would go would depend on the required level of the third most
demanding country with a major market and its reactions, and so on, as well as the overall
distribution of privately optimal disclosure levels among the world's issuers.
At the bottom there will probably be some small country, with little in the way of domes
tic issuers, offering a disclosure regime that requires essentially no disclosure. In other
words, some country in its disclosure laws is likely to become the equivalent of Luxembourg
in its banking laws. In fact, Luxembourg itself is already reputed to provide only a "nods and
winks" review of offers and sales of new issues of securities listed on the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Regulatory Harmony in the European Commu
nities: The Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. lNrL. L. 19, 41 {1990) . How many
issuers have privately optimal disclosure levels that low, however, is questionable and so we
would not expect a major jurisidction to descend to this level.
190. See supra section IV.A.2.
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choose a regime requiring them to disclose less than is socially opti
mal. The public choice story is that the government has biases run
ning in the opposite direction.

One should not favor regulatory

competition over the issuer nationality approach, however, unless
one believes that the level chosen by the government is even more
biased than the level required by the regimes chosen by legally un
constrained private entrepreneurs and managers. Few legal com
mentators (including those with a law and economics orientation)
appear to hold the belief that issuer entrepreneurs and managers
should be free to choose their own disclosure levels.191

5. Public Choice Arguments for Not Promoting
Regulatory Competition
Adding a public choice component to the analysis of what ap
proach to statutory reach is best may actually add to the overall
strength of my conclusion that there should be a shift to an exclu
sive issuer nationality approach. As we have seen, with the regula
tory competition prompted by the current approach, persons who
receive rents dependent on the volume of transactions effected in
the United States would, as globalization proceeds, forgo increasing
amounts in rent if U.S. disclosure standards are not lowered. We
have already seen how this can cause a government to lower stan
dards when the gain in rents exceeds the welfare loss from having a
substantively suboptimal level of required disclosure. Public choice
theory suggests that the relaxation may occur even if these foregone
rents from the United States not lowering its level are less than the
welfare losses from the United States lowering its level - with U.S.
issuers consequently disclosing at a less than optimal level in re
source allocation terms. This is because the gainers are concen191. See supra note 112. Easterbrook and Fischel for example, conclude that the U.S.
mandatory disclosure regime ought to be retained after explicitly considering public choice
theory. See Easterbrook & FISchel, supra note 112, at 684-85. Addressing a somewhat analo
gous problem within our domestic federal system of corporate and securities law-making,
Lucian Bebchuk has argued that placing the regulation of corporate disclosure under the
authority of state corporate law rather than federal securities law would, because of regula
tory competition, result in a suboptimally low level of disclosure. See Bebchuk, supra note
112, at 1490-91.
Jonathan Macey, on the other hand, finds "[a]s markets have become more efficient, soci
ety's need to devote resources to support a statutory regime of mandatory disclosure
designed and enforced by the SEC has disappeared. Any information that was supplied by
the force of law now is supplied by the marketplace." Macey, supra note 182, at 928. The
efficiency with which markets impound the information that issuers choose to release, how
ever, is a different issue from the question of whether issuers will choose to release as much
information as is socially optimal. Roberta Romano proposes a system by which issuers
choose by which country's disclosure regime they wish to be bound. See Romano, supra note
15. A critique of her proposal is found supra in section IV.A.2.
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trated and more capable of political action than the losers, who are
many but diffuse, and who each get just a little less because of effi
ciency losses from the way capital is utilized in the United States.
There is thus no necessary inconsistency between a belief in public
choice theory and the conclusion that in the context of a globalizing
securities market, regulatory competition will result in each country
having too low a level of mandated disclosure.
6.

Regulatory Competition and Differences Among U.S. Issuers
in Their Socially Optimal Disclosure Levels192
Allowing a U.S. issuer to choose its disclosure regime has an

other positive feature, not considered so far. This is its potential to
accommodate differences among U.S. issuers in their socially opti
mal levels of disclosure. The potential accommodation would work
as follows. First, the regulatory competition arising from issuer
choice may lead to a differentiation in disclosure regimes across
countries. Each issuer then may select the regime requiring the
level of disclosure closest to its particular social optimum. This po
tential customizing of required disclosure is the reason that Profes
sors Choi and Guzman support a transaction location approach to
statutory reach.193
This potentially positive feature of the transaction location ap
proach is, however, overwhelmed by its problems. To start, it is not
at all clear that the regulatory competition arising from the transac
tion location approach would lead to a differentiated set of regimes.
It might instead lead to all countries' standards converging toward
the single level designed to attract the most issuers worldwide.194 If
this happens, U.S. issuers will move from a standard designed for
the average U.S. issuer to one designed for the average issuer
worldwide. This movement is in the opposite direction from the
customizing of disclosure requirements that Choi and Guzman
hope the transaction location approach will bring.
192. I discuss the matters considered in
Empowering Issuers, supra note 15, at 51-63.
193.

this subsection more extensively in Fox,

See Choi & Guzman, National Laws, supra note 9, at 1865-83.

194. Choi and Guzman acknowledge that such a convergence equilibrium is quite possi
ble, particularly in a world in which countries possess natural advantages in retaining domes
tic issuers. See id. at 1879-81. The United States will still have such natural advantage, at
least residually, for the foreseeable future, although, as discussed in Part VI, it will be weak
ening over time. As long as financial information is not fully globalized, U.S. investors will
exhibit some bias toward investing in U.S. issuers. And as long as there is also some cost and
convenience advantage to U.S. investors in investing in shares offered and traded in the
United States, many U.S. issuers will make their shares available in U.S. markets so as not to
put obstacles in the way of their largest, most natural group of investors.
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The second problem is that the persons choosing each issuer's
disclosure regime

will

be its entrepreneurs or managers. As dis

cussed at numerous points above, they have a bias toward choosing
a level of required disclosure lower than the issuer's socially opti
mal disclosure level.195 Thus, even if a differentiated set of regimes
is available and some country offers a required disclosure level just
equal to the issuer's social optimum, the entrepreneurs or managers

will

instead prefer the regime of some other country with a lower

required level of disclosure.
Two observations are in order with respect to this second prob
lem. One, discussed in Part IV, is that the difference between an
issuer's privately optimal level of disclosure and its socially optimal
one is likely to be substantial.196 The other, discussed in Part V, is
that there are important differences among issuers worldwide in
terms of their socially optimal levels of disclosure that are signifi
cantly related to the nationalities of the issuers involved. These two
observations combine to suggest that the transaction location ap
proach's bias for underdisclosure

will

outweigh its capacity to ac

commodate individual differences among U.S. issuers, which
typically are not great relative to differences between U.S. issuers
and issuers from other countries. Thus, compared to the issuer na
tionality approach, the transaction location approach is likely to
lead to a greater, not smaller, average deviation between each U.S.
issuer's required level of disclosure and its socially optimal one.197
The third problem is that the transaction location approach
would apply the U.S. regime to foreign issuers whose shares are
offered or traded in the United States. The application of the U.S.
regime to such foreign issuers would be harmful to U.S. interests, as
discussed in Parts III and IV.198 For the foreseeable future, there

will

continue to be at least a residual cost and convenience advan

tage to U.S. investors from investing in shares offered and traded in
the United States. This continued cost and convenience advantage
means that some foreign issuers

will register under the U.S. regime

195. See supra section IV.A.2.
196. See supra section IV.A.2.
197. Moreover, if the need to customize is important, the U.S. disclosure regime itself
could attempt to acco=odate differences among U.S. issuers in their socially optimal disclo
sure levels. It does so to some extent already in the primary offering disclosure area. Many
offerings are granted exemptions based on the size of the offering, the number of investors or
the wealth and sophistication of the investors. Many of these exemptions require some kind
of disclosure, but at a lower level than what is required with conventional Section 5 registra
tion. Small issuers can also use the simplified procedures and lower disclosure requirements
under Regulation A.
198. See supra sections III.B.2; III.B.3; and IV.B.
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even though, for most, it requires more disclosure of them than is
socially optimal, thereby creating foreign relations problems for the
United States. All other foreign issuers of any significance will stay
out of the United States solely because of the desire to avoid such
registration. Their doing so will require U.S. investors either to in
cur extra cost and inconvenience or forgo an important range of
investment opportunities. It will also reduce the incomes of U.S.
residents whose rents depend on the volume of transactions ef
fected in the United States.199

7. Summary
A switch to the issuer nationality approach has clear advantages.
Compared to officials of the country where the sales or trades in a
U.S. issuer's shares occur or the country where its investors reside,
U.S. authorities have greater expertise concerning the resource al
location and risk reduction effects of the issuer's disclosure and
greater political incentives to choose the right level. Moreover,
U.S. officials receive more direct negative feedback if the level they
choose is wrong. The only way to justify retention of the current
U.S. approach to statutory reach - or a move to an approach giv
ing issuers even more freedom choosing their regimes - is to show
that the regulatory competition engendered thereby has benefits
and that the benefits overwhelm the clear advantages of the issuer
nationality approach. The case for such a showing is not persuasive.
The primary argument for permitting U.S. issuers to choose
their disclosure regimes is based on the claim that the current U.S.
domestic disclosure regime requires more disclosure than is good
for us, a tendency that regulatory competition will counteract. This
claim runs contrary to the conventional and reasonable starting pre
sumption in studies concerning the regulation of behavior with
transnational effects that countries' domestic regulations represent
their own best interests. Equally important, a number of factors
cast doubt on the proposition that in the particular area of disclo
sure, the United States tends to overregulate.
The conclusion that the United States is the better regulator of
U.S. issuers would not change, however, even if, for the sake of
argument, I were to incorporate public choice theory into the analy-

199. The investor residency approach to statutory reach permits a more limited degree of
issuer choice also, and to that extent creates the same problems in terms of the U.S. regime's
potential application to foreign issuers. The system recommended by Professor Romano whereby each issuer could choose its disclosure regime regardless of its nationality, who its
investors were, or where transactions in its shares occurred - would not lead to the kind of
problems discussed in this paragraph of the text. See Romano, supra note 15.
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sis and accept the claim that the U.S. domestic disclosure regime
requires too much disclosure for the typical U.S. issuer. Public
choice theory suggests that regulatory competition creates its own
imperfection: regulators giving special weight to the increasing
political pressure from members of the securities industry con
cerned with the volume of transactions effected in the U.S. market.
Thus, to be successful, the argument for issuer choice needs a polit
ical theory akin to second best theory in welfare economics. The
political theory would need to show that this second imperfection
created by regulatory competition is optimal given the assumed im
perfection that domestic disclosure standards are currently too
high. Unless a proponent of regulatory competition can provide
such a theory, there is as much reason to believe these competition
induced political pressures will represent an overdose, as an appro
priate antidote, to the assumed problem of too much disclosure reg
ulation. Moreover, even if the current U.S. regime requires more
disclosure than is socially optimal for the typical U.S. issuer and, as
globalization proceeds, the regulatory competition from permitting
issuers choice did result in just the correct readjustment downward
in the U.S. requirements, an approach based on issuer choice will
also result in many U.S. issuers choosing some other regime. Given
the preferences of the persons making these choices, these issuers
will generally choose regimes requiring a lower than socially opti
mal level of disclosure.
A second argument for permitting issuer choice is that doing so

can better accommodate differences among U.S. issuers' socially
optimal levels of disclosure. There is no assurance, however, that
permitting choice \vill lead to a set of regimes corresponding to
these differing issuer needs. Each of the world's major jurisdictions
may, in an effort to appeal to the broadest segment of the market,
in the end require approximately the same level of disclosure as all
the others. If this happens, the resulting uniform requirements will
be ones less suited to the needs of individual U.S. issuers than the
current U.S. regime. Even if issuer choice does lead to an appropri
ately differentiated set of regimes, the preferences of the persons
making the issuers' choices again means that there \vill be a bias for
issuers to disclose at a socially suboptimal level. This bias is likely
to outweigh the customizing benefits of permitting issuer choice.
Finally, assuming that issuer choice is the result of an approach to
statutory reach based on transaction location or investor residency,
the consequent application of the U.S. regime to foreign issuers will
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reduce the volume of transactions effected in the United States and
damage U.S. foreign relations.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The case is strong for the United States to switch to the issuer
nationality approach for determining the reach of the U.S.
mandatory disclosure rules. Such a switch assures that the U.S. re
gime will be applied to all the world's issuers whose disclosure be
havior primarily affects U.S. welfare and not to ones whose
disclosure behavior primarily affects only the welfare of persons in
other countries. A switch to issuer nationality also reduces the risk
that political pressures accompanying increasing globalization will
succeed in relaxing U.S. standards below the level that maximizes
U.S. welfare.
On its face, a proposal not to impose the U.S. regime on foreign
issuers whose shares are offered or traded in the United States
seems radical, notwithstanding its merits. That does not mean its
chances of adoption are poor. The same forces that would tirelessly
work to reduce U.S. disclosure standards if the U.S. retains its cur
rent approach to statutory reach could easily change course and
support the proposal set out here. There are already signs of this in
the New York Stock Exchange call to allow exchange trading in the
United States of the shares of prominent foreign issuers based on
international accounting standards rather than U.S. generally ac
cepted accounting practices.200 Applying the issuer nationality ap
proach to secondary trading of these better known issuers would be
an opening wedge that would make the approach feel less radical
over time and permit analysis of the merits of extending it further.
It is also important to keep time frames in mind. While trends
toward globalization of the market for securities make my proposal
far more likely to be adopted than might appear to be the case at
first glance, a nationally based system of disclosure regulation em
ploying the issuer nationality approach to statutory reach is proba
bly only workable into the medium-term future. Contrary to the
assertions of purveyors of what some call "globaloney," little of the
world's production today is being undertaken by issuers with no
clear national center of gravity.201 But the day will come, perhaps a
few decades off, when some significant portion will be. At that
200. See supra note 148.
201. See supra note 40. Tue European Community can, to the extent necessary, be
counted as a "nation" for purposes of this statement since the implications are the same.
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time, the arguments against a uniform international regime to regu
late the disclosure of at least this special class of issuers

will

lose

much of their force, particularly if an international institution with
greater political legitimacy and expertise than we find today can be
developed to promulgate its rules and provide administration. The
problem for U.S. policymakers right now, however, is how to fash
ion a practical approach to statutory reach that meets our needs
into the medium-term future. Issuer nationality is the solution.
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APPENDIX I
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION OF FINANCIAL
INFORMATION ON LEVEL OF TRADING IN Two COUNTRIES, ONE
WITH STRICT DISCLOSURE STANDARDS AND ONE WITH LENIENT
DISCLOSURE STANDARDS
The model presented below posits two countries, A; which has
more lenient disclosure standards and a larger pool of investors,
and B, which has stricter standards and a smaller pool. Thus, B is
like the United States, and A like the rest of the world. Each coun
try applies its rules in accordance with the goal of investor protec
tion. Complying with B's stricter standards implies that A's
standards are met as well. The model is intended to help analyze
two issues that arise when the investor residency is the approach to
statutory reach adopted by country B. First, assuming that B's stan
dards remain unchanged, what would be the impact of the full
global diffusion of financial information on the level of share trad
ing in each country? Second, what would the impact of full global
diffusion of information be on issuer sensitivity, i.e., the power of a
given reduction in B's required level of disclosure to increase the
level of transactions effected in B?
The model is structured in terms of two representative issuers, X

from B and Y from A. If everything that could be publicly known
about X and Y were known about them in each country, a share of
one would, in each possible future state of nature, be seen as pro

ducing a return just equal the return of the other. There are two
pools of investors, those from A and those from B. Each pool of
investors

will have

a downward sloping demand curve for each se

curity, reflecting the security's variance-covariance characteristics
and investors' heterogeneous expectations (as a result, at least in
part, from less than full diffusion of information

within each pool).

Since A's pool is larger than B's, the downward slopes of its de
mand curves are shallower than those of B's. As long as there is
not full global diffusion of financial information - i.e., as long as
less is known about an issuer among the pool of investors abroad
than among investors in its home pool - the foreign investors im
pose an ignorance discount in forming their demand for the issuer's
shares.202 Q is the total number of shares of an issuer that will be
202. This description of the demand function of foreign investors for an issuer's shares
corresponds to the fact that investors display a home country bias in their choice of shares
and that this bias is generally attributed to differences between the information investors
possess concerning home country issuers and the information they possess concerning foreign
issuers. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, Domestic Saving and International Capital Movements in
the Long Run and the Short Run, 21 EuR. EcoN. REv. 129, 130-31, 148 n.27 (1983) (finding
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outstanding and it is proportional to the size of the firm We as
sume nothing about the distribution of firm sizes in each economy.
We do assume for the moment that the extra burden of meeting B's
stricter disclosure standards, C,203 is proportional to the firm's size
and would be identical if X and Y were the same size, i.e., if Cx is
the total cost of compliance for X and Cy for Y, for each issuer, Cx
(i) would equal Cy if the issuers were the same size, and (ii) varies
proportionally with Q so that CxlQx is constant and equals Cy !Qy
for the other firm.
.

Neither issuer can have any investors resident in B unless it
complies with B's disclosure requirements. Each can control
whether it has any such investors. Each is going to be a public com
pany in any event and so its choice as to whether or not to comply
with B's standards depends on whether the price advantages of hav
ing investors in B as well as in A are greater than the costs of com
pliance with B's standards.

Definition of Demand Functions
Ax0(Q) = current demand function for shares of X if they were only
available to investors in A
Bx0(Q) = current demand function for shares of X if they were only
available to investors in B
ABx0(Q) = current demand function for shares of X if they were
available to investors in both A and B
Ay0(Q) = current demand function for shares of Y if they were only
available to investors in A
By0(Q) = current demand function for shares of Y if they were only
available to investors in B
ABy0(Q) = current demand function for shares of Y if they were
available to investors in both A and B
substantial imperfections in the international capital market and attributing them in part to
investors having a higher subjective variance on foreign returns due to less information);
Martin Feldstein & Charles Horioka, Domestic Savings and lntemational Capital Flows, 90
EcoN. J. 314, 316, 321 (1980) (finding a high correlation between marginal increases in do
mestic savings and in domestic investment and attributing these in part to investors' greater
uncertainty concerning foreign issuers due to less information); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Interest
Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country World, 10 J. MONETARY EcoN. 335, 357 (1983)
(explaining home bias as the result of the local nature of information but noting the lack of
models that even begin to explain the relationship). I discuss this subject in more detail in
Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 1, at sections I.B.l and I.D.
203. C is net of any reputational benefit that the issuer receives from complying with the
U.S. regime and thus is equivalent to the term "burden" in Parts VI and VII. I assume that
for X and Y compliance is, on a net basis, in fact a burden for these issuers. See supra note
_152-57 and accompanying text.
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Ax1(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information
for shares of X if they were only available to investors in A
Bxi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information
for shares of X if they were only available to investors in B
ABxi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information
for shares of X if they were available to investors in both A and B
Ayi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information
for shares of Y if they were only available to investors in A
Byi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information
for shares of Y if they were only available to investors in B
AByi(Q) = demand function after full global diffusion of information
for shares of Y if they were available to investors in both A and B

Demand Curve Assumptions and Specifications
Note: All the demand curves for Issuer X shares are depicted in Dia
gram I - X and all the demand curves for Issuer Y shares are de
picted in Diagram I - Y.
(i) Axo (Q) = d - fQ
Bxo (Q) = e - gQ
Ayo (Q) = e - fQ
Byo (Q) = d - gQ

(Q ;::: 0)
(Q ;::: 0)
(Q ;::: 0)

(Q ;::: 0)

These are standard straight line demand functions where price de
clines with quantity offered, e, d, f, and g being all greater than 0.
e > d and g > f even though in each possible future state of nature
shares of x and y will yield identical returns. e > d reflects the fact
that currently, with less full global distribution of information, for
all Q's, the foreign country's issuer is discounted by (e - ti). g > f
reflects the fact that A represents a larger pool of investors than
does B. Therefore each price would be the reservation price for
more investors in A than in B even if evaluations of the issuers were
distributed through the two populations in the same proportions.204

1-Y, e = $10.60, d
$10.50, f = .0025 and g = .0050. Thus the discount is $.10.
(ii) Bxo(Q) = Bx1 (Q) and Ay0(Q) = Ay1 (Q), i.e. , full global diffu
In the example depicted in Diagrams I-X and

=

sion of financial information concerning an issuer does not change
the evaluation of, or demand for, the issuer's shares in its home
country.
(iii) Axi(Q) = e - fQ
Byi(Q) = e - gQ
204. See Choi & Guzman, Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 9, at 225.
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With full global diffusion of financial information, investors in the
country different from the issuer's home country learn what inves
tors in the issuer's country already know about the issuer. Since the
issuers' shares have the same prospects, evaluations of the issuers
are distributed in the same proportions through the pools of inves
tors in the issuer's home country and the one abroad, but A has a
larger pool of investors than B and so the slope of the demand
curve is shallower.

Derivation of ABxo (Q), ABx1(Q), AByo (Q) and AByz(Q)
ABx0
(1) Axo (Q) = p = d - fQ

(Q ;::: 0)

Let Qx00 = Quantity of X shares currently demanded in A at price

P.

(2)

QXoa = (1/f)(d - P)
=0

(3) Bx0(Q) = P = e - gQ

P�d
P>d
(Q ;::: 0)

Let Qx0b = Quantity of X shares currently demanded in B at price

P.

p�e
= (llg)(e - P)
P>e
=0
Let Qxoab = Qxoa + Qx0b = Quantity of X shares currently
demanded at price P in A and B together if they are
, available to

both pools of investors.

= Qxob = (1/g)(e - P)
= (llf)(d - P) + (Jig) (e - P)
= (llfg) [(gd + fe) - (g + f)P]

d<P�e
P�d

Therefore,

0 < Q � (e - d)/g
P = ABx0(Q) = e - gQ
P = ABx0(Q) = (gd + fe)!(g + f) - Q(gf/(g + f))
Q > (e - d)lg
In the example depicted in Diagram I-X, (e - d)/g = 20. If X has
fewer than 20 shares outstanding, the demand for them in B alone
would put the price above $10.50 and hence no shares would be
demanded by investors in A, who put a discount on shares from B
(reflected by Ax0 starting at $10.50, $.10 below Bx0). Thus in this
range, ABx0 tracks Bx0• If X has more than 20 shares outstanding,
the demand for them if they were sold in B alone would put the
price below $10.50 and hence there would be a demand by residents
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of A. Tb.us in this range, ABx0 represents the horizontal aggrega
tion Bx0 and Ax0 and has a shallower slope than either one alone.
ABx1

(1) Axz(Q)

= P = e - fQ

(Q � 0)

Let Qx1a = Quantity of X shares that would be demanded in A at
price P after full global diffusion of financial information.

(2)

Qxza

(3) Bx1(Q)

= (1/f)(e - P)
=0
= P = e - gQ

P�e

P>e
(Q � 0)

Let Qxzb = Quantity of X shares demanded in B at price P after full
global diffusion of financial information.
= (1/g)(e - P)
=0

e
P>e
p�

Let Qxzab = Qx1a + Qxzb = Quantity of X shares demanded at price
P in A and B together after full global diffusion of financial infor
mation if they are available to both pools of investors.
= (1/f)(e - P) + (1/g) (e - P)
= [(f + g)/fg] [e - P]

p�

e

Therefore,
P = ABxz(Q) = e - Q [gf/(f + g)]
In the example depicted in Diagram I-X, after full diffusion, inves

tors in A no longer put a discount on shares from B and so Ax1
starts at $10.60 just as Bx1 does. Tb.us, whatever number of shares
X has outstanding, ABx1 represents the horizontal aggregation Bx1
and Axz. and, over the full range of Q, it has a shallower slope than
either one alone.
AByo

(1) Ayo (Q) = P = e - fQ
(Q � 0)
Let Qy0a = Quantity of Y shares currently demanded in A at price
P.

(2)

QYoa

= (l!f)(e - P)
= 0

e
P>e
p�

(Q � 0)
(3) Byo(Q) = P = d - gQ
Let Qy0b = Quantity of Y shares currently demanded in B at price
P.
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Michigan Law Review

804

= (llg)(d - P)
=0

P�d
P>d

Let QYoab = QYoa + Qy0b = Quantity of Y shares currently demanded
at price P in A and B together if they are available to both pools of
investors.

Qyoab

= QYoa = (llf)(e - P)

d<P�e

Qyoab

= (llf)(e - P) + (Jig) (d - P)
= (llfg)[(ge + fd) - (g + f)P]

P�d

Therefore,

P = ABy0(Q) = e - fQ

0 < Q � (e - d)lf

Q > (e - d)lf
(ge+fd)!(g+f) - (fg!(g+f))Q
In the example depicted in Diagram I-Y, (e - d)lf = 40. If Y has
fewer than 40 shares outstanding, the demand for them in A alone
would put the price above $10.50 and hence no shares would be
demanded by investors in B, who put a discount on shares from A
(reflected by By0 starting at $10.50, $.10 below Ay0). Thus in this
range, ABy0 tracks Ay0• If X has more than 40 shares outstanding,
the demand for them if they were sold in A alone would put the
price below $10.50 and hence there would be a demand for them by
residents of B if they are available there as well. Thus in this range,
ABy0 represents the horizontal aggregation By0 and Ay0 and has a
P = AByo(Q)

=

shallower slope than either one alone.

ABy1

(1) Ay1(Q)= P = e - fQ (Q � 0)
Let Qy10 = Quantity of Y shares that would be demanded in A at
price P after full global diffusion of financial information.

P�e
QY1a = (llf)(e - P)
P>e
=0
(3) By1(Q) P = e - gQ
(Q ?:.0)
Let Qy1b = Quantity of Y shares demanded in B at price P after full
(2)

=

global diffusion of financial information.

Qy1b

= (Jlg)(e - P)
=0

P�e
P>e

Let Qy1ab = QY1a + Qy1b = Quantity of Y shares demanded at price P
in A and B together after full global diffusion of financial informa
tion if they are available to both pools of investors.

QY1ab

=

(llf)(e - P) + (Jig) (e - P)

p�e
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= [(f + g)/fg] [e - P]

Therefore,
P = ABy1(Q) = e - Q[gf/(f + g)]
In the example depicted in Diagram I-Y, after full diffusion, inves
tors in B no longer put a discount on shares from A and so By1
starts at $10.60 just as Ay1 does. Thus, whatever number of shares
Y has outstanding, ABy1 represents the horizontal aggregation By1
and Ayi. and, over the full range of Q, it has a shallower slope than
either one alone.
A. Proof that if regulation remains unchanged, full global
diffusion offinancial information will reduce the number of B's
issuers that choose to comply with B's disclosure requirements.
If regulations in both B and A remain unchanged after full
global diffusion of financial information, then, for any given
number, Q, of shares that X, the representative B issuer, will have
outstanding, the per share extra cost of complying with B's stricter
regime, C(Q)IQ, will be unchanged. Before full diffusion, X will
comply with B's disclosure requirements if ABx0(Q) - Axo (Q) >
C(Q)/Q, i.e., if the cost of compliance, which permits access to in
vestors in B, is less than the price damage from relying solely on in
investors in A. Similarly, after full diffusion, X will comply if
ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q) > C(Q)/Q. For any given Q, full diffusion
reduces the gain from complying, and hence, at constant cost, the
likelihood that the issuer chooses to do so if [ABxo(Q) - Ax0(Q)] [ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q)] > 0, i.e., if the price damage from relying only
on investors in A goes down. As shown below, this is so for all
values of Q.
Q � (e - d)/g
[ABx0(Q) - Ax0(Q) ] - [ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q)] =
[(e - gQ) - (d - fQ) ] - [(e - (gf/(f + g)) Q (e - fQ)] =
(e - d) - (g - gfl(f + g)) Q =
(e - d) - Qg(l - f/(f + g))
Thus, in this range of Q, the reduction in the gain from compliance,
is a declining function of Q. It is positive at Q = 0 since e > d. If it
is also positive at the end point of this range of Q, i.e., at Q = (e d)lg, it is positive throughout the range. At Q = (e - d)lg, its value
is
-

(e - d) - [(e - d)lg][g (l f/(f + g))]
(e - d)[ 1 - (1 - f/(f + g))] =
-
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(e - d)fjl(f +'g)] >0
since f > 0, g > 0 and e > d.

[Vol. 97:696

Thus, in this range of

Q, diffusion will

result in a reduction of the value of compliance.

Q

>

(e - d)/g

[ABxo (Q) - Axo(Q]] - [ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q)] =
[(fe + gd)l(f + g) - Q(gfl(f + g)) - (d - fQ)] [(e - Q(gfl(f + g)) - (e - fQ)] =
(fe + gd)l(f + g) - d =
(fe + gd)l(f + g) - d(f + g)l(f + g) =
(fe - fd)l(f + g) > 0
since

e > d > 0, f > 0

, and

g > 0.

Thus full global diffusion of knowledge will result in a reduction
in the benefit from compliance for all values of
of compliance constant, fewer B issuers

Q.

With the burden

will comply with B's stricter

disclosure requirements. This can again be seen in the example de
picted in Diagram
ation if X has

20

I-X, where (e - d)/g = 20.

First consider the situ

or fewer shares outstanding. The pre-diffusion

A alone (the differ
Ax0 and ABx0) starts at $.10 and declines up to the
point that X has 20 shares outstanding. There, the price damage is
$.05. The after-diffusion price damage from relying on investors
from A alone (the difference between Ax1 and ABx1) starts at 0 and

price damage from relying on investors from
ence between

increases in proportion to the number of shares X has outstanding
so that at the point that X has
age is

.0166.

20 shares outstanding the price dam

Thus over this whole range, the post-diffusion price

damage from relying solely on investors from A is less than the pre

diffusion price damage, starting at a difference of $.05 and ending at
a difference of $.033. The difference in price damage before and
after diffusion remains at

$.033

for any number of X shares out

standing in excess of 20. Thus, whatever the burden of compliance,

there is a smaller range of issuers from B that will find it worthwhile
after diffusion than before.

Proof that if regulation remains unchanged, fell global
diffusion offinancial information will increase the number of A's
issuers that choose to comply with B's disclosure requirements.
B.

If regulations in both B and A remain unchanged after full
global diffusion of financial information, then, for any given
number, Q, of shares that Y, the representative A issuer, will have
outstanding, the per share extra cost of complying with B's stricter
regime, C(Q)/Q, will be unchanged. Before full diffusion, Y will
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comply with B's disclosure requirements if AByo (Q) - Ay0(Q) >
C(Q)/Q, i.e. if the cost of compliance, which permits access to in
vestors in B, is less than the price damage from relying solely on
investors in A. Similarly, after full diffusion, Y will comply if
AByi (Q) - Ay1(Q) > C(Q)/Q. For any given Q, full diffusion in
creases the gain from complying, and hence, at constant cost, the
likelihood that the issuer chooses to do so if [AByo (Q) - Ay0(Q)] [AByi (Q) - Ayi(Q)] < 0. As shown below, this is so for all values of
Q.

Q ::;; (e - d)/f

[AByo (Q) - Ayo (Q)] - [ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q)]
AByo(Q) - ABy1(Q) =
[e - fQ] - [e - Q(gfl(g + f))] =
Qf [(g/(g + f)) - 1] < 0

=

since f > 0 and g > 0 and so [(g/(g + f)) - 1] < 0.
Thus, in this range of Q, global diffusion results in an increase in the
gain from compliance, which increase is a positive function of Q.
Q > (e - d)/f
[AByo(Q) - Ayo(Q)] - [ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q)] =
AByo (Q) - ABy1(Q) =
[(ge + fd)l(j + g) - Q(gfl(j + g))] - [e - Q(gfl(j + g))] =
(ge + fd)l(f + g) - e =
(ge + fd)l(f + g) - e(f + g)l(j + g) =
(fd - fe)!(f + g) < 0
since e > d > 0, f > 0, and g > 0.
Thus, for all values of Q, global diffusion results in an increase
in the gain from compliance. With the burden of compliance con
stant, more A issuers will comply with B's requirements. This can
again be seen in the example depicted in Diagram I-Y, where (e d)lf = 40. First consider the situation if Y has 40 or fewer shares
outstanding. The pre-diffusion price damage from relying on inves
tors from A alone (the difference between Ay0 and ABy0) is 0. The
after-diffusion price damage from relying on investors from A alone
(the difference between Ay1 and ABy1) starts at 0 and increases in
proportion to the number of shares Y has outstanding so that at the
point that Y has 40 shares outstanding the price damage is $.033.
Thus over this whole range, the post-diffusion price damage from
relying solely on investors from A is greater than the pre-diffusion
price damage, growing from a difference of 0 to a difference of
$.033. The difference in price damage befor� and after diffusion
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remains at $.033 for any number of Y shares outstanding in excess
of 40. Thus, whatever the burden of compliance, there is a larger
range of issuers from A that will find it worthwhile after diffusion
than before.
C. For smaller B issuers, the decrease in the gain from
compliance after full global diffusion offinancial information will
exceed the increase in gain for comparable smaller A issuers. For
comparable larger B and A issuers, the respective decrease and
increase will be identical in size. With regulation unchanged,
diffusion's effect, however, on the aggregate number of issuers
registered and trading volume in B is indeterminate.
Full global diffusion of financial information will result in a
larger reduction in the gain from compliance with B's disclosure
regulations by a B issuer with a given Q than an increase in the gain
from such compliance by a comparable A issuer if the "gain change
difference expression" set out below is positive, i.e., if

[(ABx0(Q) - Axo(Q)) - (ABx1(Q) - Axi(Q))] + [(AByo(Q) Ayo(Q)) - (ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q))] =
[(ABxo (Q) - Ax0(Q)) - (ABx1(Q) - Axi(Q)] + [ABy1 (Q) AByo(Q)] > 0.
For 0

<

Q ::;; (e

-

d)/g, the gain change difference expression equals:

(e - d) - g(l - (fl(f + g))Q - f(l - (gl(g + f))Q
This starts positive when Q = 0 since e > d. At Q=(e - d)lg, the
expression then equals

(e - d) - [g(l - (fl(f + g))](e - d)lg - [f(l (gl(g + f))](e - d)I
g=
(e - d) - [(1 - (f/(f + g))](e - d) [f (fl(g + f))](e - d) lg =
(e - d)[l - 1 + (f/(f + g) - (f/g)(fl (f + g))] =
(e - d)(fl(f + g)) (1 - fig) >0
since e > d > 0 and g > f > 0. Thus, over this range of Q, the full
-

-

diffusion's decrease in gain from compliance with B's disclosure
regulations by B issuers exceeds its increase in the gain from com
pliance by A issuers.
For (e d)/g ::;; Q ::;; (e - d)/f, the gain change difference expression
equals:
-

f(e - d)l(f + g) - (f(l - (gl(g + f)))Q =
(fl(f + g))(e - d) - (fl(f + g))fQ =
(fl(f + g))[(e - d) - fQ]
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(e - d)!g, the value
(f!(f + g))[(e - d) - f(e - d)!g]
(f!(f + g))(e - d) (1 - fig)
When Q =

of the expression above is

=

and is thus the same as when Q
preceding paragraph, is positive.
When Q =

(e - d)lf,

< (e - d)!g

and, as shown in the

.
the value of the expression above equals

(fl(f + g))[(e - d) - f(e - d)!fl =
(f!(f + g))[(e - d) - (e - d)] 0
=

Since, over this range of Q, the value of the expression is a linear
declining function of Q that is positive at the beginning point and 0
at the end point, the decrease in gain from compliance with B's
disclosure regulations by B issuers with full diffusion exceeds the
increase in the gain from compliance by A issuers with full diffusion
up until the point that Q reaches (e - d)!f

For Q

>

(e - d)/f, the gain change difference expression equals:

(fe - fd)!(f + g) - (fe - fd)!(f + g) =

0

So, over the rest of the range of Q, the value of the expression is 0,
and thus full diffusion's decrease in gain for B issuers from compli
ance with B's disclosure regulations just equals its increase in the
gain for A issuers from compliance.
We have proved that for smaller B issuers, the decrease in the
gain from compliance after full global diffusion of financial infor
mation will exceed the increase in gain for comparable smaller A
issuers and that for larger issuers there is no difference. However,
with regulation unchanged, full diffusion's impact on the number of
transactions effected in B is still indeterminate since we have made
no assumption about the distribution of issuers by size in each
country. This is true even if the burden of compliance per share
were the same for ·an issuers in A and B and the distribution of
issuers by size were the same for both countries. The B issuers that
complied before diffusion and not after will each have fewer shares
outstanding than the A issuers that did not comply before and do
after. The reduction in the number of B issuers may (or may not)
be greater than the increase in A issuers, but even if it is, it may not
be great enough to make up for the difference in the size of the
issuers.
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D. Demonstration that the sensitivity of issuers to changes in
B's required level of disclosure increases with fell global diffusion
offinancial information.
As will be shown below, the sensitivity of the number of issuers
complying with B's regime to changes in the burden of compliance
is connected to the relationship between Q and the price gain from
compliance.
·

a.

Relationship between Q and the price gain from compliance.

For issuers under the circumstances indicated below and in the
ranges of Q indicated, the price gain from compliance increases
with Q.

Before diffusion, B issuers with Q

gain from compliance.

>

(e - d)/g. Gx0 is the price

Gx0(Q) = ABxo (Q) - Ax0(Q)
= [(fe + gd)!(f + g) - Q(gf/(f + g))] - [d - fQ] Q >(e - d) lg
Q>(e - d)/g
dGxJdQ f [l - (g!(g + f))] > 0
since g > 0 and f > 0 and so (g!(g + f)) < 1
Before diffusion, A issuers with Q > (e - d)/f. Gy0 is the price
=

gain from compliance with B's disclosure requirements.

Gyo(Q) = ABy0(Q) - Ayo(Q)
Q > (e - d)/f
= [(ge + fd)!(g + f) - (fg!(g + f))Q] - [e - fQ]
Q
e
f))
(g!(g
ge
+
fd)!(g
+
f)
]
[( +
ff
f]
Q> (e - d)/f
dGyJdQ = f [1 - (g!(g + f))] > 0
After diffusion, all B issuers. Gx1 is the price gain from compli
=

ance with B's disclosure requirements.

Gx1 (Q) ABx1(Q) - Ax1(Q)
= [(e - (gf/(f + g)) Q] - [e - fQ]
dGxifdQ = f [1 - (g!(g + f))] > 0
=

After diffusion, all A issuers. Gy1 is the price gain from

compliance.

Gy1(Q) ABy1(Q) - Ay1(Q)
= [(e - (gf!(f + g)) Q] - [e - fQ]
dGyi/dQ = j[l - (g!(g + f))] > 0
=

As for the remaining possible cases, the price gain from compli
ance is either inversely related, or unrelated, to Q.

Before diffusion, B issuers with Q :::; (e - d)/g.

Gxo (Q) = ABx0(Q) - Axo (Q)
= [e - gQ] - [d - fQ]

Q :::; (e - d) lg
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dGxJdQ (f - g) < 0
Q ::;; (e - d)lg
since g > f > 0. Gx0, however, is positive throughout this range. At
Q = 0, Gx0 (e - d) > 0. At Q = (e - d)/g
Gxo(Q) = (e - d) - (g - f)[(e - d)!g]
= (e - d)[l - ((g - f)lg)] > 0
since g > f > 0 and (g - f)/g < 1.
Before diffusion, A issuers with Q ::;; (e - d)/f.
Gyo (Q) = AByo(Q) - Ayo (Q)
= (e - fQ) - (e - fQ) = 0
Thus, for Y issuers in this range, there is no price gain from
compliance.
=

=

b. Sensitivity of the extent of compliance to the lowering of the
cost of compliance.
Set C equal to an issuer's extra burden in complying with B's
disclosure regulations and c = C/Q, the extra burden of compliance
on a per share basis. The question that we want to investigate is the
difference between how, before full global diffusion of financial in
formation, a lowering of C affects the range of issuers that would
choose to comply with B's disclosure requirements, and how, ,after
such diffusion, a lowering of C would affect this range. I will as
sume in the text that C is proportional to Q, i.e., that for any given
level of required disclosure, an issuer's c will be constant over the
full range of Q, and conclude that diffusion will increase the sensi
tivity of issuers to a lowering of the burden of compliance. In the
margin, I will show that the propositions necessary to reach this
conclusion hold as well with the assumption that C is constant over
the full range of Q. Since reality is probably somewhere in be
tween, with larger issuers having larger compliance burdens than
smaller ones but not proportionately larger ones, the conclusion
should hold in the real world as well.
Before diffusion, B issuers. Before diffusion, the size of the
price gain to B issuers from complying with B's disclosure regula
tions starts, when Q = 0, at (e - d). It declines to (e - d)(f/(f + g)),
at Q (e - d)/g. From that point on, it increases as Q increases.
Thus, before diffusion, any B issuer that wanted to be publicly
traded would, regardless of its Q, want to comply with B's disclo
sure requirements assuming that c was less than (e - d)(f!(f + g)),
the minimum price gain. Empirically, this would appear to be the
case today with the United States as country B, since essentially all
public U.S. issuers comply with the U.S. requirements, i.e., practi=
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cally none are public bnly abroad. Thus, before diffusion, a lower
ing of compliance burdens (and hence each issuer's c) has no effect
on the number of B issuers complying and hence no effect on the
number of B issuer share transactions effected in B.2os

After diffusion, B issuers. After diffusion, the size of the price

gain to X from complying with B's disclosure requirements is 0 at Q
= 0 and increases linearly with Q. Thus, for any given c that an
issuer may have, there is some minimum Qm at which the price gain
is sufficiently large to make compliance worthwhile. Qm can be de
termined by solving the following equation:

e - [gf/(f + g)]Qm - C = e - fQm
Qm = [(f + g)/fj]c
dQmldc = (f + g)lff > 0
Diffusion, with the burdens of compliance unchanged, will result in
B issuers with Q's less than their Qm's not complying with B's dis
closure requirements. A lowering of the burdens of compliance
lowers c and hence Qm, and will increase the number of B issuers
complying and hence the number of B issuer share transactions ef
fected in B.206

Before diffusion, A issuers. Before diffusion, the size of the

price gain to Y issuers, from complying with B's disclosure regula
tions starts, when Q = 0, at 0. It remains at 0 up to the point where
Q = (e - d)/f, and, from that point on, increases as Q increases.
205. If C were constant, this proposition would be true as long as (i) the value of C/Q at
Q (e - d)/g (the point of minimum per share price gain and the point beyond which the gain
increases while c decreases) is less than that minimum price gain, i.e., (e - d)(f/{f + g)), and
(ii) there are no public issuers with Q's so small that they are less than [{d - e) + ((e - d)2 -4{f
- g)(C))'h]/2{f- g). The second condition involves the level of Q below which c, which equals
C/Q and hence is inversely related to Q, climbs to the point that exceeds the gain. At this
point, the per share price gain equals c, i.e.,
=

(e - d) - (g - f) Q C/Q
(f - g)Q2 + (e - d)Q - C 0
=

=

an equation that can be solved for Q using the quadratic formula. Again, if the assumption
of constant C is correct, these conditions appear to be currently met with the United States as
country B since essentially all public U.S. issuers comply with the U.S. requirements. Effec
tively this is saying that for any U.S. firm so small that its burden of compliance with U.S.
disclosure laws outweighs its price gain from going public at home, it is too unknown abroad
for that to be an alternative.
206. The same is true if, at any given level of disclosure requirements, C remains constant
with changes in Q. Any B issuer with a Q greater than a minimum Qm will find compliance
worthwhile since the per share price gain will start at 0 and be increasing with Q and the per
share cost of compliance will be decreasing with Q. Qm can be determined as follows.
e - fgfl(f + g)]Qm - C/Qm = e - !Qm]

Qm2 [(/ + g)/ffJ C
Qm [(f + g)lff]112C112
dQ,,/dC {1h)[(f + g)!ff]112C112 > O
=

=

=
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c, there is some minimum Qm, greater than Q=

(e - d)lf, at which the price gain is sufficiently large to make compli
ance worthwhile. Qm can be determined by solving the following

equation:

(ge + fd)!(g + f) - lfg!(f + g)] Qm - C = e - fQm]
Qm = (e - d)/f + [(f + g)!fj]c.
dQm!dc = (f + g)/ff
Thus, even before diffusion, a lowering of c lowers Qm and will in
crease the number of A issuers complying with B's disclosure regu
lations and hence the number of A issuer share transactions
effected in B.201

After diffusion, A issuers. After diffusion, the size of the price

Y from complying with B's disclosure requirements is 0 at Q
0 and increases linearly with Q. Thus, for any given c, there is
again some minimum Q = Qm > 0 at which the price gain is suffi
ciently large to make compliance worthwhile. Qm can be deter
mined by solving the following equation:
gain to

=

e - [gf/(f + g)] Qm C = e - fQm
Qm = [(f + g)!ff]c
dQmldc = (f + g)lff > 0
-

Diffusion, with c unchanged, will lower Qm by (e - d)/f. This will
increase the number of A issuers complying with B's disclosure reg

A issuer share transactions ef
A lowering of disclosure requirements and hence of c
would further lower Qm and would further increase the number of
A issuers complying and hence the number of A issuer share trans
ulations and hence the number of

fected in B.

actions effected in B.2os

Aggregate impact of diffusion on sensitivity. Before diffusion,
all publicly traded B issuers will comply with B's more onerous dis207. The same is true if, for an given level of required disclosure, C is constant across Q.
Again there would be a Qm that can be determined as follows.

(ge + fd)/(g + f) - lfg/(f + g)]Qm - C!Qm
Qm (e - d)/f + [(f + g)/fj] (C!Qm)·

=

e - fQm

=

Qm2 [(e - d)/f]Qm + [(f + g)ffj] C 0
Qm2 - [(e - d)!f]Qm - [(f + g)!fj]C 0
=

=

=

Using the quadratic formula,

(1h)[(e - d)!f] + (1h)[((e - d)lf)2 + 4((f + g)!ff)qm
dQddC (1h)(1h)[((e - d)!f)2 + 4((f + g)/ff)q-'h(4)((f+g)/ft)
dQddC [((e - d)lf)2 + 4((f + g)tff)q-'b((f + g)!ff) > 0
208. The same is true if, at any given level of disclosure requirements, C remains constant
with changes in Q. The analysis is the same as where C remains constant after diffusion in
the case of B issuers, see supra note 206.
Qm

=

=

=
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closure requirements (assuming, as would appear to be the case
with the United States as country B, that each B issuer's c < (e
d)(f!(f + g))). Thus Qm for all B issuers is effectively 0. Lowering
the cost of compliance cannot increase the number of B issuers
complying and hence the number of B issuer share transactions ef
fected in B because none are sold and traded exclusively abroad
now. On the other hand, before diffusion, A issuers will have posi
tive Qm's. Only some - those with Q's greater than Qm - will
comply. The rest - those with Q's less than their Qm will not com
ply. Lowering the burden of compliance would lower the Qm for
some issuers to a level below their Q's and thus induce them to
comply. This would increase the number of A issuer share transac
tions effected in B.
-

Diffusion will result in B issuers having positive, rather than 0,
Qm. Thus after diffusion, with no change in the cost of compliance,
many B issuers wishing to be publicly traded - those with Q's
lower than Qm - would choose not to comply. As with A issuers
even before diffusion, lowering the burden compliance would lower
Qm, in some cases to a level below their Q's thereby inducing some
B issuers to comply after all and increasing the number of transac
tions effected in B. Diffusion will result in A issuers continuing to
have a positive, but lower, Qm. With no change in the cost of com
pliance, the number of A issuers complying with B's requirements
will increase. A lowering of the cost will increase the number more.
In aggregate, before diffusion, lowering the burden of compliance
will attract additional members of one group - A issuers - to
comply. After diffusion, a burden lowering will attract additional
members of two groups - A issuers and B issuers - to comply.
The post-diffusion potential for attracting additional B issuers
means that lowering the burden of compliance will have a larger
positive impact on the number of transactions effected in B than
before, since there is no reason to believe that the additional A is
suer share transactions induced by a given cost lowering would be
less after diffusion than before. The marginal impact of the lower
ing on Qm will for A issuers be the same before and after diffusion,
i.e., for A issuers dQmldc equals (f + g)/ffboth before and after dif
fusion. While the A issuers attracted by a post-diffusion lowering
would be smaller, they would probably be more numerous.
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II

PRISONER'S DILEMMA MODEL OF DISCLOSURE
STANDARDS RA.CE TO THE BOTTOM

Imagine two identical countries, A and B.
I.

INITIAL CONDITIONS

Initially no transnational securities transactions are possible.
Each country chooses the level of disclosure that is substantively
optimal, i.e., the marginal social cost just equals the marginal social
benefit in terms of improved allocation of capital and agency cost
ryduction. In each, there is one manufacturing industry, widgets
(W), which produces 100 units (W's) per year and one service indus
try, securities exchange services, which produces 10 units (SE's) per
year. In terms of pricing, lW = lSE. The economy is competitive
and the production functions for W and SE meet the ordinary as
sumptions of concavity and constant returns to scale. The inputs
for producing widgets.are labor (L) and capital (K). The inputs for
producing securities exchange services are labor and brokers (Br).
L, K, and Br and entrepreneurism are supplied locally. Because the
countries are identical, each factor initially earns the same return in
both countries.
II.

TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS BECOME
POSSIBLE:

A

LOWERS ITS LEVEL OF REQUIRED

D1scLOSURE AND

B

DoEs NoT

It is now possible to effect transactions in one country in the
shares of an issuer of the other country and to have shareholders in
one country of an issuer of the other. As demonstrated above,2°9 if
the countries adhere to a mix of investor and market protection, the
lowering by one of its required disclosure level can increase the vol
ume of transactions effected within its borders and the more global
ization proceeds, the greater is this gain in volume. Suppose A
lowers its level, and B does not.
A. Effects in A
1. Reduced efficiency in manufacturing. The lowering of the
required level of disclosure reduces it below what is substantively
optimal. As a result, the manufacturing sector is not as efficient
209.

See supra Part IV.
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and so the same level of input would produce less output. Use as
an example, a decline of 4W. Assume that capital, which is now
supplied globally, earns a global rate of return that is essentially the
same as its expected return in each country before the requirements
were lowered (i.e., it is insignificantly affected by the decline in effi
ciency) so that the impact of the loss in efficiency is absorbed en
tirely by entrepreneurs and labor in A.210
2.

Increased demand for stock exchange services.

Issuers in

B

take steps to facilitate the effecting of transactions in their shares in
A and so demand for A's stock exchange services increases. L is
moved out of widgets and into securities exchange services to in
crease production of these services. Purchasers of this increased

production are residents of B. Use as an example, a movement of
labor sufficient to reduce W by another 9 (so that total W produc
tion = 87.5211 ) and to increase SE by 8 (so that the total SE produc
tion = 18). The greater reduction in W than increase in SE reflects
the fixed supply of

Br

and the declining marginal productivity of

labor in securities exchange services (the SE mppl being initially
equal to the W mppl).
The supply of Br is
fixed and so the increased demand for SE produced in A will raise

3.

Increased price for SE and rents for Br.

the price and raise the return on

Br.

Use as an example a doubling

of the price of SE in terms of W so that one SE is now priced at two
w.
4.

A's welfare increases.

As long as the increased rents are

greater than the loss in efficiency in manufacturing, the lowering of
disclosure requirements has increased A's welfare. In the example,

total production is 87.SW and 18SE. 9SE will be exported in return
for 18W. Thus the suppliers of L,

Br, and entrepreneurship are now

able to consume 105.SW (i.e., 87.SW + 18W) plus 9SE less payments
to capital, compared with 100W plus lOSE less somewhat larger
payments to capital (reflecting the initially somewhat larger widget
industry) before the lowering of requirements. Suppliers of K resi210. To illustrate reasonably simply the problem's game theory aspects, it is being
modeled as a two·country example. With just two countries of equal size, a significant de
cline in the efficiency of the manufacturing sector of one would have a palpable effect on the
returns to the two nation global pool of capital. However, where A represents a much
smaller portion of world GDP, the assumption of insignificant effect would be reasonably
accurate. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
211. The efficiency loss on this somewhat smaller scale of operations would be about 3.5,
not 4.
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dent in A will do as well as before since they have as much to sup
ply and they can sell it globally at the same price as before. There is
a clear welfare gain compared to (J): the increase 5.SW dominates
the decrease of 1SE even priced by the new price ratio and even
ignoring the reduction in payments that now have to be made to the
widget industry suppliers of K.
B. Effects in B
1. Unchanged efficiency in manufacturing. Since B's required
level of disclosure is not reduced, efficiency in its manufacturing
sector stays the same as before. The same level of input would pro
duce the same level of output. Thus entrepreneurs and labor in B
will not suffer any reduction in returns because of a loss of
efficiency.
2. Decreased demand for stock exchange services. Issuers in B
take steps to facilitate the effecting of transactions in their shares in
A and so demand for B's stock exchange services decreases. L is
moved out of securities exchange services and into widgets to in
crease widget production. Purchasers of this increased production
are residents of A who take them in return for the securities ex
change services they are exporting. Use as an example, a move
ment of labor sufficient to increase W by 9 (so that total W
production = 109) and decreases SE by 10 (so that the total SE
production = 0).

3. Elimination of rents for Br. The supply of Br is fixed and
so the disappearance of demand for SE produced in B will elimi
nate any return on Br in B.
4. B's welfare decreases. The elimination of the rents for Br
results in an overall decrease in the welfare of B residents. In the
example, total production is l09W and no SE. 9 SE will be im
ported in return for 18W. Thus the suppliers of L, Br, and entre
preneurship are now able to consume 91 W and 9SE less payments
to capital, compared initially with lOOW and lOSE less somewhat
smaller payments to capital (reflecting the smaller widget industry
in B under the initial conditions) before A lowers its requirements.
Suppliers of K resident in B will do as well as before since they have
just as much capital to supply and they can sell it globally at the
same price as before. There is a clear welfare loss compared to (I):
there is a loss in how much can be consumed of both W and SE

[Vol. 97:696
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even before accounting for the somewhat larger payments that now
have to be made to K suppliers due to the enlarged widget industry.

III. A

AND

B BOTH LOWER THEIR REQUIRED LEVELS OF

DISCLOSURE

A. Effects in A
1. Reduced efficiency in manufacturing. The same as in (II)
4W given the same level of

(i.e., in the example, a reduction of
inputs).

2. Demand for stock exchange services. Like in (I) but unlike
(II), A is not comparatively more attractive than B and so demand
for A's stock exchange services would be essentially the same as in

(I)

(assume a very low income elasticity of demand for SE). Thus

in the widget industry is the same as initially in
total

W production

=

96

and

SE

=

(I).

L

In the example,

10.

3.

Price for SE and rents for Br.

4.

A 's welfare decreases. There is a decrease in welfare not
(II) but also compared to (I). Compared to (I)

Same as in

(I).

only compared to

there is a decrease in efficiency in manufacturing and no increase in

Br. In the example, total production would now be 96W
and lOSE. Exports of SE and hence imports of W will cease. Thus
the suppliers of L, Br, and entrepreneurship are now able to con
sume 96W plus lOSE less somewhat smaller payments to capital.
rents to

Because of the assumption of constant returns to scale, the reduced

payments to capital will be less than the decline in W. Suppliers of
K resident in A will do as well as before since they have as much to
supply and they can sell it globally at the same price as before.
There is thus a clear welfare loss compared to (I): the decrease of
4W dominates the decrease in the payments that now have to be
made to suppliers of

K to

the widget industry.

B.

1.
(III)

Effects in B

Reduced efficiency in manufacturing.

Same as with A in

since B's required level of disclosure is now also reduced.
2.

Demand for stock exchange services.

Compared to

mand for stock exchange services produced in

B

(II), de

has increased.

December
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Like in (I) but unlike in (II), A is not comparatively more attractive
than B and so demand for B's stock exchange services would be
essentially the same as in (I) (assume a very low income elasticity of
demand for SE). Thus L in the widget industry is the same as ini
tially in (I). In the example, total W production = 96 and SE = 10.
3.

Rents for Br. Same as in (I).

4. B's welfare increases compared to (II) and decreases com
pared to (I). There is an increase in welfare compared to (II) but a

decrease compared to (I). Compared to (II) there is a decrease in
efficiency in manufacturing but an increase in rents. In the exam
ple, total production would now be 96W and lOL. Imports of SE
and hence exports of W will cease. Thus the suppliers of L, Br, and
entrepreneurship are now able to consume 96W plus lOSE less
somewhat smaller payments to capital. Suppliers of K resident in B
will do as well as before since they have as much and they can sell it
globally at the same price as before. There is thus a clear welfare
gain compared to (II): there is an increase of 4W and an increase in
SE and a decrease in the payments that now have to be made to K
suppliers to the widget industry. The comparison between (III) and
(I) is the same as for A.
IV.

PRISONER'S DILEMMA FEATURES

If B moved first, the analysis above would be exactly the same,

but with the countries exchanging places. Absent cooperation, one
of them is bound to move because reducing the strictness of its dis
closure system will leave it better off, whatever the other party
does. Thus such a reduction is the dominant strategy for each of
them and a reduced disclosure level for both, despite its inferiority
from a welfare point of view, is the dominant equilibrium.
We can construct a payoff matrix as follows. In the scenario de
scribed above, with A moving first, the welfare positions of A can
be assigned ordinal utilities of 3, 4 and 2 respectively for stages (I),
(II), and (III) . In the scenario with B moving first, the welfare posi
tions of A can be assigned as 3, 1 and 2 respectively for the
equivalent stages: B's ordinal utility rankings in these two scenarios
are just the reverse. In the scenario described above, with A mov
ing first, the welfare positions of B can be assigned ordinal utilities
of 3, 1, and 2 respectively for stages (I), (II), and (III). In the scena
rio with B moving first, the welfare positions of B can be assigned
as 3, 4, and 2 respectively for the equivalent stages.
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PAYOFF MATRIX
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